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and B Hutabarat Foreword 
Agriculture is the largest sector of  the Indonesian economy in terms of  its 
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) and is  a very significant 
employer of labour.  Since the early 1970s, the Indonesian government 
has  had  an  active  approach  to  agricultural  policy,  with  the particular 
objective of stimulating rice output in order to provide a stable base for 
the overall economy.  The major instruments of this agricultural policy 
have been input and output price supports for producers. 
Relatively  little  economic appraisal  of these policies  has  been  con-
ducted, and in  an  attempt to  fill  this  void  research  was  beguIl at the 
University of New England in  1983.  This monograph is a report on the 
research completed in  the following six  years.  The research was  under-
taken as a collaborative project between the University of  New England, 
Armidale, Australia and the Centre tor Agro-Socioeconomic Research, 
Bogor, Indonesia, facilitated by a grant from ACIAR. 
While  the  central  theme  is  agricultural  price  policy,  the  overall 
approach  is  more comprehensive, and  attempts  to  relate  the impacts 
of the various policy instruments to the wider economy.  Hence, while 
particular  chapters  concentrate  on  specific  details  such  as  the 
operation  of fertiliser  subsidies,  the  different  pieces  of analysis  taken 
together present a picture of  the overall effect of  agricultural price policy 
on t11C  Indonesian economy. 
The  contribution  to  this  work  of Drs  Faisal  Kasryno  and  Chairil 
Rasahan is gratefully acknowledged. 
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169 BACKGROUND TO PRICE POLICY 
Background to 
Price Policy 
1.1  Introduction 
The central theme of  this monograph is  Indonesia's economic policy for 
the agricultural sector.  Such policy can  be considered in  terms of the 
three components:  objectives, economic structure and instruments. 
In  Indonesia,  the  policy  maker's  objectives  for  agriculture  are  un-
avoidably  interwoven  with  the  objectives  of overall  national  policy, 
because of  the size of the agricultural sector and because the importance 
of rice  as  the  national  staple  product ensures  that agricultural  policy 
adjustments significantly affect a large proportion of households.  This 
means that, while the usual  methods of analysing agricultural policy in 
microeconomic terms such  as  effIciency  and  equity considerations are 
relevant, a number of  other more macroeconomic targets have appeared. 
These include balance of  trade, employment and inflationary objectives. 
Hence, in  the trade area, a major stated objective of Indonesian food 
policy is to achieve overall food self-sufficiency.  Sclf-sufticiency in rice is 
a major component of this policy.  Until 1980, Indonesia was  a major 
importer of  rice.  She took about 15% of  world imports in 1980 and these 
imports were a considerable foreign exchange burden.  The increase in 
domestic  production  since  then  has  been  sufficient  to  overtake  the 
increase in  domestic consumption.  This expansion has occurred under 
the influence of input subsidies and output price support. 
With more than 50% of  the workforce employed in agriculture, changes 
in  the sector have  considerable impact on the Government's employ-
ment targets.  Of particular importance here is the concern over rural-
urban migration and the perceived need to maintain rural employment 
prospects in order to minimise the extent of urban poverty. 
Turning to macroeconomic price level  objectives, it is  clear that the 
Indonesian Government must consider the impact on inflation when it 
guides agricultural (particularly rice) prices. 
Mter considering  objectives,  the  second  component of economic 
policy is  the structure of the economy, and  the second component of 
policy analysis is modelling this structure.  From the discussion above it is 
clear  that  the  relevant  elements  of the  economic  structure,  even  in 
relation to rice price policy, are the rice production sector, its relation-
ship with the palawija (secondary food crops), employment impacts, the 
rice  consumers, suppliers of inputs, and  How-on effects  to the general 
economy through inflation and trade effects. BACKGROUND TO PRICE POLICY 
It would  be  remiss  not to  outline  the  instruments of agricultural 
policy.  Those which seem to have had the most prominent effect and 
which have been actively pursued are floor and ceiling price policies, of 
which those for rice are most complete in their coverage of  wide areas of 
Indonesia;  input subsidies, notably for fertilisers;  trade policies amount-
ing to import quotas and  levies  and export subsidies;  and  extension 
policy. 
1.2  The Evolution of  Policy Objectives 
Over the last two decades Indonesia has been transformed from a low to 
a middle-rank less developed country.  Annual growth rates ofGDP over 
this period have generally exceeded 5%.  Hence, if economic growth is 
considered the predominant objective, a modicum of success has  been 
achieved.  The Indonesian economy is officially encompassed in a broad 
public philosophy, dictated by the 1945 Constitution, known as Pancasila. 
This defines five  principles:  belief in god, humanitarianism, nationalism, 
democracy and social justice (Liddle 1982, p. 96).  Interpretations of  the 
economics of Pancasila have differed somewhat over the years, although 
the Constitution indicates that the State is expected to oversee the major 
economic  areas,  with  private  enterprise  relegated  to  those  fields  not 
concerned with  the  basic  needs  of the  people.  The State  has  in  fact 
concerned itself with much of the large-scale enterprise of  the emerging 
industrial sector, either directly or through joint ventures, but has  not 
become  so  directly  involved  in  the  agricultural  sector.  Direct State 
involvement is mostly concentrated in ownership of  estate crops and, to a 
lesser extent, through joint ventures in  forestry.  \Vhile a cursory exam-
ination shows that the food-producing sector, which accounts for over 
60% of the output of the agricultural sector, is  almost exclusively in  the 
hands of smallholders, even  here  there are  extensive  indirect controls 
over and above the various price  policy interventions.  Hence, overall, 
the economics of Pancasila seem to be  based on 'a suspicion of market 
forces and a marked sympathy for "guidance" of  the economy' (McCawley 
1982, p. 106). 
This  guidance  of the  economy  has  had  different  manifestations  at 
different times.  Historically rice has been a major concern in Indonesian 
affairs.  While  Dutch colonial policy was  one of minimal  intervention 
(Mears and  Moelyono  1981, p.  23), a  floor  price  was  set for  rice  at 
Javanese mills in 1939 (Pitt 1977, p.  5).  By the time Indonesia achieved 
its independence from Dutch rule (recognised formally in  1949), a basic 
philosophy  of government  interference  in  the  rice  sector  had  been 
established (Timmer 1975, p. 208).  Underpinning this philosophy was 
the view  that ' ...  rice  was  too important to be  left  alone,  and  direct 
intervention in  the market place ... was the proper government response'. 
(Timmer 1981, p.  35).  In  the decade following independence various 
initiatives were taken to expand rice production.  Apart from the need to 
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tCed a rapidly growing population, rice rations \\'ere part of  the payments 
s\'stem for the army and civil servants (the so-called 'budget group'). 
liuid.1nce of the econom\' \\'as  also  manitCst  ,It  the  macroeconomic 
level.  In  the  C1rly  1960s,  the  Sukharno  Go\,ernment  had  ambitious 
public \I'orks projects and, with no other sources, tinanced the resulting 
budget defIcit by expanding the monetary b.1se.  The resulting exp'lIlsion 
of the mone\' supply brought intlation  to Ic\Tls  in  excess of IOOO'};"  in 
196566 (Booth and McCa\\'le\' 19f! I, p.  107). 
\Vhen the !\'ew Order C.;o\Trnment took oHice  in  1966 the eeonOIlW 
was in disarray.  The Government imposed upon itself a strict balanced 
budget discipline and more reasonable IC\TIs  of monetar\' gro\\'th.  Do-
mestic priecs of riec till' both eonSllmers and producers \\'CIT  kept belo\\' 
the trend of world prices and the domcstic markct \\'as  insulatcd  ti'oI11 
international  instability.  Both  gcneral  price  stability  ,md  consumer 
welbre objectivcs were enshrined  in  this  rice-price  policv  (falcon and 
Timmer  1(75).  There  was  also  a  desire  to stimulate  rice  production 
through higher prices to producers, but the budgeting constraint and a 
perceil'ed  need  to  dircct  de\'e1opment  expenditures  to  uther  sectors 
prevented the immediate attainment of this objecti\'e.  In addition, the 
Government \LlIlted to stimubte business inH'stl11ent through m()net~\I'\' 
policy.  It  achiC\ed  this  bv  encouraging  the  Iargel\'  State-controlled 
banking system  to tlnance  business rather th,lIl  government expansion 
through the monev creation process (C.;ret1ville  1981, p.  112). 
Hence, bet\\'een  1966 and  1972 \\'ith economic groll'th ,1S  the prime 
objectivc, the principal components of policv \\TIT  a  balanced budget, 
strict limits on monetary expansion to control inflation, control on rice 
prices as  a significant influence on consumer prices and encouragement 
of private business investment.  Given the extremely unstable domestic 
economic environment of  the early 1960s, it was a commendable achieve-
ment to create an environment in which real GDP grew by 6% per annum 
between  1965 and  1971  (Booth  and  McCawley  1981).  Agriculture 
grew at 3.8% per annum during this period, without the significant price 
incentives that were offered to the food production sector from the mid-
1970s.  However, since the start of  the system of five-year national plans 
(called  Repelitas)  in  1969,  the  food-producing  sector  has  received 
special  attention.  At first  this was  because growth  in  agriculture was 
essential if overall economic growth was to be achieved.  Though still a 
significant sector of the economy, accounting for just over 25% ofGDP 
in  1986 (BPS 1987) alternative employment and self-sufficiency goals 
became predominant after 1972. 
The years  1972 and 1973 saw instability in  international commodity 
markets associated \vith a fourfold increase in crude-oil prices.  Although 
there were gains to Indonesia as an exporter of  oil, some turbulence was 
transmitted  to  the  domestic  economy  and  especially  the 
Indonesian policy-making process. 
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First, foreign  exchange earnings increased and this  led  to domestic 
money  supply  creation.  This  would  probably  have  created  a  larger 
inflationary problem, had the Government not restrained its own fiscal 
activity  by  maintaining a budget surplus.  Another effect of the inter-
national oil price increases was to increase the Indonesian Government's 
revenue  from  taxation  on  oil  companies,  enabling  it  to  increase  its 
development expenditure (especially  in  agriculture)  while  maintaining 
the budget surplus. 
Next, the world  rice  market suffered  severe shortages in  1973 and 
1974.  Despite having the required foreign exchange from  the sales of 
oil,  Indonesia was  unable  to purchase sufficient imports of rice  as  its 
major  supplier,  Thailand,  banned  exports  (Timmer  1986,  p.  5).  A 
significant effect of  this was to stimulate a new drive on the part of  policy 
decision-makers in  Indonesia for domestic food  security and especially 
for  self-sufficiency  in  rice.  The policy  response was  to establish  both 
output price supports in the form of  higher floor prices for rice producers 
and input subsidies across  a number of purchased inputs.  These have 
continued as the main thrusts of  agricultural policy.  One consequence of 
these policies has been the achievement of  self-sufficiency in rice in 1985, 
and the continuation of production at close to self-sufficiency since. 
Events of  the early 19805 combined to alter the set of  policy objectives 
further.  As  a result of falling international prices of oil, the country has 
faced  severe balance of payments problems throughout the decade.  In 
addition, Government expenditure has been constrained as  oil  revenues 
have fallen.  As  a result some development projects have been deferred, 
and overall economic growth has been less than it would otherwise have 
been.  Sundrum (1988, p.  37) estimates the rate of  economic growth at 
2.9%  per annum between 1981 and 1986, compared with an average of 
7.7% from 1967 to 1981. 
Throughout this unstable period, tood security and the attainment of 
self-suHlciency  in  rice  remained  a dominant objective.  Each  year  be-
tween 1977 and 1984 producer support prices for rice were increased in 
real  terms and substantial subsidies for fertiliser were continued.  These 
rice  policies  were  a  considerable  drain  on  the  budget  at  a  time  of 
restricted Government revenue.  It is  clear that the attempt to achieve 
rice self-suffIciency was being given priority. 
In  the years  following  1985, when  rice  output first  exceeded con-
sumption,  there  has  been  continuing questioning  about  the  level  of 
support given to rice producers.  Apart from the problem of  finding the 
required level  of t1nance  to support the policy, there was  concern that 
agricultural resources were being drawn away from the production of  the 
palawiJa,  or secondary  food  crops.  The  policy  stance  towards  the 
palawiJa  was  one of neglect  in  comparison  to  the  enormous  efforrs 
devoted to rice.  However, following the attainment of  self-sufficiency in 
rice, there have been reductions in real producer prices of  rice and in the 
level  of fertiliser subsidies.  One effect has been to encourage palawija 
4 production  (EIU,  1989)  while  rice  output  has  continued  to  grow. 
Another  is  that  Government  expenditure,  particularly  on  fertiliser 
subsidies, is expected to fall  considerably. 
Currently, there are several sub-strands to the Government's groWtll 
policy.  There are continuing attempts to reduce dependence on oil both 
as  :1. foreign exchange earner and as a contributor to the budget.  This has 
achieved  partial  success  as  exports of commodities  like  manufactured 
timber products have  expanded.  However, oil  remains  the dominant 
export product.  Second, the Government has been encouraging foreign 
investment, and Schwarz (1989, p.  74) argues that the flow  of funds 
from abroad, particularly into investments in the manufacturing sector, 
has 'helped rescue GDP growth from  mid-decade stagnation'. 
Such efforts have partly directed attention away from the food produc-
tion sector.  However, with consumption of rice growing as the popula-
tion and income levels increase, the self-sufficiency must be regarded as 
fragile.  The policy stance is one of  attempting to keep output expanding 
while keeping Government expenditure on food  policy  programs to a 
minimum.  This is  a fairly  diftlcult path to follow given  tile size of the 
food  producing sector.  In addition, despite signitlcant recent employ-
ment growth in  the manufacturing sector, the Government must ensure 
that farm incomes are kept high enough for agriculture to absorb labour. 
1.3  The Structure of the Economy 
Although its share ofGDP has fallen, agriculture (including forestry and 
fishing)  is  still  the  largest  sector (see  Table  2.1).  Also,  since  1980, 
agriculture'S share has declined more slowly as the output of food crops 
has expanded following price policy stimuli, technological change, and 
the relative decline in the value of  oil exports.  The main food crops (rice, 
maize,  cassava,  soybean,  groundnut,  and  sweet  potato)  continue  to 
provide  more  tlun  60%  of agricultural  output.  Food  production  is 
characterised by  small  farm  holdings (most are less  than 0.3 ha), which 
occupy more than 80% of the agricultural land (Kasryno, Budianto and 
Birowo,1982).  With more than 75% of the population located in rural 
areas  (Birowo and Sanusi, 1982), agriculture is  also a major source of 
employment (see Table 2.6).  On the consumption side, about 63%  of 
consumer expenditure is devoted to food (BPS, 1987b). 
Mining is  the second-largest sector in  the Indonesian economy (see 
Table 2.1).  Here the predominant position of oil  as  an  export earner 
means  that events  in  the international oil  market have  been  the  main 
determinant of  the fortunes of  the sector as a whole.  The years 1974 and 
1979, in which oil prices reached their highest levels, were peak years for 
mining's share of GDP. 
The manufacturing sector, dominated by  State enterprises, has  been 
developed largely to produce substitutes for imports.  Its share of GDP 
grew from 8.4% in  1969 to just over 13.0% in  1980, and to about 14.4% 
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in  1986.  Hence the period since 1980 has been one of  slower growth for 
the sector as  the economy as  a  whole  has  passed  through  a  sluggish 
phase. 
The  linkages  between  these  sectors  must  be  considered  in  a  full 
appraisal of food price policy - witness the current dilemma facing the 
Indonesian Government about whether or not to continue to maintain 
high levels of support for food  production.  Such levels of support for 
agriculture would imply lower development expenditure by government 
and hence lower growth in  the other sectors of  the economy.  However, 
there would also  be  some beneficial effects of such  a  policy  tor these 
other sectors.  For instance, there would be price eHixts from changes in 
fertiliser subsidies that would be expected to flow on to fertiliser manu-
t~lcturers and  importers (Hedley  and Tabor 1989).  Apart  fi-om  such 
price effects, a stable producer price regime in  agriculture tends to keep 
resources in the sector and, with productivity improving, would result in 
increasing output.  This  has  the impact of increasing output in  other 
sectors of the economy both to service  agriculture and to absorb the 
extra demand generated by the sector.  In addition, given the size of  the 
agricultural sector, a gradually increasing output provides a stable base 
for  the  whole  economy.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  promotion  of 
confidence overall which would be expected  to result in,  for  example, 
increased investment in, and hence a larger output fj-om, the manufactur-
ing sector. 
lA  Policy Instruments 
A series of intensification programs was the type of  policy instrument 
initially adopted to promote rood production.  The BIMAS program was 
introduced in  1963.  Others tollowing it were the BIMAS GOTONG 
ROYANG,  INMAS,  INSUS  and  SUPRA-fNSUS.  The  BIMAS  pro-
grams  were  designed  to  increase  production  through  the  use  of im-
proved seeds,  fertilisers,  pesticides, water management, improved cul-
tural practices and the development of  farmer cooperatives.  The parallel 
scheme, INMAS, aided farmers with capital (or access to it) and a keen 
desire to use modern inputs.  In the case of  the INSUS scheme, about 50 
to 100 f:lrmers  with  contiguous plots were encouraged to make  joint 
decisions about seeds, planting times, and crop choices in  addition to 
nce. 
The Government also  realised  that adequate price incentives would 
help encourage farmers to adopt new technologies.  The first stage in the 
development of price  incentives was  the announcement of the  nt11'J14S 
tani (Farmer's Formula) in  1968, which linked the price of rice to the 
price  of import urea  fertiliser  (Arndt  1968,  pp.  11- 12).  While  this 
marked  the  introduction  of a  price  policy  it  was  not  effective  until 
fertiliser distribution was also improved (Mears 1981, p.  390).  Follow-
ing the  1972 rice  crisis,  the introduction of the cooperatives (KUDs) 
6 gave BULOG (the Government procurement agency)  the opportunity 
to implement the pricing formula at the farm level.  There were problems 
of  interpretation and implementation (Afiff and Timmer 1971; Timmer 
1975), but a rice price policy based on a Mears and Afiff model (Mears 
1981, p.  391) was  gradually put in  place,  became fully  operational by 
1974, and continues through to the present time. 
The main price-policy instruments used for rice are floor prices, which 
are  used to maintain a minimum market price for  rice  delivered to the 
KUDs;  varioLls  input subsidies;  ceiling prices, which limit the amount 
that consumers must pay  to purchase rice;  and storage-cost subsidies. 
The introduction of implicit export subsidies on rice  in  1985 added a 
new policy instrument to the list.  While there is  a floor price policy for 
maize,  BULOG  intervention  in  the  maize  market  is  relatively  slight 
compared with the rice  market.  This is, in  part, because of the greater 
political  importance of rice  and  the  fact  that  marketing channels  for 
maize are less  clearly defined.  Control over imports and exports is  the 
principal means by which the Government influences the maize market. 
BULOG is the sole importer of  wheat but does issue processing contracts 
to the private sector. 
In  summary, the  Indonesian  Government uses  a  mixture  of price-
policy  instruments to influence  grain  production and  marketing,  and 
BULOG is  the key  implementer of these policy decisions.  In  addition, 
the Government devotes considerable resources to the development and 
dissemination of improved technologies.  Some policy instruments can 
be viewed  as  supply shifters  (e.g.  fertiliser subsidies and technological 
innovations),  while  others  encourage  output expansion  along  supply 
functions (e.g. producer price supports). 
1.5  Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to provide an economic evaluation 
of the output and input price  policies that have  been implemented in 
Indonesia to expand rice  production.  Central to that evaluation is  the 
identification of  the effects of rice price policies.  Examples of the issues 
to be addressed include: (a)  the efficiency costs of  current policy relative 
to a zero-intervention situation; (b)  the effects on rice  and secondary 
food crop production and consumption of marginal changes to existing 
policy; and (c)  whether the current policy mix in  terms of output price 
support and input subsidies is appropriate given the financial constraints 
facing the Government. 
While policy evaluation is  the main objective, there are a number of 
subsidiary objectives.  These include reviewing the current status of rice 
and secondary food  crop production and  consumption, reviewing the 
considerable literature that exists on Indonesian price policy in  relation 
to  important  food  crops,  and  providing  a  description  of the  rather 
unique  food  policy-making  process  in  Indonesia.  The  fulfilment  of 
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these subsidiary objectives should be of considerable  benefit to other 
researchers. 
The final subsidiary objective is to outline a model which can be used 
for  future  food policy experimentation in  Indonesia.  The aim  was  to 
develop a  model which was realistic in the sense of  capturing important 
influences at work, yet simple enough to be used to address policy issues 
at short notice without the need for large-scale data collection. 
1.6  Overview of  Remaining Chapters 
The next three chapters are  basically survey chapters dealing,  respect-
ively,  with  (a)  the  economy, emphasising  the status and  role  of the 
agricultural sector; (b)  the cash  crops, livestock, forestry  and fisheries 
sub-sectors; and (c)  the rice  and secondary food  crops sector.  These 
chapters draw on a wide range of  reference sources and assist in planning 
the subsequent policy  analysis  in  general  perspective.  Chapter 5  is  a 
review chapter dealing with recent modelling of Indonesian price policy. 
The methodology for  the policy  evaluation  conducted  in  the present 
report is  described in  Chapter 6 and the policy evaluation is  reported in 
Chapter 7.  Finally, Chapter 8 serves an a summary and contains some 
recommendations for change. 
The body of the report is  supported  by  an  appendix  presenting an 
approach to price policy appraisal using equilibrium displacement model-
ling.  This is a method of  using Marshallian elasticity information across a 
number of  commodities, independently of  functional form, to reveal the 
qualitative impacts of  price policy changes.  Matrix manipulation is used 
to show the total eft-ect of  a policy change in terllls of  general equilibrium 
elasticities.  Thus it is  an approximate method of performing the policy 
analysis  of Chapters 6  and 7.  The method should be  useful  to those 
interested in price policy analysis in Illulti-commodity contexts similar to 
that found in  Indonesia. 
The  researchers  prepared  substantial  additional  written  material  in 
support of the report, originally  with  the intention of including it  as 
appendixes.  This material, which is available from ACIAR in the form of 
three photocopied papers, should be  useful for those undertaking food 
policy analysis in Indonesia for the first time.  The first two papers, which 
are  comprehensive  reviews  of the  rice  and  the  secondal1'  food  crop 
sectors  respectively,  contain  substantially more detail  than  the report. 
The third is a review of  the policy-making process for rice and secondary 
food crops. 
8 Overview of the 
Indonesian Economy 
with Particular 
Reference to the 
Agricultural Sector 
2.1  Introduction 
Following  World  War  Il  the  economy of Indonesia  was  beset  with 
problems of  revolution, rebellion and armed confrontation.  It was some 
20 years before the Soeharto 'New Order' Government in 1966 began to 
provide stability as  a basis  for development.  Subsequent rapid growth 
during the 1970s was largely concentrated in the natural resource indus-
tries,  especially  petroleum  which  experienced  :arge  price  rises  during 
1972-74 and 1979, but also timber and mining.  Substantial gains were 
made in rice production, but continuous progress was  marred by crises 
with drought and insect pests.  In addition, the exploitation of  oil wealth 
was  not without problems.  Some of the early  profits were  needed to 
repay short-term debts of the State oil company, Pertamina, while infla-
tion, fed  by the oil-led export boom, averaged 19% per annum between 
1973 and 1978.  In  the latter year a large devaluation was undertaken, 
ostensibly to improve the position of the non-oil traded goods sector, 
whose profitability had been eroded by the boom through an appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate (the so-called'  Dutch disease'). 
At  the  beginning of the  1980s  the  Indonesian  economy was  still 
benefiting from the second oil shock, and was further buoyed by record 
rice  harvests  in  1980 and  1981.  However, drought in  1982 reduced 
harvest  levels,  while  a  weakening oil  market also  exerted  a  depressive 
influence.  Continuing oil price declines brought 1985 oil production to 
a  ten-year low,  and  the  accelerated  oil  price  decline of 1986 seemed 
initially as  if it would bring economic growth to a standstill.  Although 
1984  and 1985 rice  production reached record levels and the desired 
aim of self-sufficiency was  achieved, deteriorating balance of payments 
figures contributed to two more devaluations in  1983 and 1986.  The 
seriousness  of the  oil  price  decline  in  1986  led  to significant  policy 
changes which attempted to deregulate and restructure the economy.  A 
partial downgrading of price incentives in  1986 resulted in a slowdown 
in the agricultural sector, exacerbated by a drought in  1987.  Since then 
higher oil prices and growth in non-oil exports have contributed to an 
alleviation of the current account deficit, and to a significant revival of 
economic growth.  Two good rice harvests in 1988 and 1989 have also 
contributed to the latter. 
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It is against this background that the present survey reviews the major 
changes in economic structure, performance and policy which have taken 
place over the period 1966-89.  Particular attention is  given to the role 
of  agriculture in the later years of the period. 
2.2  The Role of Government 
In characterising certain countries of the region, Myint (1984) classifIed 
Indonesia  in  the mid-1960s as  among the 'inward-looking countries'. 
These countries pursued protectionist  import-substitution policies in-
tended to insulate their domestic economies from international market 
forces.  Although the advent of  the Soeharto Government brought some 
weakening of inward-looking policies, especially in  the form of encour-
agement of  private foreign  investment, it was  not until  1983 that the 
Government reappraised its previous development strategy.  The difficul-
ties which prevented earlier policy change are numerous, but the major 
obstacles stemmed from  the tradition of bureaucratic control and dis-
trust of free market forces, both legacies of the Dutch colonial era. 
The  Indonesian  economy  is  oHicially  viewed  in  terms  of a  broad 
philosophy, dictated by the 1945 Constitution and known as  Pancasila. 
This philosophy defines a number of  goals - 'belief in God, humanitari-
anism, nationalism, democracy and social justice' (Liddle 1982, p. 96). 
The  Constitution  indicates  that the State  is  expected  to  oversee  the 
major economic areas, with private enterprise relegated to the remaining 
fields.  The  State  has  concerned  itself with  much  of the  large-scale 
enterprise of  the industrial sector, directly or through joint ventures, but 
is less involved in agriculture.  Foodcrops, which account for over 60% of 
the value of  output of  the agricultural sector, are almost exclusively in the 
hands of smallholders, as  is  tl1e  livestock sector.  State involvement is 
mostly concentrated in  estate crops and, to a lesser extent, in  forestry. 
Excessive government regulation during the colonial era probably made 
it  inevitable  that successive  Indonesian  administrations  would  tallow 
suit.  The  1945  Constitution  imposed  a  need  to  organise  economic 
affairs as  a 'joint efiort based on family principle' (Rice 1983, p.  61) or, 
broadly speaking, a consensus.  To achieve its aims the Soeharto Govern-
ment  uses  both  formal  and  informal  methods  of economic  control. 
Formal control is  set fortl1  in a series of five-year plans,  in  addition to 
tlscal and monetary policies.  The informal category is exemplified by the 
use  of widespread  bureaucratic  controls  and  State-run  enterprises,  in 
addition to legal sanctions.  It was  to both areas  of control  that the 
Government  turned in  a post-1983 attempt to deregulate and restruc-
ture a slowing economy. 
Formal control  has been implemented since 1969 with a series offive-
year  plans  (called  Repelita).  It  is  'broad  brush  indicative  planning' 
(Booth  and  McCawley  1981a, p.  14)  applying  to  public  and  private 
sectors, although tl1e latter freely chooses how to achieve targets.  Subtle 
10 pressure  is  brought to  bear  in  certain  sectors  (e.g.  rice  farming)  to 
achieve  production  targets  in  a  specitied  manner (e.g.  high-yielding 
varieties  in  intensitication  schemes).  Repelita  I  (1969- 74)  aimed  at 
stabilisation and a growth rate of  around 4.7% per annum.  The agricul-
tural emphasis was on rice production, which f:liled to achieve the target, 
although other sectors reached targeted levels.  Repelita  II  (1974-79) 
added equity to development aims and GDP growth was set at 7.5% per 
annum.  In (Kt, it was slightly higher, following the unexpected oil price 
rise.  Food self-suHiciency  became the agricultural  goal.  Repelita  III 
(1979-84) emphasised equitable income distribution and access to health 
and education.  GDP  growth was set at 6.5%  annually, and 5.7% was 
achieved.  Repelita  IV  (1984- 89) was  planned  at a  time of lower oil 
prices.  The GDP growth rate of 5%  per annum seemed unattainable in 
1986.  However, a  good pertormance in  the  tinal  years  indicates  the 
growth target has been Inet.  Repelita V (1989-94) is  the current plan 
and the target GDP growth rate is  also  5%  per annum, with  3.6%  per 
annum set for agriculture.  Employment creation and reduction in  the 
debt service ratio are prime plan objectives. 
2.3  National Output and Structural Change 
Economic growth  in the early 1960s was slow, and it was not until after 
1966  that  considerable  real  growth  become  evident  and  significant 
sectoral  change  took  place.  Tables  2.1  and  2.2  show  the  sectoral 
breakdown of GDP at current and constant prices, and Table 2.3 indi-
cates  average  annual  growth  rates  for  the  various  sectors  during 
1984- 89.  In  1983 a  new series of constant prices  replaced  the 1973 
series which had become distorted because of heavy weighting attaching 
to the oil sector.  Subsequently, the 1986 Economic Census showed a 
larger number of enterprises in  the large and medium industry category, 
and the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP was revised in  1989 
and 'back-cast' to 1983 (Mackie and Sjahrir 1989). 
The agricultural share of GDP was  more than halved  between  1960 
and 1989 (Table 2.1).  In 1960 agriculture accounted for  over 50%  of 
GDP and  by  1970 still  accounted for  48%.  By  1989 the agricultural 
share had  fallen  to 23%  of GDP.  (The revised  constant price  data in 
Table  2.2  indicate  agriculture's  share  falling  ti·om  22.8%  in  1983  to 
20.6% in 1989.) WaIT (1986) points out that, by international standards, 
the decline in  agriculture's contribution to GDr> during the 1970s was 
quite high, occurred over a  relatively  short period, and  despite  heavy 
public investment and price support.  While the share of agriculture in 
GDP has  been declining, the share of mining (predominantly oil) rose 
from  nearly 4% in  1960 to over 25% in  1980, before fllling to 13%  in 
1989.  (The revised data show the constant price share of  mining in GDP 
has  t ~ lllen from  20.7% in  1983 to 15.6% in  1989.)  The output share of 
manufacturing has been edging upwards from an 8.4% share ofGDP in 
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1960 to 18.4% in 1989.  Its share rose from 12.7% in 1983 to 18.5%  for 
1989, in the revised constant price series.  At this rate of  growth Mackie 
and Sjahrir (1989) suggest that manufacturing in  constant price terms 
will soon exceed agriculture as  the major component of GDP. 
Table 2.3 indicates the recent growth performance of  the major GDP 
sectors at 1983 constant prices, using the 'revised' series.  Agricultural 
sector  growth  during  the  five-year  period  1984-89 averaged  around 
3.5%  per annum.  This compares with  around  4.2%  annually  during 
1978-83 (1973 constant prices).  Sundrum (1986) calculates that agri-
culture grew at 3.5% annually during 1973-81 (1973 constant prices), 
while GDP grew at 7.5%, and that agriculture contributed 1.2 percent-
age points to the overall rapid growth of that period.  In contrast, there 
was  a sharp decline in growth in  the first  half of the 1980s.  Sundrum 
(1988)  estimates  that  GDP growth  during  1982- 86  (1973  constant 
prices) was 4.01  % per annum, while agriculture for the same period grew 
at 3.16%.  He argues that the agricultural sector contributed only 0.3 
percentage points to the decline in  the overall  growth rate, while  five 
other major sectors accounted for four-fifths of the decline. 
Following deregulation and restructuring, the rate of  economic growth 
has improved.  Table 2.3 indicates the growth of  the component parts of 
the agricultural sector between  1984-89 (revised constant price series). 
Estate crops grew at around 6% per annum, non-food crops and fisheries 
at 5%  per annum, while  livestock just exceeded  the 4%  average.  The 
foodcrops figure  of around 2.8% per annum resulted from a number of 
factors  including  the  rice  surplus  of 1985,  policy  changes,  reduced 
incentives  and  drought.  The  poor  results  of the  forestry  sub-sector 
followed a policy decision on the banning of log exports in 1980.  The 
overall GDP growth rate during 1984- 89 of 5.2% per annum exceeded 
initial expectations and, with a combination of favourable  factors  con-
tinuing, a real  growth rate of over 7%  for 1989 is  also  anticipated for 
1990. 
Changes in expenditure on GDP are indicated in Table 2.4 in constant 
prices.  The 1965 data show the high percentage of  household consump-
tion expenditure as  hyperinflation took its  toll.  Capital formation im-
proved during the 1970s, slowed again during the mid-1980s, but rising 
rates are evident during the latter part of the decade, with growth in the 
private sector share.  Pangestu and Habir (1990) indicate  that non-oil 
exports have been the main source of expenditure growth. 
The  decline  in  the  agricultural  share  of GDP  evident  particularly 
during the 1970s (Table 2.1) comprises elements of  physical output and 
variation in price.  To consider both aspects Table 2.5 sets out implicit 
price  indexes  for  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  sectors.  The 
results show prices in  the former changing at a slower rate  relative  to 
prices in the latter.  The ratio of  the agricultural implicit price deflator to 
the non-agricultural implicit price deflator (Table 2.5, Col. 3) indicates 
the deteriorating position of  the agricultural sector as the 'Dutch disease' 
12 took  effect.  However,  WaiT  (1986)  argues  that  the  constant  price 
decline was concentrated, loosely speaking, in  those agricultural indus-
tries  in  which  prices were  not Government controlled, and  where the 
effects of the oil  boom could be expected to occur more freely.  The 
change to a  1983 constant price series shows that,  by  the mid-1980s, 
prices  in  the  non-agricultural  sector  were  changing  at  a  slower  rate 
relative to prices in  the agricultural sector, except tor 1988. 
2.4  Population, Workforce and Income Distribution 
2.4.1  Population 
Mter China, India, the USSR and the  USA,  Indonesia has  the largest 
population in the world.  A growth rate of  some 2.32% during the 1970s 
resulted in a 1980 Census figure of148 million.  An emphasis on family 
planning and declining crude birth rates reduced the growth rate to 2.1 % 
per annum over the period 1980-85 despite increasing life  expectancy, 
and it is hoped this will fall  to 1.8% per annum by 1993-94.  Repelita V 
estimates the 1988 population figure at 175.6 million, growing to 192.9 
million by 1993 (Booth 1989). 
The population is spread very unevenly throughout the country.  Java, 
with 7% of land area has 60% of population, a density of 755 people to 
the square kilometre (BPS 1988).  The relative under-population of the 
outer islands  has  led  to oftlcial  transmigration schemes,  but numbers 
declined after the oil-related  fall  in  Government revenue.  Repelita V 
projects some 550 000 households will  be  moved, of which only about 
one-third will  receive Government assistance (Booth 1989).  A second 
facet of  the population profile is the age structure.  In 1985 some 39% of 
the population was under 15 years of age.  Projections to 2005 indicate 
that the proportion of  the population under 15 will have fallen to around 
29%, and the 0-14 age group will grow at only a modest rate.  The 1980 
Census  figures  provided  a  breakdown  of population  by  rural/urban 
definition and classified 22.4% in the latter category.  To avoid increased 
urbanisation and its concomitant problems, J  ones (1984) advocated that 
strategies be developed to move the rural economy's centre of  gravity to 
higher-productivity activities without moving the workers to cities. 
2.4.2  Workforce 
The present age structure of  the population and the resultant increase in 
the labour force  anticipated during Repelita V  (some  12  million)  has 
been foreseen  as  one of the major problems of the plan period (Booth 
1989).  Part of the labour force growth rate is  the result of an increased 
participation rate, including a higher female  rate.  At the beginning of 
the 1960s agriculture accounted for over 70% of the workforce and by 
1971 the proportion was still some 65% (Table 2.6).  However, by 1980, 
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agriculture's share had bllen to 56%, and declined to 54.7% in 1985.  By 
the  cnd  of Repelita  V  it  is  hoped  the  proportion  of the  workforce 
accounted for Lw  the agricultural sector will have fallen to just over half. 
Table 2.6 indicates that during the 1970s the growth rate of  agricul-
tural employment of 1  'Yc,  per annum was lower th,ln  that f()r  any of the 
other  major sectors  (Scherer  1982).  Mining  and  quarrying  had  the 
largest annual increase at 16.5%, followed  by  tinance at 10.1 'Yc,.  Trade, 
transport, construction and ser\'ices all  averaged bet\\'een 5 and 9%  and 
manut:1eturing 4.1%.  I Io\\,ever, since all  except agriculture were operat-
ing  ft"om  ,1  low  base,  even  a  low gro\\'th rate  f()r  agriculture meant it 
absorbed onc-fifth of the increased proportion of  the workt()rce.  As  the 
economv slowed significantl\'  during  1980-85, the  rate  of gro\\'th of 
agricultural employment increased, while other sectors declined except 
trade,  tr,lIlsport  and  manuflCturing.  The  data  in  Table  2.6 sho\\'  .1 
negati\'e  growth  rate  t()r  utilities  which  seClllS  unlikely,  probably  the 
result of  some ddinitional discrep'lI1c~ ' .  All  other sectoral data in  Table 
2.6 arc consistent with the economic decline 1980- 85 as reduced budget 
expenditure  cut  civil  service  recruitment,  mining  sector  growth  fell 
sharply, and construction reflected a How-on effect tt'om the oil-induced 
slowdowll.  The bendits tt'om the 1983 dC\'aluation, together with some 
impro\'ement in commodity prices and a slight recovery in  \\'orld trade, 
prohably  account  for  part of the  stronger growth  in  emplovment of 
trade, transport and manuflcturing,  The strong growth of agriculture 
during 1980-85 and the large rice  harvests of 1984 and  1985 indicate 
how it was  possible  t()r  this sector to account f()r  over half of the total 
increase in  emplovment during that period. 
During Repelita V agricultural employment is expected to grow at 2% 
per annum, and absorb about 4 million of  the 11.5 million extra workforce 
(Booth  1989).  The  agricultural  share  of the  increased  workforce  is 
expected to decline ti"om  50 to some 35%  for  1988-93.  Non-agricul-
tural employment is anticipated to grow at 4.1 % annually, with industry 
accounting for the bulk of the increase (6.7% per annum), while trade, 
construction  and  transport  average  between  4  and  4.5%  per annum. 
Industry and trade are expected to absorb most of the non-agricultural 
workforce  increase,  taking  2.3  and  2.6  million,  respectively.  Booth 
(1989) indicates that agricultural employment growth is expected to be 
concentrated in cash crops, livestock and fisheries.  The lack of  employ-
ment growth expected in  foodcrops appears to be  part of a  long-run 
trend.  For 1961-80 Jones  (1984)  reports  a  162%  increase  in  non-
agricultural employment in rural areas, with only a 10% increase in direct 
agricultural employment.  There was  a  diversification  from  traditional 
dependence  on  direct agricultural  work  to  rural  industries  related  to 
commodity processing, including a switch from large to medium-scale 
rice  milling, cottage industry, food processing, leather goods, weaving 
and batik.  An expectation that high-yielding rice varieties might increase 
employment has not been realised.  It appears that triple harvesting (now 
14 discouraged  because of disease  problems)  resulted  in  peaks  of labour 
demand becoming sharper and closer together.  Mazumdar and Sawit 
(1986)  concluded  that labour demand  in  agriculture  may  have  been 
confined to the prosperous fertile lowland areas, while in poorer upland 
villages  there  remains  an  increasing  demand  for  non-agricultural 
employment. 
2.4.3  Distribution of  income 
Data on income distribution are not directly available and researchers are 
restricted  to  'making  do'  with  approximate  indicators.  A  series  of 
household consumption surveys  (SUSENAS) are  not directly compar-
able over time, although they show consumption patterns for regions by 
different expenditure groups.  Using SUSENAS data Booth and Sundrum 
(1981) document an  increase  in  per capita expenditure inequalities in 
urban  Java  between  1964-65  and  1976,  and  a  decline  in  equalities 
elsewhere.  However, between 1970 and 1976, while inequalities contin-
ued to increase in urban Java, they fell  in rural Java and remained almost 
constant elsewhere.  These  changes  in  per capita  expenditure  reflect 
changes in  the economy during the 1970s.  Garnaut (1980) argues that 
the  effects  of the  resources  boom  were  concentrated  in  the  modern 
(urban) sector, but had only small net effects on the traditional (mainly 
rural)  sector.  The  income  (and  numbers)  employed  in  the  modern 
sector increased, while there was little improvement in traditional sector 
living standards.  Booth and Sundrum (1981, p. 202) conclude that the 
benefits of the boom 'disproportionately accrued to a small segment of 
the urban  population, who were most advantageously placed  to begin 
with because of  their access to Government jobs and their higher levels of 
education'.  One of  the ways in which agriculture benefited was through 
the fertiliser and oil subsidies and the price support scheme for  rice, all 
budget financed.  Kasryno (1981) argues that most of  the benefits of  the 
BIMAS rice program accrued to the land-owning class, while until 1979 
the  level  of real  agricultural  wages  was  almost static  (Kasryno  1985). 
However, Warr (1986) indicates BPS data show real rural wages increas-
ing in  three of the four regions ofJava during 1976-82. 
During 1979-81 Kasryno (1985) noted an  upward trend in  agricul-
tural wages as  a result of higher labour productivity in the non-agricul-
tural sector.  Village level studies by Collier et a!.  (1982) also support the 
proposition that real agricultural wages increased after 1978.  However, 
the oil-induced downturn in growth resulted in  a reversal of the earlier 
trend.  J  ayasuriya  and  Manning (1988)  suggest that real  wages  have 
fallen  recently in  the rice  sector of Central and  East Java  as  well  as  in 
urban  construction, although estate  sector real  wages  may  have  risen 
slightly.  The downward pressure on real wage rates resulting from  the 
1983 and 1986 devaluations and Government fiscal  policy have contrib-
uted to maintaining Indonesia's competitive edge.  This, in  turn, has 
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contributed to non-oil  export growth and  the  recent higher levels  of 
economic activity.  Nevertheless, there is  a cost in  terms of stagnating 
real wages, under-employment and unemployment, now involving edu-
cated job seekers.  According to a recent Presidential speech, between 
1980 and  1987  there  was  a  slight  fall  in  the  share  of total  income 
accruing to the top 20%  of the population and a slight increase in  that 
accruing to the poorest 40%.  This appears to indicate no major deterio-
ration in income distribution over the period (Mackie and Sjahrir 1989). 
2.5  The Manufacturing Sector 
The Indonesian manufacturing sector of the 1960s was  hardly different 
from that of the 1930s, but during the 1970s there was a rapid rate of 
growth of  real output as well as an increase in product type and establish-
ment (Dapice  1980).  The  manufacturing share  of GDP in  constant 
prices rose from 11% in  1975 to 15% in 1983 (Table 2.2).  Despite the 
slower economic growth of the  mid-1980s  manufacturing performed 
better than expected.  Mter the 1986 Economic Census the constant 
price  manufacturing share  of GDP increased  from  12.7%  in  1983 to 
18.5% in  1989.  The 1983 constant price  figures show manufacturing 
growing at around 10.4% per annum for 1984-89 (Table 2.3). Together 
with significant changes in  trade policy, modification of industrial policy 
has brought about a revision of  the previous highly-protectionist attitude 
to industrial development, re-oriented a former inward-looking domes-
tic  market stance towards a  more export-led  strategy, and tempered a 
long-standing  attitude of extensive  Government  intervention  in,  and 
regulation of, the sector. 
Industrial census data for 1974- 75 show some striking facts noted by 
McCawley (1981).  These were:  (a) the concentration of  production on 
Java;  (b)  the  narrow  base  of industry  and  its  dependence  on  the 
agricultural sector;  and (c) the engagement of  80% of  the manufacturing 
workforce in  cottage industry, predominantly in  rural areas.  Across the 
provinces the same two or three agricultural-based industries dominated. 
Oil revenues in the 1970s allowed rapid industrialisation, and there  was 
more diversification  as  intermediate and capital  goods industries were 
introduced.  The Government moved into large-scale industry and in-
vested in fertiliser, cement, paper, iron, steel and oil refineries.  From the 
mid-1970s to around 1980 McCawley (1984) suggests that the medium 
and large-scale sector grew at around 15%  annually, while  Hill  (1984) 
notes that the consumer goods share of manufacturing output almost 
halved between 1971 and 1982.  However, Warr (1986) thinks it likely 
that the petroleum boom held back the rapid growth of manufacturing. 
The decade of the 1970s  widened the industrial sector and, with the 
easy phase of  import substitution undertaken, the Government opted for 
a further push into large-scale, key  or upstream basic  industries to fill 
gaps  in  its  industrial  structure.  Soehoed  (1988)  proposed  52  basic 
16 industries, centred on natural resources, in  which the Government was 
expected to take the initiative.  In the event, some of  the plans had to be 
modified or postponed as  a result of the oil price decrease of 1982 and 
the 1983 devaluation.  With  Repelita  IV  to commence there was  dis-
agreement about the direction industrial policy should take.  Consider-
ation of the choice  between  'basic' development/import substitution 
and  labour-intensive/export-oriented  enterprise  suggested  that  the 
latter contributed most to a labour-intensive industrial strategy (Roepstorff 
1985, Kuyvenhoven and Poot 1986).  Hill (1984) indicated that basic 
'upstream' industries raised critical  policy questions, since  most of the 
industries would  not  be  internationally competitive and  many down-
stream users would be penalised.  Hill was also sceptical of the venture 
into 'hi-tech' industry. 
The oil price decline and devaluations of the 1980s to a large cxtent 
determined the direction of the industrialisation pattern, at least for the 
short to medium term. A series of  deregulatory 'packages' between 1984 
alld  1989, involving trade, finance  and investment has  resulted in  the 
quarterly index of industrial  production (base  1983=100) rising  from 
126.95  in  1986  to  146.37  in  1987, and  169.0  in  1988,  indicating 
growth rates of 15.2% and 15.4% respectively.  However, there appears 
to have been a fall  during 1989, to a growth rate of9.5% (Conroy and 
Drake 1990).  Pangestu and  Habir (1990) indicate the slowdown has 
been in  the main  manufactured exports (plywood, textiles, garments), 
with  some  decline  also  in  paper and  rubber  products,  while  certain 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods growth remains strong (soft 
drink, cigarettes, cement, crumb rubber and machinery).  Footwear is 
OI1l: industry which is still growing strongly, the result of  export ·oriented 
investment,  predominantly  t(lreign  il1\'Cstment.  hgures on  apprO\'Cd 
investment ti'om the I  n\'estment Coordinating Bo.1rd  (BKPM) indicate 
that Japan is  the largest tilreign investor (particularly in  Ja\',1I1ese  manu-
bcturing) although, as  Thee ( 1(84) points out, the  L'SA  is  the largest 
investor  if the  energy  sector  is  included.  Of realised  total  foreign 
investment between  ] 967 and  1980, the agricultural  sector .1ttracted 
around  9'){,  and  manubcturing 60%.  Apprm'ed  tilreign  il1\'Cstment  in 
1987 totalled  L'S$I.2  million, of which  agriculture accounted  till'  9% 
and  manufacturing  57%.  By  1988  there  was  a  more  than  threctilld 
increase ofti)reign il1\'estment approvals to L'SS4.4 million, with agricul· 
ture's share blling to 4%,  and that of nunubcturing increasing to 78% 
(Bl'S 1989). 
Until  the  mid-1980s  .1t  least,  Indonesi'1I1  data  do  not support the 
argument  that  Japanese  direct  investment  proposals  were  export-
oriented (Thee 1984).  Data ti'om  BKPM for approved ti)reign  im'est-
ment proposals  for  ]988  indicate  that 42%  \\'as  ti'om  Asia,  although 
Japanese discontent with  the  regulatory regime  (Hill  1987) continues 
to  be  rctlccted  in  falling  investment  tj'om  that  country.  Schwarz 
(1990b,  p. 42) reports that Indonesia Ius recentl\' become thc prekrrcd 
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destination for manufacturers from  Hongkong, Singapore, Taiwan and 
South  Korea  who  all  face  rising  wages  and  appreciating  currencies. 
Labour-intensive,  low-to-medium-technology  industries  are  most 
favoured.  In 1987 BKPM released  a new investment priority list and 
indicated several initiatives towards a more liberal business climate (Hill 
1987).  Some efforts have been made also to consider the efficiency and 
accountability of State enterprise  (Mackie  and  Sjahrir  1989).  So  far 
seven  possible  choices  have  been outlined, but no specific  action has 
been initiated. 
Between  1980 and  1987 Indonesia's trade  in  labour-intensive and 
resource-intensive  manufactures  grew  rapidly  (Hill  1987),  but  this 
export-oriented approach may not continue, given  vested interests, re-
forms  needed at the  industry level  (Thee  1989) and  future  structural 
changes.  With these constraints in  mind, the implications for agriculture 
are not entirely clear.  The backward and forward and high employment 
linkages  of commercial  crops  (Kasryno,  Budianto and  Birowo  1982) 
remain important and explain  the  Repelita V emphasis on this sector, 
together with  a  more general  awareness of agribusiness  opportunities 
(Schwarz  1990c,  p.  58).  The  potential  for  further  agricultural  and 
industrial linkages may depend on the strength and convictions of  policy 
makers,  the  perception  of export  markets  and  the  technology  mix 
chosen. 
2.6  The Oil Industry 
Between World War  II  and  1963 little  oil  exploration  took place  in 
Indonesia and, although some new production-sharing agreements were 
signed  after  1965, it  was  the  1967 Arab-Israeli  war  which  to a  large 
degree established  the industry on a firm  footing,  as  Japan and  other 
countries diversified their trade.  Major issues during the 1970s revolved 
around  production increases  accompanying  the  price  rises  during the 
two oil booms; the continuing growth in domestic consumption, and its 
subsidisation  at  the expense of exports;  and the need  for  continuing 
exploration to guarantee future exploitation. New concerns involve  the 
consequences of the  1980s  oil  price  falls  and  declining  oil  reserves. 
Although the industry's importance has lessened during the 1980s, the 
extent of its  economic  influence  can  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that in 
1980-81  oil  company  tax  provided  71%  of domestic  revenue.  In 
addition, despite  significant growth in  non-oil exports, oil  and gas  in 
1988 still accounted for 40% of total exports. 
By  1972 oil  production was  increasing steadily and  off-shore  fields 
were brought into production to bendit from  the 430% increase in  oil 
prices 1972-74.  However, the Pertamina debt crisis in 1975 took a large 
share of  early oil profits. By 1976 production increased threefold and the 
oil sector accounted for one-fifth of GDP, three-quarters of  exports and 
over half of Government revenue  (Johnson  1977).  At  this  point the 
18 significance of natural gas began to be appreciated, although industrial 
use  and exports were some time away.  Meanwhile, domestic oil con-
sumption was growing steadily, and became of  concern.  By 1977 the oil 
boom appeared to have faded, and to counter the loss of profitability in 
the  non-oil  traded  goods  sector  a  devaluation  was  undertaken  in 
November 1978.  The results were not entirely as  planned but, in any 
case, the whole economy was once again overtaken by the February 1979 
Iranian revolution and the subsequent oil price rises of 1979-80. 
The second oil  boom was short-lived and it became evident during 
early  1982  that a  depressed  world  oil  market,  requiring OPEC  pro-
duction cutbacks, spelled problems.  OPEC attempted to stabilise  the 
world price at $35.70 a barrel, but the price fell  during 1983 and 1984, 
and by January 1985 was down to $29.50 a barrel.  During early 1986 
the price fall accelerated sharply from $24 mid-January, until Minas light 
crude was quoted in  March at $11 a barrel.  Muir (1986), commenting 
upon the speed and extent of  the price decline, felt that the macroeconomic 
problems it presented were of  a magnitude not experienced by Indonesia 
since  the late  1960s.  Glassburner (1986) estimated the extent of the 
calamity by calculating that every $1 loss in the average export price of  oil 
resulted  in  a  loss of some $400 million  in  export earnings, as  well  as 
Rp300 billion in oil revenues.  Efforts by the Government to deal with 
the problem and its economic consequences have covered several policy 
initiatives, including two devaluations, new approaches to trade policy, a 
review of tax policy and financial deregulation. 
2.6.1  Oil p1"odltctilJII 
Although Indonesia is  one of the older oil-producing areas, it has small 
shallow  'pools',  unlike  the  extensive  deep  fields  of the  Middle  East. 
Consequently,  there  is  need  t()r  continuous  exploration  to  maintain 
steady production.  Although there were production increases during the 
1970s,  the  uil  booms  were  primarily  the  result  of price  rather  than 
production  increases.  Production  during  1973-75  averagcd  around 
1.3  million  barrels  per  day  (bpd),  and  by  1978  stabilised  ,It  arollnd 
1.6 million brd.  Production fluctuated over subsequent years and, when 
world dcmand weakened, OPEC responded in  1982 with a production 
cutback.  From late 1983 to October 1984 the Indonesian quota was set 
at 1.3 million bpd, then reduccd to 1.189 million bpd. The situation was 
complicated by OPEC policies, which stipulated an agreed CO\'ernment 
scale  of prices  (CS!'), although  the latter did not  necessaril~ '  coincide 
with the s()-caJled market 'spot' price and the divergence could become 
quite large (e.g. S6 to $8).  Indeed, this divergence, combined with low 
prices,  fi)rced  Indonesia to abandon the  CSI' in  negotiations with  its 
t()reign  production-sharing  p.lrtners,  whose  taxes  were  based  on  thc 
liSP.  After negotiation the CSP was  replaced  by a markct-price based 
t<lfI11ula  (Handley 1986, p.  89). 
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In December 1985 Indonesia reaftirmed its adherencc to the OPEC 
policy of defending market shares.  Production for  1985 averaged only 
1.2 million bpd, and a nnv OPEC agreement was negotiated in Decem-
ber 1986 in an effort to re-assert market control.  The policy resulted in 
a return to the tixed price structure, with Minas crude set at lTS S 17.56 a 
barrel, and Indonesia was  allocated a quota of 1.133 million  bpd until 
June  1987, a quota retained for  1988.  The end of the Iran-Iraq war 
contributed during 1988 to a further oil price bll - to CS $13 a barrel 
during October.  In t:ebruarv 1988 the Government returned to its use 
of the GSP, and it was  upon this price (l'SS 17.56) that oil companies 
once again paid taxes (E\'ans 1(88).  To overcome the price divergence 
and prevent problems, the oil companies were gi\'en a $1  a barrel rebate. 
Although lower prices made it ditEcult for OPEC to ent()rce production 
quotas, the option to ignore quotas was unavailable to Indonesia, gi\'en 
that t(mner Minister Soebroto had  become OPEC Secretary-General. 
However, during 1989, oil prices tinned t()llowing unexpectedly strong 
world demand, rising towards l'SS20 a barrel.  At  the same time Japan 
succeeded in renegotiating its price t()r oil and L1'\G. 
2.6.2  Domestic WIHlJJIlptiOJI 
During the 1970s domestic consumption of  oil grew at around 13 --14% 
annually, helped by  a subsidy which  arose  when domestic prices were 
pegged  in  1973.  Dick  (I <)7<))  explained  the  difticulty  of increasing 
domestic petroleum prices in terms of two 'political' considerations, viz. 
the widespread consumption of  kerosene t()r cooking and lighting (then 
5% of  total rural consumption expenditure) and its inclusion in  t.he price 
index of nine basic commodities; as  well  as  the widespread use of petrol 
by  urban  consumers,  and  its  inclusion  in  the  cost  of transport.  By 
1981- 82  the  oil  subsidy  had  risen  to  Rp  l316.4  billion,  and  over 
succeeding  budgets  prices  were  gradually  increased  until,  by  1983, 
aviation  gas,  turbine  fuel  and super  grade  gasoline  had reached  world 
levels  (Lukman and McGlinchy  1986).  Prices were increased  for kero-
sene and fuel oil in 1984, but a subsidy remained until the price of oil  fell 
in 1986.  In 1988-89 the subsidy was Rp 133.1 billion, an estimated Rp 
400.7 billion in  1989-90, and was projected  to be  Rp  626.5 billion in 
1990- 91 .  However, the price of fuel was increased in March 1990 and 
the subsidy phased out (Schwarz 1990b, p. 42). 
2.6.3  Exports 
The volume of exports of  crude oil  in  1981 was 362.2 million barrels but 
had  fallen  to  274.4  million  barrels  in  1988-89  (Mackie  and  Sjahrir 
1989), while the value of exports fell  from  US$18.1 billion in 1981 to 
US$5  billion  in  1988- 89.  Gas  exports  (predominantly  LNG)  have 
helped a little to otTset falling oil  prices,  as  gas is  not subject to OPEC 
20 quotas.  The price of LNG is, however, tied to oil, so that although the 
volume of exports has  increased  ft-om  772.0 billion  cf in  1984-85 to 
964.9  billion cf in  1988- 89, the value of gas exported has  fallen  from 
US$3.4 billion to  US$2.6 billion over the same period.  Nevertheless, 
proven reserves mean its future export potential outweighs that of  oil. 
2.6.4  Exploration 
Continuous oil exploration is  necessary to ensure an uninterrupted flow 
of output.  Exploration fell  during the later 1970s, although contracts 
signed between foreign firms and Pertamina averaged around 10 per year 
during that decade.  The rate of  signing fell  ti-om  12 in  1983 to 10 over 
the period  1984-86.  There was  some  recovery during 1987 and  10 
contracts were signed in  1988, rising to 19 in  1989 (Comoy and Drake 
1990).  Exploration increased in 1988 and 1989, with major gas finds off 
Natuna  Island  and  Madura  (Mackie  and  Sjahrir  1989).  The  joint 
Australia-Indonesia zone of  exploitation around Timor is  also expected 
to bring results.  Apart ti-om  oil  and gas,  Indonesia's mineral resources 
include tin, bauxite, copper, nickel, with smaller reserves of  silver, gold, 
phosphate, manganese and  mineral  sands.  Coal  mining  has  been  in-
creased to diversifY  domestic energy consumption and  conserve oil  for 
export.  All  minerals, except possibly gold, have tended recently to find 
the world market beset with low or fluctuating commodity prices. 
2.6.5  Oil and agriculture 
The oil price increases of the 1970s dramatically changed the economic 
outlook tor the country through  relaxing  previous constraints on  the 
balance of payments and allowing large increases in  budget expenditure. 
Agriculture  benefited  both  directly  and  indirectly  from  increased  oil 
revenues.  The fertiliser subsidy contributed directly, but there is also the 
fertiliser  itselt~  imported and  domestically produced.  Oil  money pro-
vided for extension and upgrading of irrigation  facilities,  an  indispens-
able  ingredient  in  the  expansion  of fertiliser-responsive  high-yielding 
rice varieties.  Food subsidies, the operation of the floor price scheme, 
storage  costs  and  BULOG's  buying  and  selling  activities  have  been 
direct charges on the budget.  The upgrading of  roads and a fud subsidy 
assisted  with  more  efficient  transport  and  marketing  of agricultural 
produce, while  Government revenues  built vast  storage complexes  to 
maintain  the  rice  price  scheme.  Oil  provided  also  the  background 
climate of economic  growth  and, consequently,  the downturn  in  oil 
prices and shortf:lll in  revenue have  had important implications for  the 
availability of resources to agriculture. 
2.7  Fiscal Policy 
The Sukarno years left an unenviable legacy of  economic disruption.  To 
protect themselves from inf1ation Indonesians reversed monctisation and 
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went back to barter (Nasution 1983).  The prime platform of the 'New 
Order' Government was a promise of  fiscal  responsibility and a commit-
ment to a balanced budget as a guarantee against future deficit spending 
and  inflation.  The  balanced  budget  concept  plays  a  'political  cum 
psychological role' (Booth and McCawley 1981b, p.  144) and is one of 
the two major strands  of macroeconomic management, the other being 
a free  foreign exchange rate.  In theory, the budget is  balanced in  the 
sense that total expenditure equals total revenue, although total revenue 
includes  Government borrowing from  abroad.  The main  difficulty  is 
that this ostensible balance  needs various  background measures to ac-
commodate  deficits  or surpluses.  Surpluses  involve  building  up  re-
sources with the central bank, repaying past borrowings, or concealment 
in  the balance of payments (Nasution 1983).  Deficits are camouflaged 
by category changing, as  circumstances demand, to produce the desired 
result,  and  can  be  measured  in  various  ways  (Booth  and  McCawley 
1981b).  Other fiscal  goals  include  widening  the  tax  base,  increasing 
Government saving to eventually eliminate foreign aid, and emphasising 
productive development expenditure.  Policy emphasis has been changed 
or modified as circumstances and revenue dictated.  The formal Govern-
ment budget, covering only central Government  activities, excludes the 
activities of public sector enterprises, except for  their contribution to 
non-tax revenue. 
2.7.1  Sources of  Government revenue 
Government revenue  falls  into three basic  categories:  oil  tax  revenue, 
non-oil tax  revenue (direct and indirect taxes), and foreign  borrowings 
(Table 2.7).  Oil  tax  revenue  was  26%  of 1970-71 domestic  revenue, 
increased  rapidly  after  the  first  oil  price  rises  and  peaked  at  71%  in 
1980-81.  Thereafter it fell,  until  by  1990-91 it  is  projected at 34%. 
During  the  1970s  the  Government  increased  its  spending  without 
considering other sources of revenue,  and  non-oil  revenues  increased 
marginally or stagnated.  With reduced oil  revenues it was necessary to 
boost the non-oil tax base, and a review of  the tax system was undertaken 
in  1983 (Gillis  1985). Existing personal and company tax  scales  were 
revised and amalgamated, a new value-added tax (VAT) was introduced, 
and some taxes were abolished or replaced. Control of  imports by a Swiss 
firm  (SGS)  has  doubled revenue and quickened clearances,  but it  has 
been decided to phase out SGS services in 1991 (Schwarz 1989d, p.  57). 
Direct and indirect taxes include income tax, VAT/sales tax, import 
duties, export, property and other similar taxes.  Previously the personal 
income tax system was criticised for evasion, underassessment and nego-
tiation between tax  payer and tax  officer.  Indeed, in  1974 there were 
only 195 000 registered tax  payers (Lerche  1980).  In  1981 personal 
income tax was projected to yield 1.7% of  domestic revenue.  When the 
new tax  package became effective in  January 1984 income tax replaced 
22 four  previous  tax  categories.  It  is  levied  on  companies  as  well  as 
individuals, and in the 1990-91 budget was projected at 20% of  domestic 
revenues.  The Ipeda land  tax  (Booth  1974), as  revised  in  1965, was 
meant to cover rural and urban land owners, and be seen as a contribu-
tion to regional development.  However, although realised  collections 
were small it seemed inequitable, since all  rural  landowners paid, even 
the smallest peasant.  When compared with the earlier-mentioned scale 
of income tax evasion, it can be argued that the agricultural sector was 
disadvantaged.  Booth and McCawley (1981 b) noted that "vhile central 
Government  tax on the agricultural sector appeared  light (Ipeda and 
export tax), there were other levies in cash, kind and labour, collected by 
local and regional governments. Together these taxes indicated that farm 
incomes might have been taxed at a higher rate than other sectors.  The 
new land and building tax which replaces Ipeda may be more equitable 
and remains the responsibility of  regional authorities. The main thrust of 
the 1984 tax revision was to replace most sales taxes with a value-added 
tax (VAT).  This tax applies to domestic and imported manufactures, not 
agricultural products, and manufactured exports are taxed at zero.  It has 
proved  a  highly  successful  means  of revenue  raising,  accounting  for 
21.6% of domestic revenue in  the 1990-91 budget. In contrast, export 
taxes, which mainly fall  on agriculture, have  remained a minor form of 
revenue. 
Foreign aid, the final component of  Government 'revenue', comprises 
project and program aid.  The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
(IGGI), formed  in  1967, assisted  in  rescheduling debt and  provided 
program aid  (including food).  Project aid  followed later when specific 
projects could be fittcd into development objectives and donor cap~lCity . 
Generally, the ()reign donor meets the f()reign exchange component of 
projects/programs, \\'hile  the  dcvelopment  budget allocates  the  local 
rupiah (counterpart) funds.  Thc oil pricc declines of 1986 rcsulted in a 
need  t()r  yct  more foreign  aid  to fund  the de\'elopment budget.  for 
several years  Il~GI prO\'ided  'speci~ll assisunce' aid,  no\\' being phased 
out as  the eCOllom\' imprO\·cs. 
2.7.2  PlIblic c.\,pwditlm: 
Gon:rnment  expenditure  is  di\'ided  bet\\'een  'routine'  and  'de\'Clop-
ment' categories, but the distinction is somewhat blurred in practice, and 
Booth and McCawley ( 1981 b) suggest there is  ~l  case t()r abolishing the 
arbitrary  division.  Routine  expenditure  covers  sabries  and  pensions, 
procurement of materials,  regional  subsidies,  t()Oti  and  fuel  subsidies 
(when applicable) and the presently large  item of debt servicing.  Ci\'il 
service salaries were  frozen  after  1986, but have  been increased in  the 
1989-90  and  1990-91  budgets.  Subsidies  t()r  fud  and  t()Oli  h~l\'C 
appeared in  the routine hudget since  the  1970s.  food subsidies were 
commenced when rice, sugar, wheat and soybeans \\'ere  imported and 
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sold at a loss.  With a large rice harvest in 1984 direct food subsidies were 
discontinued in  the 1984-85 budget. 
Development expenditure has been subject to change over the years. 
Since 1969 the Government has been able to fund part of development 
expenditure fi·om  domestic revenue, although initially the vast propor-
tion was  accounted for  by  aid.  With  the oil  boom, total expenditure 
increased  sharply,  so  that  in  1975-76  development  expenditure  ac-
counted for over half total expenditure, and by 1985-86 the share was 
still 46%.  The share of  development expenditure fell  to 34% in  1987-88, 
and is predicted to be 38% in the 1990-91 budget.  The fertiliser subsidy 
accounted for 3% of  the development budget in 1983-84, but rose to 8% 
in  1987-88.  Thereafter the pesticide subsidy was  phased out and the 
fertiliser  subsidy  reduced  to  Rp  200  billion  in  1988-89 and  Rp  155 
billion  in  1989-90  (1.6  and  1.2%,  respectively,  of the  development 
budget).  The 1990- 91  budget projects a fertiliser subsidy of Rp  155 
billion.  These  'nominal'  figures  have  resulted  from  the  Government 
shifting  part of the  subsidy  off-budget and  funding  it  through  bank 
credit (Booth 1988a). 
Development spending by sectoral share shows agriculture and irriga-
tion  have  always  been  in  the top three to four places,  being 15.2 and 
14.7%  for  the 1989-90 and 1990-91  budgets, respectively.  In  these 
budgets only  transportation  and  tourism  received  a  higher allocation 
(19%).  Although  the  relative  sectOl'al  shares  have  not varied  widely 
during the 1980s, the  actual  level  of development spending began to 
decline  after  1983.  The  budgets  of 1983- 84  and  1984-85  were 
comractionary and development expenditure was restricted further after 
the  1986 oil  price  decline  and  devaluation,  partly  to  restrain  foreign 
borrowing.  The 1986-87 budget was  below that of the previous year, 
and  the  development  budget  fell  again  in  1987-88.  Although  the 
1988-89 budget projected an  increase of development expenditure of 
nearly 15%,  its influence on domestic demand was counterbalanced by 
the large debt repayment figure, which accounted for 33% of that year's 
realised  Government  expenditure  (Table  2.7).  The  1989-90  budget 
remained  contractionary  although  oil  revenues  were  larger  than 
projected, and development expenditure is  expected to be lower than 
projected.  The consequent 'saving' and a similar 'saving' projected for 
1990-91 will probably be used to reduce reliance on foreign aid, accord-
ing to Pangestu and Habir (1990). 
2.8  The Financial Sector 
The hyperinflation of  the Sukarno years resulted from deficit finance, and 
the 'balanced budget' was meant to prevent future borrowings from the 
domestic financial system.  The oil price rise of 1973 increased pressure 
on the financial sector as vast amounts of  oil revenue were injected.  The 
central  bank  in  1974 initiated  strong controls  over credit expansion, 
24 together with  selective  credit policies  and  subsidised  interest  rates  to 
certain sectors (Arndt 1979).  However, once the Government began to 
spend oil  money through the budget, without removing domestic pur-
chasing power, the result was continuing inflation throughout the 1970s. 
The inflation rate varied, falling  to around 14%  in 1976, but averaging 
19% between 1973 and 1978.  It reached 27% in 1979, was 17% in 1980, 
only to increase again in 1981 after the second oil price boom. The static 
oil  prices  of 1982  and  1983  and  deteriorating  balance  of payments 
brought a  further devaluation  in  April  1983, giving  more impetus to 
inflation.  In  conjunction with  the  tax  review  a  second  major  policy 
initiative occurred in June 1983 when the Government made significant 
reforms to the banking system.  Most of the 1974 direct central bank 
control of credit and  interest  rates  was  eliminated.  Further banking 
reform  was  undertaken  in  October and  December  1988  and  March 
1989, in  a number of  packages designed to promote competition in the 
financial sector, including the stock market. 
2.8.1  Monetary policy d~tring the  1970s and early 1980s 
The  Soeharto  Government  reorganised  the  five  State  banks  which, 
together with the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and small private com-
mercial banks (later some foreign banks), formed the financial sector.  By 
1972 some non-bank financial institutions were allowed to function, and 
in  1977 the stock exchange was reinstated.  Monetary policy was  oper-
ated  through  informal  means  ('special  relationships'), and  the  formal 
control of the volume of bank credit through issue of reserve  money, 
reserve  ratios  and indirect control of credit volume (Grenville  1981), 
although Nasution (1983) considers reserve requirements were no more 
than a subsidiary policy element, if indeed used at all, in controlling the 
credit volume.  State banks each concentrated on a particular sector (e.g. 
Bank Raykat Indonesia (BRI) was responsible for rural development and 
smallholder  agriculture,  Bank  Bumi  Daya  for  estate  agriculture  and 
forestry).  The private  banks were excluded from  central  bank 'cheap 
funds', while the State banks were the instruments of credit directed to 
certain areas at concessional rates (e.g. the BRI dispensed BlMAS credit). 
Credit ceilings  were  used  to direct  loans  to certain  ethnic  (pribumi) 
businessmen,  and  interest rates  were  differentiated  according to loan 
purpose,  rather  than  credit  worthiness  and  loan  maturity  (Nasution 
1983).  The problem of trying  to  reconcile  market-oriented  banking 
with  development-oriented  lending  guidelines  resulted  in  inefficient 
State banks and bad debts.  Grenville (1981) points out that monetary 
policy in the 1970s had to be operated through a financial sector which 
was  still  evolving,  and  which  touched  upon only  the  modern sector. 
However, the rice program, in particular, brought modifications to the 
rural  sector,  increasing  monetisation  and  linkages  with  financial 
institutions. 
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2.8.2  Major ban/zing reform of  1983 
Substantial capital flight in  early 1983 before the April  devaluation was 
followed  by  major banking sector rdorm in  June.  Direct central bank 
control of  credit and interest rates was eliminated.  State banks were to 
control their own rates for lending and fixed deposits, with the exception 
of certain  concessional  rates  to particular priority clients  (e.g.  BIMAS 
farmers, other smallholders and small-scale enterprise) and credit ceilings 
were abolished (Arndt 1983).  The aim was to stimulate, and use more 
productively, private savings, in addition to enhancing the credit role of 
the banking system.  Changes in  June 1984 named the central bank as 
lender of last  resort,  with  two  discount windows  for  banks  suffering 
liquidity  problems (the second  window dealt with  special  Indonesian 
conditions).  A market in Government bearer certificates (SBIs) was also 
introduced (Rosendale 1984). The SBIs were intended to torm the basis 
for the conduct of  open-market operations. 
By  mid-1984  the  impact of the  1983  deregulation  was  becoming 
evident.  State banks attracted time deposits with high short-term inter-
est rates, but were unsuccesstttl lenders.  Private banks increased lending 
at such a rapid rate that they began borrowing on the call money market 
to finance further lending.  Bank Indonesia stepped in with supplemen-
tary measures and Booth (1984) argued that the problems would solve 
themselves as  banks became used to a deregulated system.  In  February 
1985 Bank Indonesia widened further its possible monetary tools with 
the  introduction  of a  promissory  note  facility  (SBPU).  Glassburner 
(1985) remarked upon the financial deepening which took place in  1985 
(as time deposits grew at a higher rate than cash and demand deposits), 
and the fact that the SBI and SPBU markets had developed to a point 
where open-market operations were considered to be possible. 
Interest rates remained high, even after the 1986 devaluation.  Never-
theless, the toreign exchange market witnessed episodes of  capital flight 
in  late  1986 and  the  tirst  half of 1987.  Bank Indonesia  twice  raised 
interest rates on its short-term monetary instruments, and finally on 22 
June 1987 ordered four large State enterprises to withdraw funds from 
State and commercial banks and purchase SBls.  This resulted in a sharp 
rise  in  inter-bank rates  and, coupled  with  mild  appreciation,  induced 
large  capital  inflows  (Hill  1987).  The  major  cost  was  in  terms  of 
continuing high interest rates, 25% or above (with a real rate of  15-20%) 
which discouraged private investment.  Time and savings deposits grew 
rapidly in  1987 and 1988, having a contractionary influence on money 
supply, narrowly defined (M,). 
2.8.3  Furthel' ban/ling reforms 1988 to  1990 
Further  reform  of the  financial  sector  began  on  27  October  1988 
(PAKTO 1988).  The main focus was on removal of entry restrictions, 
allowing new private banks, including joint ventures with foreign banks. 
26 Other measures included the reduction of reserve  requirements to 2%, 
but  imposition  of a  15%  withholding  tax  on  time  deposit  interest. 
During March 1989 certain implementation regulations related to PAKTO 
1988 were announced.  For example, the tax  on bank interest income 
applied only to savings deposits over Rp 5 million (Schwarz 1989c, p. 
83).  The major impact  was  evident throughout 1989 in  terms of the 
large growth in  bank numbers and branch expansion, competition for 
deposits (including lotteries), and shortage of experienced staff (Mackie 
and Sjahrir 1989, Pangestu and Habir 1990).  Between 1988 and 1989 
savings deposits more than doubled.  Competition during 1989 resulted 
in  the lowering of interest rates to atound 19-20%.  A further measure 
was announced in  January 1990 when domestic banks were required by 
the  end  of the  year  to  have  at  least  20%  of loans  directed  to  small 
business.  This  measure  was  the  result of Bank  Indonesia cutting its 
volume  of subsidised  (liquidity)  credit  to  selected  sectors,  although 
agriculture  and  BULOG  were  largely  unaffected.  There  was  also  a 
revival  of the share  market.  The PAKTO  1988 tax  on  bank interest 
income had  been designed to improve the appeal of the capital market 
since dividends were already taxed.  Throughout 1989 the Jakarta stock 
market surged with  intense share demand and, although still  small  by 
Asian  standards, seems set to provide an  alternative capital  source for 
some companies. 
2.8.4  Finance and the agricultural sector 
Finance for agriculture comes from  both formal  and informal sources. 
Informal  finance  includes village  money lenders,  family/relatives,  and 
odd borrowings at certain times of year/life.  Measures were suggested 
to  outlaw  the  informal  system,  but  it  persists,  and  McLeod  (1980) 
believes it is best left alone.  Glassburner (1985) estimated that informal 
finance  accounted for some four-fifths of the total capital needs of the 
agricultural sector.  Early formal  finance to the agricultural sector cen-
tred around the BlMAS scheme for rice,  palalVifa and livestock.  Other 
smaller schemes were directed to rural  areas and still  others related to 
particular cash crops.  At the time of the 1983 banking reforms BlMAS 
credit was  terminated after it  became evident that repayment rates had 
dropped significantly, arrears being around 50% (Booth 1984).  In early 
1984 a new rural general credit scheme (KUPEDES) was launched.  The 
existing  BRI  village  banking system set up  to administer BIlVlAS  was 
retained and expanded.  Loans were no longer tied to specific agricul-
tural programs, but were available to various small  rural enterprises for 
investment as well as  working capital, and interest rates were structured 
to encourage rapid repayment (Dick 1985).  Figures to November 1985 
showed that agriculture directly accounted for only 23%  of loans while 
trade accounted for 72%.  Glassburner (1986) argues that agri-business 
and rural enterprise generally are so interlinked that this categorisation 
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may not reflect the true economic impact;  while, in  view of  the large 
demand for funds in  the rural sector, Dick (1985) considers that it does 
not  matter to  which  part of the  matrix  credit  is  injected.  By  1988 
credit  under  KUPEDES  had  quadrupled  to  Rp  462  million  (Bank 
Indonesia 1989). 
As previously noted, Bank Indonesia, in January 1990, began to phase 
out some of its  subsidised  credits to selected sectors.  Export credits, 
fertiliser company and mining enterprise credits ceased, although farm-
ers,  including cash  crop farmers,  cooperatives, and  B ULOG will  con-
tinue  to  get  access  to  credit  at  Government  'market  rates'  of 16% 
(Schwarz 1990a p. 56).  The curbing of subsidised  credit to fertiliser 
companies is  noteworthy, given that the Government has shifted a large 
portion  of the  fertiliser  subsidy  off-budget.  A  further  consideration 
involves  the tradition of village  institutions and  self financing.  Given 
their predominance, the spread of  banking facilities may take some time 
to  have  an  impact  upon  rural  areas.  Moreover,  the  continuation of 
subsidised credit to most sectoral activities removes some incentive for 
the private financial sector to penetrate poorer and remoter areas.  How-
ever, the BRr with its large branch network has begun to promote new 
consumer savings  and  credit schemes  (Schwarz  1989a, p.  47), while 
wearing its 'commercial hat'.  If this approach provides greater availabil-
ity of  credit as against selective subsidised credit, the sector will be better 
served. 
2.9  Trade and the Balance of Payments 
In 1966 the Government had exhausted its  foreign  exchange reserves, 
faced spiralling  foreign debts, and was promoting a confrontation policy 
with  Malaysia  which  exacerbated  an  already  imvard-Iooking develop-
ment policy.  To restore stability a debt moratorium was introduced, the 
currency was  devalued, and a resumption of normal regional trade and 
diplomatic  ties  negotiated  (Nasution  1983).  The  next  major  policy 
decision was the encouragement of foreign investment, a reversal which 
has helped develop the export base. 
2.9.1  Trends in the balance of  payments 
Mter inflation was  controlled and the exchange  rate  devalued exports 
improved, and by 1972 foreign exchange reserves began to accumulate. 
The period of the 1970s and 1980s was one of current account deficits, 
except for the oil surpluses of 1974 and 1980.  (Commodity price rises 
also  made some contribution to the 1980 surplus.)  The deficits have 
been financed  by capital inflow in the form of foreign aid, official loans 
and direct private investment.  The overall  balance of payments was  in 
surplus  throughollt the  1970s, except  for  the  1975  Pertamina  crisis. 
Thereafter, continuous additions were made to reserves until 1981 when 
28 the  trade  balance  deteriorated.  As  oil  prices  stagnated  the  current 
account deteriorated, with a deficit exceeding US$ 5 billion in 1982; and 
in  1983 the trade balance was weakened further by the oil price decline. 
Following the devaluation  in  March  1983 the current account deficit 
declined as  exports increased in the aftermath of devaluation and a mild 
world economic recovery.  The oil  price decline of 1986 resulted in  a 
devaluation in September of  that year, and the current account deficit for 
1986- 87 was  $4.1  billion  (Table  2.8).  Improved exports,  especially 
non-oil  exports, and slower import growth  have  reduced  the current 
account deficit to $1.6 billion for 1989-90 and a provisional  $2.6 billion 
for 1990-91, despite large net services of  over $8 billion for both years. 
Reserves stood at SUS 5.5 billion in September 1989 (BPS 1990).  Net 
official  capital  inflow  for  1990-91  is  expected  to  be  just  under  the 
$6 billion total, while private capital inflow shows a slight increase as the 
deregulatory climate helps the flow into realised investment. 
2.9.2  Exports 
While traditional  exports stagnated, oil  began to dominate during the 
1970s.  In 1980 oil and gas accounted for 75% of merchandise trade, but 
by  1989 this  proportion  had  fallen  to 40%.  Some of the  traditional 
exports (coffee, rubber), which formed  the base of exports in  the late 
1960s, contributed to the late 1980s surge of non-oil exports.  Agricul-
tural exports (see Table 3.2) contributed 16.5% of total non-oil exports 
in 1988, but in 1989 this percentage fell to 15% after a decline in primary 
commodity  prices.  However,  many  commodities  now  classified  as 
industrial  sector products (e.g.  processed  rattan, palm  oil  and  crumb 
rubber) are but one step away from  their original form, so that agricul-
ture's contribution  to non-oil  exports  is  greater than  initial  statistics 
indicate.  Following the 1986 devaluation and a series of  trade packages, 
non-oil exports grew  31%  between  1986 and  1987, and  increased  to 
34.5%  between 1987 and  1988.  Provisional  figures  for  1989 indicate, 
hO'vvever,  that there  has  been a slowdown  in  export growth to 16.8% 
between  1988  and  1989  (Pangestu  and  Habir  1990).  Part  of the 
explanation for the decline rests with commodity price fluctuations, part 
is  the  result  of direct  policy  intervention  (e.g.  sawnwood)  and  part 
appears to be a matter of  supply constraints. 
2.9.3  Imports 
Import composition has changed since  1975, with  the 1980s showing 
more emphasis on raw materials,  less  emphasis on consumption items 
and a fairly static pattern of capital good imports.  As  the rice program 
increased production the large cost of  rice imports fell  (to zero in 1985) 
after accounting for 6.4% of  total imports in  1980.  The import replace-
ment program has succeeded in  reducing demand for  many consumer 
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durables and some intermediate products.  Industrial policy emphasis has 
kept  the  proportion  of raw  materials  which  are  imported  quite  high 
(70- 80%) during the 1980s, while capital goods have remained around 
17- 19%.  Arndt (1983)  argued  that the effort at import substitution 
undertaken in  the intermediate goods industries (e.g. fertiliser, cement) 
could be regarded as probably representing an efficient use of  economic 
resources, although he was doubtful about capital-intensive import sub-
stitution.  Imports fell  in  value  terms between  1984 and  1986 as  the 
depressed state of  the manufacturing sector demanded less raw materials, 
while  the  1986 devaluation  contributed to  keeping down  the import 
level.  However,  higher  economic  growth  from  1987  to  1989  has 
resulted in stronger import demand. 
2.9.4  Early 1980s trade restrictions 
In response to a deteriorating balance of payments in  the early  1980s 
there was an increase in the use of non-tariff barriers.  This was achieved 
through direct import bans,  quotas, import licensing and special 'de-
letion' programs (PangestLI  1987).  Particular measures used to control 
imports included:  (a) an  approved  importer system  for goods in  nine 
categories;  (b) a few  importers or a sole importer authorised to import 
certain  raw  materials  and  agricultural  products;  and  (c)  a  sole  agent 
importer authorised for certain brand products.  Agricultural commodi-
ties  under category  (b)  included  cotton,  wheat  flour,  milk  and  milk 
products,  soybeans,  soy  flour,  cloves  and  sugar,  for  many  of which 
BULOG was  (and remains still)  the sole importer.  Out of 5229 items 
some 28% were under licence, including 296 under quotas.  The agricul-
tural sector accounted for 122 items under licence and 64 under quotas. 
2.9.5  Trade lrcforms 
In the aftermath of the 1980s oil problems there was concern about the 
narrowness of the export base and the need for diversifIcation.  The first 
response was the New Trade Policy ofl982, which had as its main theme 
a  counter-purchase  scheme  for  Government  contracts.  INPRES 
(Instruction of President) 4/1985 handed cust01l1S  responsibility to a 
Swiss firm, abolished protection to inter-island shipping and eliminated a 
system of  check prices used to subsidise exports and discourage imports. 
Nasution (1985) argued  that tariffs  should replace  non-tariff barriers, 
since Indonesia in  March 1985 signed the GATT Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Duties.  Further trade measures were announced 
in May 1986 (PAKEM), and included a range of  initiatives to encourage 
foreign  investment  as  part of a  program  to  increase  non-oil  exports 
within  GATT guidelines.  PAKEM  measures hardly  began to operate 
before the 1986 devaluation,  and  were  closely  followed  by  the  Post-
Devaluation  Package  of October  1986.  On  15  January  1987  new 
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textiles industry, reduced tariffs on a further 55 categories of parts and 
components,  and  simplified  regulations  for  expansion  into  new 
products.  The overall impact of  the last two packages was the removal or 
relaxation  of 40% of import  restrictions  on  the  manufacturing sector 
(Pangestu 1987). 
A  new  Investment  Priority  List  (DSP)  was  released  in  June  1987, 
licences  issued  f'·om  BKPM  are  now valid  inddinitely, processing has 
been simplified and product categories broadened (Hill  1987).  Further 
measures  followed  on  24  December (PAKDES  1987) which  covered 
export  promotion  and  incentives,  import  monopolies,  the  domestic 
share market, tourist promotion and attraction of more foreign  capital 
(Booth  1988a).  Three  categories of commodities  remain  subject to 
export control and items are either banned, controlled by  the Depart-
ment of  Trade or restricted to licensed exporters.  The majority of these 
items originate in  the agricultural sector and include rice, soybean flour 
and vegetable oils.  Booth (1988a) argues that Government policy seems 
to be shifting key  commodities f'·om  quantitative import restrictions to 
tariffs, with the ultimate aim of  reducing the tariff level.  The November 
1988 (PAKNO) package focused on shipping deregulation, and allowed 
foreign  companies  some  latitude  in  domestic  trading.  Simandjuntak 
(1989) concludes that, although the deregulation packages have intro-
duced tr~lI1sparency into import policy, Indonesia's export policy entails a 
type  of protected  export substitution  for  primary  commodities  with 
world trade market power, particularly restricting exports with low de-
grees of processing.  The PAKMEI  1990 trade measures have brought 
reform  to  the  tariff schedule,  removed  certain  non- tariff barriers  (al-
though other tariffs were increased), and introduced some deregulation 
to pharmaceuticals and agriculture (Conroy and Drake 1990). 
2.9.6  Devaluation 
After  two  devaluations  in  1966  and  1970  the  exchange  rate  of 
Rp 415  =  US$1 was  tied to the US$ and kept constant t1·om  1971 to 
1978.  As  a result of the oil  boom the currency appreciated during the 
1970s,  disadvantaging  the  traded  goods  sector.  Rosendale  (1981) 
argues that devaluation in Indonesia was generally envisaged as having its 
principal  effect  on  income distribution  by  increasing  prices  of traded 
good  prices  relative  to  non-traded  goods.  It  was  with  the  aim  of 
exchange rate  protection (WaIT  1984)  that the  1978 devaluation  was 
undertaken.  The tie between the US$ and the rupiah was broken and a 
managed float against an unspecified basket of  currencies was undertaken 
at a rate of Rp 625 =  US$1.  Although monetary and fiscal  policies were 
broadly consistent with the aim of  devaluation, at industry level Govern-
ment  actions were counterproductive (see Dick 1979).  There was  an 
apparent  reluctance to see  a rise  in  the price of tradeable items move 
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resources out of the non-tradeable sector.  Price control on tradeables 
was enforced and Dick (1979, p.  29) cites informal administrative bans 
on coffee and pepper.  Price increases for rubber and tin were not allowed 
to exceed 10%, while palm oil was subject to a higher rate of export tax, 
and quotas were set for the supply of  palm oil to the domestic market at 
prices  below export prices.  Corn, rice,  soybean, flour and sugar were 
among 20 items subject to export quotas, although most would not have 
been exported anyway.  Dick cites copra as  a smallholder crop stifled by 
taxes, mainly borne by the t:1rmer at the farmgate.  There was no export 
surplus,  the  industry  was  run  by  quotas,  and  from  1976  BULOG 
imported coconut oil and sold it at a loss to hold down domestic prices. 
Most of the export quotas and  bans were  later replaced  by  addit.ional 
export taxes,  as  fiscal  policy was  used to remove part of export sector 
profits to prevent inflationary pressure. 
By  1982  most of t.he  benefits  of the  1978  devaluation  had  been 
dissipated by on-going inflation (see Warr 1986).  Declining oil prices, 
capital outflow and a large current account deficit triggered the March 
1983 devaluation. This time the Government avoided most of  the 1978 
problems, although it still tried to minimise domestic inflationary effects 
by not allowing B  U LOG to increase prices of rice, sugar and flour. The 
Government  instituted st.rict monetary and fiscal  policies as  a follow-up 
to devaluation and shortly afterwards began its process of  tax reform and 
financial deregulation. There was  little or no capital outflow before the 
1986 devaluation  but, as  Booth (1986) pointed out, the current and 
projected  balance of payments deficit  justified  the  devaluation.  Tight 
fiscal  and monetary policy has  helped to contain domest.ic inflation, so 
that real  effective  exchange rates  have  been  maintained,  allowing  the 
increased competitiveness of non-oil exports to be sustained from  1987 
to 1989. However, to reap the full  benefits of the devaluation, the re-
allocation of  resources to tradeable sectors must be quickly and efficiently 
made and the deregulatory packages have aimed at this transition. 
2.10 Agriculture and the Macroeconomy 
It is evident, even with the profound changes of the 1970s, that agricul-
ture remains of major importance, not only as  a provider of food  and 
employment,  but also  as  a  substantial  contributor to export income. 
Glassburner (1985) argues that it is  not merely tl1e size of the agricul-
tural sector that needs to be considered but also  the intersectoral link-
ages,  and  the  impact of macroeconomic  policy  variables  on  incentive 
patterns and agricultural sector performance.  Macroeconomic policies 
primarily impinge upon Indonesian agriculture through trade, the bal-
ance of payments and the exchange rate, fiscal  and monetary policies. 
Glassburner (1985), in  considering the  impact of past  policies,  con-
cluded  that while  previous  specific  policies  were  somewhat mixed  in 
quality  (supportive  in  some  areas,  neglectful  or  \-vorse  in  others), 
32 macroeconomic  policies  were  of sufficient quality  to provide  a  stable 
background which allowed the agricultural sector to produce a healthy 
average growth rate of3.7% per annum over the three Repelitas.  Despite 
the ups and downs provided by the oil economy, Gelb (1986) concludes 
that Indonesia was most successful in  using oil revenues to strengthen its 
agriculture,  while  the  World  Bank  (1986,  p.  72)  considered  that, 
'Indonesia, all  but unique among the oil-exporting developing countries 
with large populations, succeeded in  avoiding serious disruption to its 
agriculture'.  There  is  thus  a  large  measure  of endorsement  of the 
argument that macroeconomic policies to 1985 were largely supportive 
of  agriculture, despite some areas of  concern. 
Subsequently  there  have  been  major  deregulatory  changes.  This 
survey is concluded with a brief review of the measures to see if  available 
information indicates their impact upon, and support for, agriculture. 
2.10.1 Macroeconomic policies post-1985 
The  1984 reform  of the  tax  system  widened  the  tax  base.  Increased 
revenue has resulted from more progressive income taxes and efficiency 
of collection, with  VAT providing a major source of non-oil  revenue. 
There  has  also  been some  growth  in  revenue  from  State enterprises. 
While land taxes have risen, these fall  on urban as well as rural areas, and 
there is no indication of  increase in tlle rural burden.  The export  tax on 
sawn logs has been used from JanualY 1990 as a protective rather than a 
revenue device.  Government expenditure on agriculture has remained at 
about the same proportion of total development expenditure, but the 
contractionary budgets post-1986 have generally meant static or falling 
absolute  levels.  New  irrigation  projects were  abandoned, and  it  was 
difficult to fund operation and maintenance of  existing services.  Budget 
stringency also influenced provision for other infrastructure which sup-
ports agriculture (e.g. transportation, communications, health and edu-
cation).  However,  the  1990-91  budget  appears  to  be  slightly  less 
austere and the rural sector should benefit from expenditure on roads, 
irrigation,  electrification,  harbours,  and  INPRES  grants  (special  local 
government programs funded by direct presidential decree). 
The 'financial  deepening'  (a  rise  in  the ratio of monetary assets  to 
GDP) which occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s has continued 
and the ratio has increased more rapidly from 0.208 in 1983 (Glassburner 
1985) to 0.296 for 1987.  Currency, although declining as a proportion 
of broad money (Ml )  since 1983, exhibited a steady upward trend until 
1987.  Boediono (1985) believes this component of monetary assets is 
more closely related to the 'traditional' sector than 'quasi' money, which 
is  primarily a 'modern' sector phenomenon.  Certainly, the recent ex-
plosion in banking activity and facilities appears to be concentrated in the 
larger cities although, since  BR! launched its savings plan, rural savings 
have jumped from Rp 42 billion in  1984 to Rp 649 billion in July 1989 
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(Vatikiotis and Schwarz 1989, p.  73).  Rural areas will  benefIt from t.he 
fall  in  inflation  during the second  half of the decade, and  the higher 
growth rates for agriculture during 1988 and 1989 probably reflect, at 
least  partly,  confidence  in  economic  management  as  well  as  better 
seasons  and  stable  incent.ives.  Alt.hough  Bank  Indonesia  has  curbed 
subsidised  lending,  agriculture  has  been  largely  exempted,  and  B1U 
continues  to  advance  about  60%  of loans  under  its  program  loan 
category (Schwarz 1989b, p.  74).  However, the increase in  subsidised 
lending rates exhibited in  the move from  BIMAS to KUPEDES should 
emphasise tl1e scarcity value of  capital and help to curb abuses.  Intormal 
finance will  continue in the short run to provide tl1e bulk of the sector's 
capital  needs,  but as  the economy develops and  financial  deregulation 
settles into a stable pattern, it is inevitable that private sector banking will 
push further into rural areas. 
Since  1986 fiscal  and  monetary policies  have contained inflation so 
that tl1e  improvement in  the real effective exchange rate has  been main-
tained,  which  in  turn  has  contributed  to  continuing  non-oil  export 
competitiveness.  Trade policy changes have aimed at boosting non-oil 
export performance, and figures tor 1987 and 1988 indicate the success 
of this  initiative,  although provisional  figures  for  1989 show that the 
current account improvement in that year was mainly the result of  higher 
oil  prices.  Continuing  progress  in  export  growth  will  need  furtl1er 
investment and,  although  investment approvals  are  promising,  realis-
ation takes time. 
The trade policy changes outlined previously were aimed primarily at 
the  manufacturing sector, and  trade  policy  has  been  one of selective 
ratl1er than general export encouragement.  Bans remain on the import 
and export of  certain agricultural commodities.  There are other agricul-
tural exports subject to controls by the Department of  Trade or restricted 
to certain exporters.  The ban on semi -processed rattan and rattan skins 
and the export tax on sawn timber (effectively a ban) have been justified 
in  terms  of increasing  value-added  and  export  earnings.  However, 
timber  industry  bans  are  criticised  on  two  counts:  (a)  they  are  all 
seemingly  engineered  by  one entrepreneur, and  this  protected  infant 
industry  may  take  a  long  time  to  contribute  to  export growth;  and 
(b) the policies contradict tl1e general deregulatory push and acceptance 
of market forces. 
Cash  crops  generally  have  been  assisted  by  the  1986  devaluation, 
controlled inflation  and a stable real  effective exchange rate, although 
commodity prices have fallen recently.  Foodgrains (except cassava) have 
always been subject to strong Government intluence and protected from 
international  competition,  as  attempts  were  made  to  reduce  foreign 
exchange  costs,  stabilise  prices  (primarily  for  urban  consumers),  and 
increase production and farmer incomes.  The 1986 devaluation reduced 
effective protection rates for rice and maize to world parity but domestic 
(imported) wheat prices are above world prices, while sugar and soy bean 
34 remain highh· protected at rates of62 and 39% respecti\Th- (Rosegr~1I1t et 
~ll.  I <)H7).  (:.tSSa\·~l is  the onlv economicalh·-dtlcient food crop nport. 
_?lO.2 CIlJldlldill/T ClJlIlilltJlts 
The generalh  prudent macroeconomic  managelllent of the  I <)70s  re-
sulted in study and substantial growth, although there \\TIT areas where 
Dapice  (I <)XO)  noted  that  performance  \LtS  modified  as  the  result or 
compromise among conHicting goals.  The <";o\"erl1ment's  response to 
the problems of the  19XOs  oil  IT\·enlle  downturn  has  been decisive  in 
terms oj LtX,  trade, financial  and ill\·estment rdimll, and reduction in 
domestic  subsidies.  This  response  has  alread\'  altered  the  pace  and 
direction  of·  gr()\\"th,  \\·hile  the  longer-term  outlook  will  be  further 
iniluenced bv the acknowledglllent in  Repelita V of the brger role now 
accorded to the pri\·ate sector. 
Policies  directed  to  the  agricultural  sector during  the  19HOs  h.1\"e 
tilllo\\Td  the  same  bro~ld  lincs  as  those  of the  pre\·ious  decade,  and 
elicited the same mixed qualit\' ()fresults noted in subsequent chapters of 
this  report.  Yet  there  has  been a grO\\·ing  ~lppreci;1tion or the need  to 
balance rice  against secondal"\" crops .1I1d  initiati\Ts in  other sub-secwrs, 
cred  i  t poliC\· has been restructured, and in pu  t policv partially reappraised. 
\Vhile most ~lspects of macropolic\' during the I <)XOs  ha\T been basiclll\· 
sound, much of the sectoral  and  macroeconomic  polic~· inconslstenc\, 
( rahor et  ~ll.  19X8,  Booth  I <)XXb)  remains, although slightly modified 
h · recent policy changes.  Foodgrains and cash  crops (smallholder and 
estate) sllt"fCred  discrimination and/or bendited !i·om  a \  .  .11"\ ing mix  of 
export  taxes,  exchange  rate  protection, su bsidised  inputs,  credit  and 
infrastructural  support.  However,  continuing pressure  for  economy-
wide reform is evident, including advocacy of a shift to market-oriented 
agriculture (Hedley, Hadiwigeno and Sarkanputra 1987), and this may 
ultimately provide for a more coordinated policy approach in the 1990s. 
Despite  the  problems associated  with  rice  in  1986 and  1987, this 
industry improved its  performance in  1988 and  1989, yielding a 3.5% 
annual  growth  rate  for  Repelita  IV.  This  in  turn  contributed  to  an 
annual growth rate of 3.3% for the agricultural sector as  a whole for the 
plan  period,  a  more  than  adequate  result,  given  the  circumstances. 
Within an overall growth target of 5% per annum, Repelita V projects a 
3.6%  per annum growth rate for the agricultural sector, with cash crops, 
livestock  and  fisheries  expected  to  reach  between  5.5  and  6.7%  per 
annum, while foodcrops are expected to contribute a more modest 2.8% 
per  annum (rice  alone, 2.9%).  Given  adequate intersectoral terms of 
trade and allocatively-sound sectoral policies, the macroeconomic poli-
cies which have been in  place during the latter half of the decade, and 
which have continued to be supportive of agriculture, should allow this 
sector to continue to make a significant contribution to overall growth. 
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Oxford University Press. Table 2.1.  Indonesia:  GDP, sectoral output shares, selected years, current prices (%). 
Sector  1960  1970  1980  1985  19891' 
AgrinIiturc  53.9  48.6  24.8  23.2  23.5 
- toodcrops  (34.3)  (28.8)  (14.0)  (14.3)  (14.5 ) 
Mining  3.7  5.3  25.7  14.0  13.1 
Manufacturing  8.4  9.0  1l.6  16.0  18.4 
Utilities  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.6 
Construction  2.0  3.1  5.6  5.5  5.3 
Trade  14.3  16.6  14.1  15.9  17.0 
Transport  3.7  3.0  4.3  6.3  S.S 
Government  4.5  5.6  6.9  8.2  6.7 
Other services  9.2  8.2  6.5  10.5  9.9 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
P  Preliminary figures 
Sources:  1960, 1970 Booth and Glassburner (1975). 
1980, World Bank ( 1983). 
1985, 1987 BPS  ational  Income of Indonesia  1984- 1989. 
41 -I>-
1'0 
Table 2.2.  Indonesia: sectoral output shares ofGDP, selected years, constant prices (%). 
Sector  1960 Constant prices 
1960  1970 
Agriculture  53.9  47.5 
-foodcrops  (34.3)  (30.8) 
Mining  3.7  5.6 
Manufacturing  8.4  8.9 
Uti lities  0.3  0.5 
Construction  2.0  2.6 
Trade  14.3  17.5 
Transport  3.7  3.2 
Government  4.5  5.3 
Other services  9.2  8.9 
Total  100 0  100.0 
Revised series 
p  Preliminary  figures 
Sources:  1960, 1970 Booth and Glassburner (1975). 
1975 Glassburner (1978). 
1980, 1983 (1973 constant prices) Booth (1984). 
1973 Constant prices 
1975  1980  1983 
36.8  30.7  29.9 
(22.2)  (18.6)  (18.8) 
10.9  9.3  7.4 
11.1  15.3  15.1 
0.5  0.7  0.9 
4.8  5.7  6.3 
17.0  16.6  17.4 
4.0  5.4  5.9 
7.4  8.7  9.2 
7.6  7.6  7.9 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
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:t  m Table 2.3.  Indonesia: GDI' 1984-1989 at constant  1983 prices (Rp  billion). 
Sector  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989"  Growth 
ratc J 
1984-89" 
Agriculture  18 513  19 300  19799  20 224  21  168  22086  3.5 
- foodcrops  II 680  11  986  12 287  12415  12 974  13446  2.8 
- non-toad crops  2 349  2 576  2 581  2693  2 835  2 999  5. 1 
- estate crops  446  511  562  565  578  607  6.3 
- livestock  1 890  2037  2064  2 I II  2 212  2 324  4.2 
- fo restry  894  851  889  968  1 013  I 083  3.9 
- fisheries  1 253  1 341  1 4 18  1 472  1 557  1 626  5.4 
Mining  17  120  15 480  16309  16366  15893  16727  - 0.5 
Manufacturing  12079  13431  14678  16235  18 182  17836  10.4 
Utilities  324  361  430  495  549  616  13.7 
Construction  4 39.J.  4508  4609  4803  5 259  5878  6.0 
Trade  II 811  12399  13 399  14 356  15657  17 230  7.9 
Transport  4H3  4 487  4 668  4 939  5212  5 667  5. 1 
Government  5997  6455  6862  7 366  7 932  8 397  7.0 
Other  8357  8 661  9 327  9735  9 904  10 884  5.4 
GDI'  83 037  85082  90081  94518  99 936  107 321  5.2 
a  Logari thmic  slope of the line between end points. 
p  I'rcliminarv  j·igurcs. 
Sources:  B  PS  National Income of Indonesia 1984- 1989.  ..,. 
w -I:> 
-I:> 
Table 2.4.  Indonesia:  expenditure on GDP (constant prices) (%). 
Item  1960 Constant prices  1973 Constant prices 
1965  1970 
Household consumption expenditure  82.8  75.3 
Government consumption expenditure  6.7  9.3 
Gross domestic capital formation  8.4  13.8 
Exports of goods and services  13.0  16.1 
Less imports of goods and services  10.9  14.6 
Total  1000  100.0 
P  Preliminary tigures. 
Sources:  1965 Grenville (1973), Table 14. 
1970- 1983 UN National Account Statistics  1983, 1985. 
1985- 1989 Bl'S National Income of Indonesia 1984- 1989. 
1975  1980  1983 
74.7  79.4  89.6 
10.9  13.3  13.7 
21.6  25.9  30.5 
18.5  15.1  11.9 
25.7  34.0  45.7 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
1983 Constant prices 
1985  1986  1987  1988 
58.1  56.1  55.2  54.3 
10.6  10.3  9.8  9.9 
30.9  30.8  29.2  26.3 
22.9  24.9  27.2  26.0 
22.5  22.1  21.5  16.5 
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:t  m Table 2.5.  Indonesia:  implicit price indexes for agricultural and non-agricultural 
contribution to GDP, and ratio of implicit price indexes of the two sectors 
(1973 = 100 and 1983 = lOO). 
Agricultural sector  Non-agricultural sector  Ratio of agricultural 
Year  implicit price index'  implicit price index"  to non-agricultural 
implicit price dcflator" 
(I )  (2)  (3) 
(1973 = 100) 
1970  66.8  58.8  113.6 
1973  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1974  124.4  161.7  76.9 
1975  142.4  179.2  79.5 
1976  163.5  204.4  80.0 
1977  198.1  222.5  89.0 
1978  213.9  249.4  85.8 
1979  276.3  333.3  82.9 
1980  329.6  441.0  74.7 
1981  379.6  477.3  79.5 
1982  426.9  507.9  84.0 
1983  488.1  582.9  83.7 
(1983 = 100)' 
1983  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1984  110.3  107.7  102.4 
1985  116.6  113.4  102.8 
1986  125.6  110.7  113.5 
1987  144.0  128.8  111.8 
1988  161.5  176.0  91.8 
1989p  176.6  149.4  118.2 
a  Index is calculated by dividing the current price by the constant price contribution of 
the sector to GDP. 
b  Ratio is  obtained by dividing column 1 by column 2. 
c  The revised 1983 constant price series. 
p  Preliminary figures. 
Sources:  1970- 1983, UN National Account Statistics, 1983. 
1984- 1989, BPS National Income of Indonesia 1984- 1989. 
45 .p.  ):,0 
Cl)  Table 2.6.  Indonesia: distribution, size and growth of work force, 1970, 1980, 1985.  G)" 
~gj  8s 
r-fll 
1971  1980  1985 
2~ 
~~ 
Sector  ('000)  (%)  ('000)  (%)  Gro\\'th rate  Share of  ('000)  (%)  Gro\\'th rate  Share of  ~:t 
trl~  1971-80'  total  1980- 85'  total  O§  increase  increase  :00 
1971-80'  1980- 85'  <: 
8i 
); 
Agriculture  24964  659  28040  55.5  1.0  20.6  31  142  54.7  3.7  51.0  <: 
trl  Mining  91  0.2  369  0.7  16.5  2.4  416  0.7  2.1  0.4  0 
Manufacturing  2950  7.8  4361  8.6  4.1  11.5  5796  9.3  5.6  12.2  <: 
0 
Utilities  38  0.1  85  0.2  8.9  0.4  70  0.1  -4.1  -0.1  ~ 
-<: 
Construction  741  2.0  1 573  3.1  8.4  7.0  2096  3.4  5.6  4.5  S 
Transport  919  2.4  1468  2.9  5.0  4.5  1958  3.1  5.7  4.2  :t 
Trade  4144  10.9  6611  13.1  5.0  20.4  9345  15.0  7.0  23.5  :;; 
:0 
Finance  96  0.3  233  0.5  10.1  1.2  250  0.4  1.2  0.1  ::j 
Cl 
Public Service  3940  104  7739  15.4  7.5  32.1  8317  13.3  1.2  4.2  ~ 





Total workforce  39475  100.0  51  192  100.0  2.9  100.0  62457  100.0  4.1  100.0  gj 
Distributed proportionatelv among other industries.  ~ 
a  Cl 
fll 
Sources:  1971, 1980 Scherer (1982, Table 9).  0 
1985 BPS (1988) Statistik Indonesia  1988, derived fi'om Table 3.2.8.  :t 
fll Table 2.7.  Indoncsia: Government budget (1988- 89 - 1900-9 I (Rp billion). 
Itcm  1988- 89  1989-90  1990- 91 
(Realised)  (Projected)  (Projected) 
Domestic revenue  23004.3  25249.8  31  583.6 
I.  Oil revenues  9  527.0  7899.7  10783.2 
2.  on-oil  revenues  13477.3  17350.1  20800.4 
Income tax  3 949.4  4947.6  6515.8 
Value-added tax  4 505.3  5 830.9  6824.9 
Customs duties  I  192.0  I 421.2  I 971.8 
Excise taxes  I 389.9  1487.0  I 911.2 
Export taxes  155.6  159.8  107.8 
Land taxes  424.2  638.5  620.4 
Other taxes  292.1  424.6  288.5 
Non-tax  revenue  I  568.8  2047.6  2560.0 
Proceeds fuel sales  392.9 
Development revenue  9990.7  1I 325.1  II 289.5 
I.  Program aid  2040.7  1 798.9  2885.3 
2.  Project aid  7950.0  9 526.2  8404.2 
Total revenue  32 995.0  36574.9  42873.1 
Routine expenditure  20739.0  23445.0  26 648.1 
Wages  4998.2  5966.5  6909.3 
Purchase of goods  1491.6  1 476.6  1720.9 
Subsidies to regions  3037.7  3594.1  4226.7 
Debt service  10940.2  12236.8  12984.4 
Other  271.3  171 .0  806.8 
- Fuel subsidy'  133.1  626.5' 
Development expenditure  12250.7  13129.9  16225.0 
Rupiah funding  4300.7  3603.7  7 820.8 
Govt departments  1 855.3  1474.0  4316.0 
Regional development  I 491.7  1 759.1  2 834.5 
Other  953.7  370.6  670.3 
- Fertiliser subsidy  200.0  155.0  155.0 
Project aid  7950.0  9526.2  8404.2 
Total expenditure  32989.7  36574.9  42873.1 
a  Subsidy phased out March  1990 (Schwarz 1990b, p. 42). 
Sources:  BPS (1989) Indicator Ekonomi  Tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
Pangestu and Habir (1990) Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 2.8.  Indonesia:  balance of payments 1986- 87 - 1990-91 (US$ billion). 
1986-87  1987- 88  1988- 89  1989- 90  1990- 91 
Item  (Realised)  (RC31iscd)  (Realised)  (Realised) (Provisional) 
I. Exports  13.7  18.3  19.8  23.8  27.4 
2. Imports  - 11.5  - 12.9  - 14.3  - 17.4  - 21.5 
3. Nct services  - 6.3  - 7.1  - 7.4  - 8.1  -8.5 
4. Current account  -4.1  -1.7  - 1.9  - 1.6  - 2.6 
5. Ofticial capital  5.5  4.5  6.6  5.5  5.2 
6. Other capital  1.2  1.7  - 0.2  0.6  2.9 
7.  Debt repayment  - 2.1  - 3.0  - 3.8  - 3.7  -4.3 
8. Total  0.5  1.5  0.8  0.8  1.2 
(1- 7) 
Monetary movcments - 1.3  1.6  0.7  - 0.2  - 1.8 
Errors c1I1d  omissions  0.7  0.06  - 1.4  - 0.6  0.7 
Sourccs:  Booth (1988a) Tablc 8. 
Simandjuntak (1989) Tablc 4. 
B  PS ( 1989) I ndikator Ekonomi Tablc 6.1. I. 
Pangestu and HClbir (1990) T,lble 6. 
Parker (1991 ) Table 7. 
48 Cash Crops, Livestock, 
Fisheries and Forestry 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter reviews the agricultural sector other than the foodcrop sub-
sector.  In  1987 the  cash  crop sector (both estate  and smallholder), 
livestock, forestry and fishing together constituted some 39% share of  the 
total agricultural sector, and contributed just over 8%  of GDP in  con-
stant prices. 
Except for palm oil and tea most of the cash crops are produced by 
smallholders (Table 3.1).  The cash crop sector is  predominantly estab-
lished in  the outer islands.  These commercial crops traditionally have 
played  a  large  role  in  foreign  trade  although  this  role  was  reduced 
somewhat in  the 1970s, partly as  a result of declining world commodity 
prices, but mostly as a result of  large increases in export receipts from oil 
and gas.  While Java wields commanding influence in Indonesian agricul-
ture with respect to foodgrain production (its early 1900s contribution 
to agricultural exports having dwindled), Sumatra is the foremost earner 
of  foreign exchange in terms of  commercial crops, oil and gas (Baharsyah 
and Hadi\\'igeno  19R2).  Cash crops sn\'e as  export earI1ns as  \\'dl as 
nKeting  the  needs  of dOIlKstic  consumption,  .1l1d  it  is  in  this  dual 
function  that conflict can  arise  Large  estate  production  tends to  LK 
oriented  almost  cOll1pktely  to  the  export  market,  \\'hiIL  smallholdn 
production (sometimes of interior quality)  is  directed at  both intnnal 
and  u.:tnnal  111 <lI'kets.  Sugar \\'as  an  important export  ClrI1n  bdell'e 
\Vorld  \'Var  IT,  but the  industr\' since  then  has  been  o\Tr\\·hdmed  Lw 
gro\\'ing domestic demand.  Imports became necessary, and onh' no\\' is 
a stage of  near sdf-sufticienn' being reached, albeit ~lt a domestic pricc up 
to fentr  times highn than the \\'orld tll;lrket price  (furthn discussion of 
sugar is  hdd o\'n until  the next chaptn \\'hne it \\'ill  be  discussed  in 
relation to sa/flah rice and pa/a1l'ija, L\'en though statisticall\' it is  treated 
as  a  cash  crop.)  Thne  has  been  contlict  also  between  domestic  and 
export market needs in relation to both coconut and palm-oil during the 
late  1970s and into the 19HOs. 
Anothn  bcto!'  of importance  rdates  to  population  gro\\'th  rates, 
which arc slightl\' higher fell'  the outn islands in  comp;lrison with Ja\'a. 
This bct, togethn with the  push for  transtlligr;ltion  programs, means 
that thne is  an increased reliance on the cash crop sector to prO\'ide for 
increases in  pCI' capita incotlle 
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A further distinction to be noted is  the breakdown of the cash crop 
sub-sector between smallholders and estates.  The latter may be private 
estates (small or large), or large-scale, State-sector enterprises.  The State 
sector  appeared  after  Independence when  many  of the  large  private 
estates were nationalised.  Small private estates continue to operate for 
some crops, while  Government policy  has  encouraged foreign  private 
investment  in  joint-venture  estate  crops  and  'nucleus estate'  projects 
(explained later in chapter).  Moreover, there is  the 'sharp technological 
dualism'  (Booth  1984, p.  27) which  is  manifest  in  the split  between 
smallholder and  estate  production.  This  is  evidenced  by  the  lack  of 
change in smallholder technique, while estates have made large strides in 
technical progress.  Government neglect of the smallholder sector until 
the late 1970s has contributed to the technological divergence between 
the two sectors. 
The livestock and fisheries sub-sectors provide small, though impor-
tant, sources of animal protein in  the Indonesian diet, but have suffered 
from  lack of investment and technology.  BIMAS (intensification) pro-
grams existed for the livestock sector, but like BIMAS for secondary food 
crops, suffered from lack of  implementation for various reasons.  Exports 
of live  cattle ceased in  the mid-1970s although products of this sector 
(e.g. animal hides) are still export earners.  Export of prawns from  the 
fishery  sub-sector  reached  second  place  by  the  mid-1980s  (in  value 
terms) behind coffee in  the agricultural exports category.  In 1988 their 
value was US$498.  7 million while cot  Tee exports were US$549.5 million 
(Table 3.2). 
The forestry sub-sector became a signitlcant export earner for Indon-
esia in the early 1970s in the form of  timber products and was surpassed 
only by  oil  and gas  as  an  earner of foreign  exchange.  A  1979 policy 
decision to begin to phase out the export oflogs (in an dTort to expand 
local  timber industries) caused problems, and there was  a dmvnturn in 
export earnings.  It has  taken  nearly a decade for  timber industry net 
export earnings to recover to the pre-1980 level of export income from 
logs (Mackie and Sjahrir 1989, p.  12).  A ban on raw rattan exports in 
1986, a ban on exports of semi-processed rattan and cane webbing in 
1988  and  an  export  tax  on  sawn  logs  in  1990  have  raised  further 
problems and questions of policy in the forestry sector (see 3.12).  With 
the downturn in  international oil prices the Government had to look to 
the expansion of  non-oil products to increase export earnings.  In fact, by 
1988 a major structural change had emerged in the export pattern as the 
non-oil!  gas sector increased its share to 60% of total exports, of which 
agriculture accounted for  16%.  Indeed, the agricultural sector makes a 
larger contribution to exports than is  implied by this latter percentage, 
since  commodities  like  processed  wood  and  rubber  are  classified  as 
industrial products. 
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The cash crops include rubbn, palm oil, coffee, tea, copra, spices and 
tobacco.  Apart ti'om the basic cultivation constraints (e.g. soil  type and 
weather), these crops all  bee certain common problems with processing, 
marketing, research, o:tension and credit.  A comprehensi\'L review of  all 
these aspects  is  not  ~lttempted for each crop, but rderences to furthn 
reading are  provided.  Here an  attempt will  be  made to highlight the 
special  constrain  ts  on  one  crop  (ru  bbLl'),  togethn wi th  men  tion  of 
present progress and future plans for the othn crops. 
3.3  Rubber 
Indonesia  is  second  to  Malavsi~l  in  the  world  production  of ruhber 
(having held numbLl' one spot until 19S7).  Around 70% is produced by 
smallholdLl's (mainly in SUlllatra and Kalinuntan) \\'hile estates account 
for the remaining 30'X),  of which State-o\\'ned entnprises produce  18% 
and private estates 12% (lhrlow and Muharminto 1982).  The l"SA and 
Singapore are the major export markets, with the ti)J'll1Cr  taking around 
46-47% of the total during most of the  19805. 
3.3.1  S'Yllflllholdcr rllbber 
Snullholder production  tilrms  p.ut of the  shifting cultivation  system, 
normally tillll1d  in  remote areas, whne land is  cleared and rice or othLl' 
intLl'crop~ are  planted  \\'ith  unselected  (i.e.  not high -yielding)  I'll bbLl' 
seedlings till' about three  year.~.  AttLl' this time the growing rubhn tree 
canopy obscures the sunlight ~lI1d the n~ltural soil nutrients are exl1<lllsted 
(tLTtilisLl' and chemicals are rare h' lIsed ).  following ab~ll1donment of  the 
area it is  about ten Yell'S  before these rubber trees are tapped, while the 
system allows tilr mature trees to be rested if output declines or price hlls 
(Itlrlow ~lI1d Mulurminto 1982, pp. 90-1).  The product of  snullholdLl' 
rubbn is  the 10\\' qualin' 'slab', rarely the better quality 'sheet'.  Bar!O\\' 
and J\/luharminto (1982, p. (3) dra\\' a picture ofa 'V~lst unimproved area 
of ru bbn smallholdns, \\'ith  virtually no use  being made of new tech-
nologies'.  These  authors  outline  the  easil~'  ~l\'ailable  technology  as: 
higher-yielding selected seedlings,  mainten.lnce methods till'  immature 
plants, more careful tapping methods  ~ll1d bettn processing techniques. 
This technology is  widely med in  M,llaYsia, Thailand and Sri  Llllka, but 
has  made  no impact at all  in  Indonesia.  The existing system  can  be 
argued  to  have  some economic  rationale  in  terms of cnlde extensive 
exploitation of  widening areas, but Ihrlow and Muharminto believe new 
knowledge  aV~lilable to snullholders would result in  better exploitation 
of traditional  resources.  They  suggest  a  'dispersal  approach'  to  the 
improvement of  smallholder rubber which would incorporate four basic 
changes - planting with selected seedlings, increased density of  rapping, 
raising the standard of resource exploitation and improving brmLr edu-
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cation.  With the addition of  extension services and iimited input subsi-
dies this proposal was put forward as a policy alternative or supplement to 
oHtcial programs. 
A significant aspect of the official  programs was the restructuring of 
agricultural research in  1975.  This confirmed the position of rubber by 
making it one of a four-pronged research approach.  IDA credit during 
the 1970s was  granted for  high-yielding variety programs on Govern-
ment estates, complemented later by some assistance to private estates. 
Loans and grants from  the World Bank were extended to smallholders 
and to the 'nucleus estate' scheme or NES (see 3.10.2) which covered 
rubber and other cash  crops.  A  further project involving smallholder 
rubber was commenced in  1981 with the establishment of  a scheme for 
the rehabilitation and extension of  export crops (PRPTE) which covered 
rubber and other crops like coffee. 
In reviewing  these Government initiatives  Barlow and  Muharminto 
(1982) believe  that the special  schemes to assist  the smallholder mo-
nopolise the comparatively small  number of extension workers, leaving 
them no time to assist farmers outside the schemes.  They consider that 
their 'dispersal' approach would be able to dispense the benefits of new 
technology  much  more  widely  and  in  part  supplement  the  existing 
schemes. 
3.3.2  Estate rubber 
Some 30%  of rubber is  produced  by  estates  and  the  1973  Census of 
Plantation Rubber showed nearly halfwere on Java, 44% on Sumatra and 
the remaining 8%  on other islands (mainly Kalimantan).  Montgomery 
(1978) in  analysising the data noted the 44% increase in yields between 
1963 and 1973 for estate rubber.  He proposed various possible explana-
tions for the productivity increase including: 
(a)  accelerated change in  certain provinces; 
(b) clonal variety, cultural methods, tapping methods and frequency 
of tapping; 
(c)  replanting, new planting and changes in the age structure; and 
(d) more  widespread  use  of stimulants  (Etherel)  and  chemical 
fertilisers. 
Montgomery's investigations confirmed three of  these factors as possi-
ble  sources  of growth  - replanting,  increased  use  of tertiliser  and 
pesticide and use of stimulants.  Apart from  replanting and consequent 
alteration in  the age structure of trees, the increase in  fertiliser use was 
judged to be the most striking change.  Between 1963 and 1973 usage of 
fertiliser increased from 10 860 tonnes to 50000 tonnes (with the rise in 
Sumatra being over 600% ), while pesticide use was also extremely high, 
involving  a  multiplicity  of types.  Use  of stimulants  (to  inhibit  the 
52 coagulation of latex  veins  once opened for  tapping)  is  recommended 
only on adult trees over 15 years old, but appears to be used inappropri-
ately on young trees, inviting damage during their later production years. 
The  yields  on  estates  continued  to  grow  during  the  1970s  with 
Government estates averaging 725 kg (per planted ha) in  1977, foreign 
estates  753 kg  and  private  Indonesian  estates  291 kg  (Baharsyah  and 
Hadiwigeno 1982, p.  87).  This compares with a smallholder (outside of 
special projects) average of290 kg.  The technology differences between 
the estates and smallholders are multif.'lceted.  Estate use of  high-yielding 
varieties of plants responsive to fertiliser  is  further enhanced by careful 
monitoring of the age structure of trees.  Smallholders use virtually no 
fertiliser or pesticide, fe\-v  weed their trees, and the price structure they 
face  is  quite different from  the estate sector, with the latter's access  to 
capital,  research  and  technology,  marketing and  transport advantages 
(Montgomery 1978, p.  81).  Whether the policy changes already initi-
ated  by  the new schemes will  assist smallholders to upgrade, as  is  the 
avowed intention, remains to be seen. 
During the 1970s export earnings from rubber increased as a result of 
increased  prices  rather than  output, but the  low  prices  of the  1980s 
produced a substantial fall  in  production in  1982 (Table 3.1), attributed 
to the  smallholder sector.  The recovery of prices  in  1983 and  1984 
brought 1984 exports to a peak ofUS$45 million (Table 3.2) before a 
further  price  slump  reduced  export earnings  by  nearly  US$5  million. 
Prices recovered during 1986, and remained at about the same level  in 
1987 until  unexpected  bad  weather in  South-east Asian  countries re-
sulted in  a large price increase in  the first half of 1988.  Stocks, built up 
during  the  life  of the  first  International  Natural  Rubber  Agreement 
(INRA I)  which  expired  in  October 1987, were  rapidly  depleted.  It 
appears, however, that Indonesia may not have benefited to the fi.dlest 
extent during the 1988 price increase, as  the bulk of its exports do not 
pass  through established  markets, being sold directly to consumers in 
private deals.  This apparently prevents exporters obtaining full  market 
value  (EIU  1988a,  p.  23).  To  reduce  this  perceived  disadvantage 
Indonesia decided  to undertake a  new  regional  policy initiative.  This 
involved calling a meeting in  March 1988 with Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand to put forward a set of  proposals for establishing a coordinated 
marketing strategy(EIU 1988a, pp. 23-4).  While this initiative has yet 
to yield results, there is some indication of  progress toward standardising 
rubber futures trading contracts between Indonesia and Singapore (EIU 
1988b, p. 22). 
In another policy move the Government announced plans to ban the 
export of one particular grade of rubber, Standard Indonesia  Rubber 
(SIR) 50, from  1 January 1989.  This was  aimed at ensuring adequate 
supplies  for  the domestic rubber-products industry which  is  presently 
expanding very rapidly (EIU 1988b, p. 22).  Meanwhile, in a reaction to 
the price increases in the early part of1988, prices fell again in October. 
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The price of  the main export grade of  rubber, SIR 20, fell  by SO% during 
the year July 1988 to July  1989.  Despite the renegotiation of a new 
rubber agreement, INRA II (which began on 29 December 1988), the 
virtual depletion of the buffer stock, and consequent hopes for stability 
in  the  world  market,  the  Indonesian  industry  has  suffered  a  further 
setback.  The falling rubber price, which has continued into early 1990, 
has  been exacerbated by rising producer costs.  These costs are attribut-
able  largely  to  increased  electricity  charges,  VAT  charges  on  related 
services,  and  higher  interest  rates  on  export  credit,  the  result  of a 
reduction in  the previous rate of  subsidy (EIU 1989b, pp. 24- S).  Fears 
are  expressed  that  this  squeeze  on  profitability  may  result  in  a  large 
number of  the crumb rubber factories closing (there are an estimated 90 
at present), with consequent implications for exports and employment. 
Perhaps more importantly, the downturn in  profitability and pessimistic 
outlook might induce smallholders to decrease tapping and turn to other 
actJVltles.  This,  in  turn,  would  reduce  prospects  for  achieving  the 
targeted production level of  1.S million tonnes by the end of  Repelita V. 
Production has grown annually at around 3% during 1981 to 1988, and 
Repelita V has set a target growth rate of  production from 1988 to 1993 
of S.4%  per annum, although area growth is scheduled at only O.S%  per 
annum (ROI 1988, Tables IV.D.4 and IV.D.S). 
3.4  Coffee 
The coffee industry dates back well over 200 years in  Indonesian history 
and,  as  is  the  usual  case  with  export  cash  crops,  its  story  is  one of 
fluctuating fortunes.  A shift of coffee tree variety was made in  the early 
part of  this century when Robusta supplanted the disease-prone Arabica, 
which is still cultivated in a few  higher altitude areas, although it consti-
tutes only about S%  of exports.  Some 9S%  of total production is  now 
from  smallholders, mainly on the outer islands  where production still 
continues to expand, with Sumatra accounting for around two-thirds of 
production.  Java  has  only about 10 to 12%  of smallholder coffee, but 
accounts  for  most of the  (small)  estate  sector whose  importance de-
clined, as  a result of price falls  during the Depression years.  The estate 
sector has been slow to recover in importance despite the Government's 
change of  emphasis on foreign investment. 
During the 1970s production grew steadily at around 8%  per annum 
(McStocker  1987) and  during the  1981- 88  period  has  continued to 
grow at around 3%  annually.  Repelita V has projected a growth rate of 
2.8% per annum to 1993 (ROT 1988, Table IV.D.4).  Coffee makes few 
demands on the smallholder (except during the harvesting season it is 
often grown in an intercrop system, does reasonably well with minimum 
care, and is thus considered by many farmers as an ideal 'speculative' crop 
when it is  not the primary source of income.  However, this method of 
production, in addition to the haphazard methods of  harvesting (unripe 
54 berries, inefficient bean separation from shell and unclean drying) results 
in  coffee  beans of poor quality  (Baharsyah  and  Hadiwigeno  1982, p. 
159).  McStocker (1987, p. 49) presents conflicting evidence regarding 
yields,  so  that  there  is  no  firm  indication  that  estate  production  is 
superior to smallholder cultivation where coffee is concerned.  However, 
estates  do  use  a  more  capital-intensive  method  of post-harvest  bean 
technology, resulting in  the production of  a superior-quality dry bean. 
An  increase in  coffee prices in  1975 was short-lived, but showed the 
potential  of the  crop  as  it  pushed  coffee  into  third  place  in  export 
ranking, after oil/gas and timber.  Prices  fell  again  in  1981 and  1982 
Mter  a  peak  of US$655  million  in  1979- 80,  the  value  of exports 
decreased during 1983-85. A new peak was  reached  for  both volume 
and value in 1986 (Table 3.2), following the Brazilian crop failure of  that 
year and a consequent increase  in  world prices.  Despite a  continued 
increase in production (Table 3.1) and stability in the volume of  exports, 
the value of  exports has fallen during 1987 and 1988.  Prices fell again in 
1989  after  the  suspension  of quotas,  and  exports  for  that  year  are 
expected to decline in value by about one-fifth (Schwarz 1989b, p. 44). 
Part of the difficulties experienced by  the Indonesian coffee industry 
during  the  recent  past  have  revolved  around  its  participation  in  the 
International Com':e Organization (lCO), responsible for the implemen-
tation of the International Coffee Agreement (lCA).  The leO, whose 
membership included all  major producers and consumers, has allocated 
world export quotas among member countries in  an attempt to keep a 
moving-average  indicator price  for  coffee  within  the  bounds of a  set 
range (e.g. from 1980 to early 1989 this range was  US$1.20-1.40jlb). 
Member country quotas were set, by negotiation, for export sales within 
the IeO membership.  Those countries who were not members ofICO, 
largely the Soviet Union and its satellites (McStocker 1987, pp. 44-5), 
purchased coffee on the so-called non-quota market.  In Indonesia's case 
the quota market allocation  was  5.19%  in  1987- 88  (slightly  up  ti'om 
4.75% previously), but a quota which accounted for only about 54% of 
domestic production, and which Indonesia believed did not reflect her 
status as  the world's third largest coffee producer (EIU 1989b, p. 24). 
Indonesia attempted to recoup her losses on the quota market by sales 
on  tl1e  non-quota  market  (to which  she  was  a  leading  exporter),  al-
though from  time to time  the ICO also imposed restrictions on non-
quota sales.  Moreover, the non-quota sales were more often than not 
undertaken at a discount. 
Although  two  separate  rounds  of talks  failed  by  mid-1989 to  re-
negotiate  a  ne\",  coffee  agreement and  in  July  1989 the IeO export 
quotas were suspended for  two years,  it is  unlikely  that a deregulated 
international  market will,  in  the  space  of two years,  prove  to  be  tl1e 
answer to domestic coffee industry problems.  The major problems for 
the industty involve  the quality of production, previously  mentioned, 
and the predominance of  the Robusta variety in local production.  There 
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has been a shift in  world demand from the Robusta variety to the milder 
Arabica, reflected in  1988 in  unprecedently wide price differentials be-
tween the two varieties (EIU 1988c, p. 21), which the ICO attempted to 
reduce with selective quota increases for the Arabica variety.  In a recent 
response  to these problems the Government has  announced plans for 
upgrading of bean  quality,  together  with  encouragement of higher-
altitude growers to replant with Arabica (EIU 1989b, p.  24).  There is 
hope in  Indonesia that the deregulated international market will  force 
rationalisation on the world industry, and that Indonesia's lowcost pro-
duction profile will  help her to withstand any long-run associated prob-
lems.  Nevertheless,  there  are  predictions of short-term  costs  to this 
strategy, especially as export constraints in the form of a new agreement 
in September 1991 are probably inevitable, and a larger quota share is by 
no means assured. 
The USA imported the largest share of  the Indonesian crop until 1986 
when Japan  took the  number one position in  the trade  for  1987 and 
1988.  In the light of the 1986 record export figure, McStocker (1987) 
argued that Indonesia should embark upon a production push for coffee 
since  he  believes  that,  despite  25  years  of fluctuations  in  real  cofTee 
prices,  the  world  price  will  remain  high  enough  to  offer  favourable 
returns  into the  foreseeable  future.  He  believes  also  that yields  and 
quality could be improved, and that the low opportunity cost of coffee 
grown on surplus land (particularly by migrants to transmigration areas) 
makes coffee a cheap source of foreign exchange. 
3.5  Tea 
Tea plants were introduced to Indonesia in  the 1820s and  both estate 
and smallholder production \vere well  established by  the beginning of 
the 1900s.  The depression of  the 1930s brought the usual price decline 
problems, while  the war years  devastated whole areas  and  many  trees 
were  uprooted  to  plant  food  crops.  Unlike  most other commercial 
crops, including tree crops, the tea bush matures at around ten years, but 
its reproductive lite with pruning 'can be well  in excess of one hundred 
years' (Etherington 1974, p. 84). 
In 1957 the Dutch plantations were nationalised and became Govern-
ment  estates  known  as  PNP  or  PTP  (the  distinction  depending  on 
corporate structure and accountability).  The breakdown of tea produc-
tion between estates (public and private) and smallholders has changed 
significantly over the period of the New Order Government.  In 1964 
State-owned plantations accounted for 30% of  area and 47% of produc-
tion, while between 1964 and 1979 smallholder and private estate areas 
planted fell, as did their contribution to total production (Baharsyah and 
Hadiwigeno 1982, p.  173).  By 1984 smallholders contributed only 21 % 
of production and their yields  were  only about half that obtained on 
State plantations (although private plantation yields were even lower). 
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output has exceeded demand, with a consequent stock build-up.  India 
and Sri Lanka dominate the market with more than a 50% share.  Indone-
sia's best export year, 1984, resulted when world prices increased follow-
ing a reduction in  Indian tea exports.  The USA and Pakistan are  the 
major export markets for Indonesian tea.  Tea produced for export is  of 
the black variety, which  is  quite different from  the green and scented 
varieties preferred by the domestic market, so that excess export produc-
tion cannot be sold on domestic markets when world prices fall.  State-
owned plantations grow black  tea  for  export, while  smallholders  and 
private  estates  produce green  and  scented  tea  for  a  domestic  market 
where demand is  not strong.  This  particular constraint must receive 
close  consideration if further expansion of the tea industry is  contem-
plated.  Etherington (1974) argued that, given the world tea situation as 
well  as  the  dictates  of domestic  demand, any  tea  industry expansion 
might  indeed  be  questioned.  However,  he  pointed  to  the  labour-
intensive nature of  the crop (harvesting) and the implications of  that fact, 
together with the potential for productivity increases on estates, as  two 
factors which also needed consideration. 
Meanwhile,  despite  the  above  constraints  and  despite  world  price 
fluctuations, production has continued to increase except in  1982 (Table 
3.1) when drought and volcanic activity brought a temporary reduction. 
Following 1984 when export value  almost doubled over the previous 
year's total, export value declined again in 1985, reaching a low in 1986, 
with a gradual improvement in value during 1987 and 1988 (Table 3.2), 
after a recovery in world prices.  Export volume also recovered in  1987 
and 1988 following a low in 1986.  Repelita V projects a growth in area 
cultivated of tea of  2% per annum to 1993, while production is expected 
to grow at 4% per annum for the same period (ROI 1988, Tables IV.D.5 
and IV.D.4), a production growth rate less than the 1981 to 1988 period 
of  over 6% annually. 
3.6  Palm oil 
Palm oil  is  produced almost completely from  estates with  smallholder 
production being extremely small  (1080 million tonnes in  1984 com-
pared with 3.5 million tonnes), although there is  now some encourage-
ment under the  Nucleus  Estate System  (see  3.10.2) to extend small-
holder production.  Indonesia is  the world's second largest producer of 
palm oil after Malaysia, and most production is concentrated on Sumatra. 
As  domestic demand for coconut oil grew during the 1970s and even 
exports redirected to domestic demand failed  to fulfil  needs, palm oil 
supply was increased to help fill  the gap.  In fact, domestic preference is 
for coconut oil  and palm  oil in  the past has had to be  blended with a 
certain amount of coconut oil or flavoured with a coconut oil  taste to 
make it acceptable (Gwyer and Avontroodt 1974, p. 99).  In addition, 
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palm  oil  needs  to  undergo  a  relatively  expensive  refining  process  to 
convert it to a liquid.  A Government policy decision of 1979 ordered 
that 60%  of palm oil  production be allocated for  domestic needs at  a 
price below world market prices (Teken and Soewardi 1982, p. 93), and 
by  1981 Government regulation  forced  almost all  the crop on to the 
domestic market (Arndt 1981).  Exports remained restricted in  1983 in 
an effort to prevent domestic price rises  (cooking oil  is  one of the nine 
basic commodities), and export opportunities were neglected. 
Exports during the late  1970s reached over 400 000 tonnes before 
Government intervention, fell  during the early years of the  1980s as  a 
result of that intervention, and  recovered  significantly  in  volume  be-
tween 1985 and 1988.  However, prices have  been volatile during this 
latter period, rising to US$740/t in  March 1986 before rapidly falling 
within the month to US$235/t, thereafter reaching a low of US$190/t 
in  August  1986.  Indonesia  (and  Malaysia)  contributed  to  the  price 
volatility during 1985 and 1986.  Mter increased coconut oil production 
allowed domestic vegetable oil demands to be met, export restrictions on 
palm oil were relaxed and large amounts were placed on a world market 
already suffering a glut of subsidised vegetable oils  from  USA  and the 
EC.  Prices increased again during 1987 and early 1988, partly the result 
of adverse  weather  (US  drought  conditions),  but  peaked  mid-year, 
averaging US $437/t for 1988 (FAO 1989, Table 67). 
The short- and medium-term prospects for palm oil have been uncer-
tain, partially as  a result of  actions by other countries.  Soybean growers 
in  the US  have advocated the rejection of 'tropical' oils on the basis of 
health hazards, and the EC, in  1987, attempted to levy a consumption 
tax on vegetable oils and fats, both domestically produced and imported. 
As the EC (and the Netherlands in particular) is  the main export market 
for Indonesian palm oil, taking over two-thirds in  1985, and one-half in 
1987, the defeat of this latter proposal was of particular importance. 
Another factor which has influenced palm oil  prospects has been the 
change in  Government policy.  vVorld prices of  palm oil and coconut oil 
began to diverge in 1985 and have continued to widen, so that by  1988 
they averaged US$437/t and US$568/t, respectively (FAO 1989, Table 
67).  This led, in 1987, to a reversal of  the policy of  retaining coconut oil 
for the domestic market and exporting palm  oil.  In fact, both oils were 
being exported and  domestic demand for  cooking oil  was  met by  an 
allocation  of palm  oil  from  domestic  production, supplemented with 
lower-priced  Malaysian  palm  oil  imports  during  1987  (EIU  1988b, 
p. 23).  At the same time export restrictions for palm oil still applied, and 
the oil  producers association (GAPKl) has  lobbied for  the abolition of 
these restrictions.  They also sought the withdrawal of a 10% export tax 
on palm oil imposed on 1 January 1989, on the argument that it reduced 
export  competitiveness  in  traditional  markets  (EIU  1989c,  p.  25). 
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promotion of the industry, with particular emphasis being given to the 
setting-up of  domestic refining capacity so that processed oil will eventu-
ally dominate over crude palm oil. 
The growth rates of production of  palm oil and palm kernel between 
1981 and1988 were over 15% and 17% per annum, respectively, reHect-
ing  to a  large  extent the key  role  given  to oil  palm in  the  tree  crop 
development strategy of  the 1980s.  Area planted of  palm oil (estate and 
smallholder) rose from 270 000 ha in 1981 to 729000 ha in 1987 (BPS 
1985, 1988), or a rate of  around 18% annually.  Despite the difficulties 
resulting  from  international  price  instability  and  problems  related  to 
competition  from  vegetable  oils,  the  Government  has  projected  area 
planted to oil  palm  to continue to grow during Repelita  V  at  11.8% 
annually, and production to grow at 19.3% annually (RO! 1988, Tables 
IV.D.5 and IV.D.4). 
3.7  Copra 
In contrast to palm oil, copra is  produced almost exclusively by  small-
holders, scattered over all islands.  The traditional supply of  edible oil to 
the Indonesian domestic market had been from locally-grown copra.  In 
the early 1970s exports declined as  domestic demand overtook supply, 
coinciding with a general world shortage of  edible oils.  By the late 1970s 
Indonesia \vas  importing copra (or coconut oil)  which  had  previously 
been an export crop (Teken and Soewardi, 1982, p. 92).  Some replant-
ing took place in 1975 in  response to world demand and, in 1979, high-
yielding hybrid seedlings became available.  However, just as  the trees 
were beginning to produce, the 1982 drought brought some damage to 
the stock.  Production fell  in  1982 and 1983 (Table 3.1) but recovered 
in  1985 when exports again  became feasible.  Despite the drought in 
1987 Indonesia increased the volume of  coconut oil exports and by 1988 
exports were reported at 207 000 tonnes, second only to the Philippines 
in  world trade (EIU 1989c, p.  25). 
As  noted in  the previous section, there has been a reversal of  Govern-
ment policy  which  retained coconut oil  for  the domestic  market and 
exported palm oil.  Indeed, vegetable oil pricing policy was subject to a 
review which commenced on 1 July 1989, but further policy changes are 
so far  unannounced.  Higher world prices for coconut oil, partly result-
ing from  reduced Philippines exports, have encouraged Indonesian ex-
ports.  These exports are  backed  by  expanded  area  under production 
(almost  doubled  between  1970  and  1987 to  3.2  million  ha)  and  a 
renewed  emphasis  on  research,  replanting  and  use  of hybrid  stock. 
Repelita V projects an  area  growth of only 0.3%  per annum although 
production is  expected to grow at 5%  per annllm (ROI 1988, Tables 
IV.D.5 and IV.D.4). 
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3.8  Spices 
Spice production is a major source of  income for some smallholders, with 
cloves, black and white pepper, nutmeg and mace being among the more 
important crops.  Indonesia dominates the world nutmeg market and is 
second to India in pepper exports.  Cloves are grown purely tor domestic 
consumption (used in locally-consumed kretek cigarettes) and for several 
years imports were necessary.  Home production increased in  1982 to 
32.4 million tonnes and continued this trend to 55.9 million tonnes in 
1987  (BPS  1988).  Clove  production  can,  however,  be  considered 
somewhat hazardous as it is hindered by the existence of  a disease known 
as  'Sumatra disease'  (Gwyer and Avontroodt 1974 p.  61).  Between 
1968 and 1976 some 70% of  clove trees in West Sumatra were destroyed 
by the disease and, although research has located the source, no control 
measures are as yet available (AARD Newsletter, 1986).  Cloves are also 
the subject of a floor price scheme although it is  seldom, if ever, called 
into play (Daroesman 1981, p.  24). 
Pepper is producing improved cash returns for smallholders, as during 
the  mid-1980s  world  prices  increased  after  several  depressed  years. 
Between  1984 and  1988  the  volume  of exports of white  and  black 
pepper rose from 34 million kg to 35 million kg, while export receipts 
rose  from  US$64 million  to  US$150  million  (BPS  1988).  In  1988 
pepper accounted for 67% of the total value of  spice exports.  However, 
during 1989 an infestation of the fungus phytophthora (toot rot) was 
reported from Bangka (EIU 1989c, p. 25).  This island produces white 
pepper  and  accounts  for  over  half of total  pepper  production. 
Phytophthora  is  the  pepper plant's  most  serious  disease,  and  it  was 
thought (Vinning 1989, p. 61) that the Indonesian cultivars were resist-
ant to the disease.  So far  the other major producing area, Lampung, 
appears to be free of the disease. 
Repelita V projects a growth rate of 4.2% per annum for area under 
pepper production, with output scheduled to grow at  2.3%  annually. 
Only 0.1  % per annum area growth is envisaged for cloves, while produc-
tion  is  expected to grow at 5.6%  per annum.  Projected  nutmeg area 
growth during Repelita V is 0.3% per annum, with production growth at 
0.5% per annum (ROI 1988, Tables IV.D.5 and IV.D.4).  According to 
Vinning (1989), the prospects for nutmeg and mace are not encourag-
ing.  The cartel formed by Indonesia and Grenada to coordinate market-
ing  and  help  stabilise  prices  was  not  functioning  smoothly,  possibly 
partly as  a result of  static world demand. 
3.9  Tobacco 
As with several of  the other cash crops the story of tobacco goes back to 
the  Indonesia of last  century.  The 1920s were  the high peak of the 
tobacco industry which  collapsed  with  tl1e  1930s Depression  and re-
mained stagnant through the war years.  In 1957 the Dutch plantations 
60 were  taken  over and  became public sector enterprises  (referred  to as 
PTP), but they constitute less than 10% of  production with smallholders 
now dominating the industry.  The early days of tobacco were concen-
trated  upon  the  production  of cigar  tobacco,  the  famous  'Deli'  of 
Sumatra and 'Na-oogst' of East Java, which were large export earners. 
Virginia  tobacco is  also grown, but in  insufficient  quantities as  yet to 
meet  the  demand of domestic  manufacturers,  and  imports  continue. 
Some cigar-tobacco farmers have shifted to Virginia tobacco production 
to provide a more assured, but possibly lower, income.  Only 15% of/ocal 
tobacco production was exported in 1988 and the volume of  exports fell 
between 1981 and 1988.  Low international prices and increased domes-
tic demand appears to have been responsible for the fall in export volume 
in the early 1980s, while the low points of 1984 and 1987 are most likely 
the result of  rice and drought, respectively.  Area planted also fell  during 
1984 and  1987.  In 1988 both export volume and value  fell  to their 
lowest point of the decade. 
Mackie  (1985, p. llS) points to tobacco as  one of the casualties of 
expanded  rice  production.  It is  possible  that increased  emphasis  on 
soybean may also have played a part.  Originally cigar tobacco was a short 
season crop (two months from planting to harvest) which complemented 
rice on sawah, but the advent of the also short growing season of high-
yielding rice has resulted in some decline in  the old comparative advan-
tage of tobacco, especially with the assured price of rice  under the floor 
price scheme.  Even so, it would seem that the future prospects of  cigar 
tobacco are clouded by the fairly static world market prospects.  Virginia 
tobacco, once home consumption demands are met and imports wiped 
out, will  face  exactly the same world tobacco prospects, constrained by 
the  growing  health  awareness  and  smoking  restraints.  Despite  the 
evident export prospects (but possibly with an eye on import demand for 
Virginia tobacco), the  Government continues with  intensification pro-
grams  to raise  productivity, particularly of smallholders.  The  Federal 
Republic of Germany takes  over  half of Indonesia's  tobacco  exports, 
whjle the USA accounted for 13% in 1988.  Repelita V projects growth in 
area and production at 3.6 and 7.8% per annum, respectively (ROI 1988, 
Tables rV.D.S and IV.D.4). 
3.10  Government Initiatives in the Cash Crop Sector 
Government  initiatives  cover  a  range  of programs  for  the  cash  crop 
sector.  Where large State run plantations are concerned, direct interven-
tion and assistance  is  fairly  easy  to implement.  To develop  the small-
holder cash crop sector the Government has  organised a series of pro-
grams, the foremost being the Nucleus Estate System (NES), which is 
supplemented  by  Smallholder  Programs  (since  the  NES  is  not  large 
enough to cover all  farmers).  Where necessary further specific types of 
commodity programs  may  also  be  set  up  (e.g.  cloves  and  coconut). 
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Research and extension is under the direction of  the Ministry of  Agricul-
ture.  There has been also an attempt to improve marketing, so that the 
smallholder receives at least 70% of  the f.o.  b. price of  his product (Booth 
1984).  The abolition or reduction of many export taxes has helped this 
goal.  However, as mentioned in Section 3.6, export taxes continue to be 
imposed (e.g. a 10% tax on palm oil from 1 January 1989). 
3.10.1 Research and extension 
The Directorate General of Estate Crops within the Ministry of  Agricul-
ture is  responsible for the direction of  policy within the cash crop sector, 
both smallholder and Government or private estates.  The direct respon-
sibility is greatest for the Government estates.  Within the Ministry there 
exists  an  Agency for  Agricultural Research  and Development (AARD) 
which is  responsible for all  research, and it in  turn directs  the Central 
Research  Institutes  on  coconuts,  tobacco,  fibres,  spice  and  pepper 
(Baharsyah and Hadiwigeno 1982, p.  148).  Extension work is  under-
taken by the Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension 
(AAETE).  Within  the  Ministry  structure  there  is  also  the  BIMAS 
Secretariat and two further directorates which oversee animal husbandry 
and fisheries.  The latter two sub-sectors are dealt with in later sections of 
this chapter. 
3.10.2 The Nucleus Estate System (NES) 
The  Government has  declared  NES  'to be  the  principal  approach  to 
develop  smallholder  commercial  crop  farming'  (Baharsyah  and 
Hadiwigeno,  1982,  p.  173).  This  scheme  commenced  in  1977  to 
provide for the transfer of  technology from the large estates (where yields 
had increased substantially) to smallholder farmers.  The idea was for the 
large estates (the nucleus) to gather round them the surrounding farmers 
and provide an example of how higher yields could be achieved, provide 
processing  facilities  for  smallholders,  show  how  to  improve  product 
quality and assist farmers with marketing expertise, or even extend their 
own marketing facilities for use by smallholders.  Booth (1984) classifies 
NES  as  a  land  development  program,  mainly  for  transmigrants,  and 
Daroesman (1981) describes NES as  essentially a program of regional 
development, although officially designated to assist the smallholder and 
improve export crops.  Both descriptions are correct.  Squatter tilrmers 
and shifting cultivators, especially those occupying land and having no 
formal ownership proof, are given first  priority of participation.  Where 
new land is opened up farmers are initially paid wages for three years until 
formal land title is  given.  Twenty-year credit is  provided, since the full 
cost of clearing and planting/replanting (except overheads) is  borne by 
the  farmer.  Transmigrants are  settled  under the same  terms, and  the 
NES is expected to operate in close liaison with transmigration schemes. 
62 l),lnlCSn1.1n sa\'s the main problem of:-\ES is statling of  the existing large 
plantations (the nucleus) and their ahilit\· to cope with the extra demands 
made upon them Lw  the :-\ES scheme. 
for some crops the nucleus estate is ,llso expected to act as  a contr,l(-
tor in  extending ,1ITaS  under cultiLltion  (e.g.  rubber and sugar).  The 
TRI sugar program ( Tdm  Rtlltynt Illtm..-ifilw..-i)  is  a special  case of the 
:-\ES  program.  Ihh,lI's\',lh  and H,ldi\\'igeno ( 1982) suggest the NES is 
most suitable for rubber and oil p'llm.  Coffee 11.1s  not been added to the 
list  because  inefticient pest  control on  the  part of smallholders might 
imperil  estate crops.  The\' suspect there  may  ,llso  be problems arising 
bct\\'een estate and sn1.1llholder cottee growers, because the two groups 
h,l\"(  ditferent outlooks and expectations. 
3.10.3 SJlltlllholdcr aJ/d (01Jl1/1l1Jlz'ty pro.!Ftllll.1 
'A'here  there  are  not  enough  nucleus  estates  established  to  prm'ide 
examples t()r surrounding brmers, the special smallholder programs are 
meant  to  till  this  niche  ,1I1d  do  <l  similar  job.  These  arc  sometimes 
described  as  the smallholder cooperative programs or l'PP.  In  some 
respects the programs <lrelikened to the BIMAS approach f()r [(lOdcwps, 
in that assistance is in the t()rm of  subsidised (longer-term) credit.  Booth 
(1984) points to the inflexible nature of the credit package (a mistake of 
the origin,)1  BIMAS).  She also  ack.nowledges  the need [()r  smallholder 
credit and considers that an\' subsidy clement ma\'  be  justified  by  the 
burden of  export taxes imposed on this sector t()r many years.  Although 
Bank Indonesia (the central hank) mm'L'li to cut subsidised credit in early 
1990 (Schwarz 1990a, p. 56) certain categories including farmers were 
exempted.  Lending for  farmers  was  to continue at  a  rate of 16%  as 
against a prime rate of 20%.  Another type of  scheme is  the commodity 
program.  In  1981  a  scheme for  the rehabilitation and extension  of 
export crops (PRPTE) was set up to cover crops like rubber, coffee and 
coconuts.  The program aims to provide high-yielding stocks of  plants to 
farmers on their own land, with long-term investment credit and crop 
supervision until the plants reach bearing age. 
3.10.4 Recent policy changes and the NES 
The NES is  the central peg of the Government strategy for smallholder 
development and the World Bank  has  financed  seven  NES projects in 
conjunction  with  the  relevant  State  plantations.  However,  declining 
commodity prices  (especially  the  1986 palm oil  price fall),  has  meant 
some State plantations have run into financial problems, especially those 
whose management has not been as  efficient as  it might have been.  A 
further plank of  Government policy is to interest toreign investors in the 
NES scheme, and  to this end an initial  20%  ownership share in  estate 
crops and NES was set.  Hovvever, this land ownership rate is considered 
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unprofitable from a strictly commercial viewpoint (Handley 1986) and 
little  interest  has  been  shown  by  private  investors.  Another  factor 
mentioned by Hill (1984) for the apparent reluctance to invest is that the 
leasehold  is  only  35  years  compared with  99  years  in  Malaysia,  and 
investment in agro-business differs in several respects from investment in 
industry.  There is still a 'colonial stigma' attached to large private land 
holdings (Hill  1984, p.  28).  Despite this the May 6  Package of 1986 
announced new measures to encourage foreign investment.  There was 
an  increase  from  20 to 40%  of the  private  share  in  the ownership of 
agricultural estate crops and NES projects (including aquaculture), in an 
endeavour to provide more realistic returns  for investors in  the agricul-
tural  sector  (lDN  1987,  pp.  66-7).  However,  Muir  (1986,  p.  22 
footnote) argues that the May 6 Package, with respect to foreign invest-
ment is not, strictly speaking, a policy change at all, but rather a resched-
uling and expansion of  existing obligations and opportunities offered to 
foreign investors. 
3.11  Livestock 
Livestock  products  provide  a  small  but  increasing  source  of animal 
protein in  the Indonesian diet.  In addition, livestock provide a valuable 
source of manure for fertiliser, while certain types (e.g. buffalo) provide 
the main  source of traction  in  agriculture.  Lastly,  but perhaps most 
importantly,  livestock  act  as  a  cash  reserve.  Livestock  production  is 
almost completely in the hands of the smallholder sector and forms part 
of the  background of many  traditional  farms.  However, while  cattle 
raising is a traditional part of  the rural scene, it is important to note that 
cattle  breeding is  not (Leake  1980, p. 68).  This fact  places  long-run 
constraints on the quality of cattle.  Numbers of cattle and buffalo are 
reported to have decreased substantially between 1970 and 1976 (Leake 
1980).  Birowo and Sanusi (1982, p.  15) also maintain tlut the cattle 
population  fell  during  the  1970s.  However,  opinions  differ  on  this 
matter and data vary greatly.  Kristanto (1982, Table 4) shows the cattle 
(sapi)  population constant around the 6  million  range all  through the 
period 1967 to 1978.  BPS data (Statistik Indonesia 1985, Table 5.4.1) 
shows 1983 figures at nearly 9 million; a possible but unlikely growth in 
five years after such static trends for 11 years.  The BPS data in the 1988 
edition of the same publication shows a cattle population of 9.7 million 
for 1986. 
Bali cattle are indigenous to Java and Sumatra and have been interbred 
with Indian Zebu types as well as with many European breeds.  However, 
even with regular infusions of  new types (e.g. Brahman) the initial vigour 
of  the cross-breeds has dwindled, and a continual breeding program will 
always  be  necessary if quality stock are  to be produced.  Dairy cattle, 
originally brought in  during the Dutch era, also need continuous up-
grading.  Buffalo are prized for their ability to work in the swampy areas 
64 of paddy  fields,  and  have  the  additional  advantage  of being  able  to 
survive and reproduce on much poorer quality feed  than normal cattle 
breeds. 
Sheep and goats have always  been part of the smallholder farm, and 
are,  in  fact,  much  more widespread  across  the sector than  cattle and 
buffalo.  They have the advantage of being adaptable to most environ-
ments, reproduction rates are higher than the larger ruminants, forage 
requirements are smaller and marketing is easier. 
The poultry industry, unlike other subsectors of  livestock, is  regarded 
as  performing  well,  averaging  an  11%  increase  during  Repelita  II 
(1974- 79), compared with 7%  for Repelita I (Birowo and Sanusi  1982, 
p.  15).  Progress  during  Repelita  III and  Repelita  IV  has  also  met 
expectations.  Much of this progress has been by the growing commer-
cial  poultty  farming  sector  whose  demands  for  maize  have  at  times 
outstripped domestic supply and  necessitated  imports.  Although  the 
maize income elasticity of demand for human consumption is  generally 
regarded as  negative, it is  positive at 1.5 when used  as  an  animal  feed 
(Rosegrant et al. 1987, Table 5.12). The income (expenditure) elasticity 
of  demand for poultry and eggs is high (1.50 as estimated by the ASEAN 
Study Team of 1980, Teken and Soewardi 1982).  Other expenditure 
elasticities of the livestock sector are also high (e.g. 1.03 for pork, 1.50 
for beef and 1.27 for all  meat).  Although 1976 data used for estimation 
of the figures are now dated and these estimates need revision, it never-
theless remains true that livestock protein will  remain a luxury item for 
the vast majority of  the population for some time to come. 
3.11.1 Cows and buffalo 
Cows  and  buffalo  form  part  of the  traditional  smallholder  farm  in 
Indonesia.  According to Leake (1980) over 25% of  smallholdings report 
cattle or buffalo ownership, although these animals are usually limited to 
numbers of 1 to 3  and penned in  small  areas, at least on Java  (where 
grazing is  virtually impossible).  Some ranch-type farming of cattle was 
commenced on the outer islands in the late  1960s (Kristanto 1982) by 
both State  and  private  companies,  but lack  of managerial  experience 
resulted in  poor annual growth performance.  Now there is  a move to 
types of mini-ranches holding about 50 cattle on about 50 hectares. 
Feeding of cattle  and  buffalo  on  smallholdings  presents  the  most 
difficult problem.  A  range of products is  used  (e.g.  natural  grasses, 
leguminous  straw,  cassava  chips,  copra  cake  and  other  byproducts). 
Even so, the main feed needs are seldom met, and cattle are often in poor 
condition.  Buffalo are  used only at certain times for draught purposes 
and feeding is often kept at a level to just avoid death through starvation. 
Farmers do not perceive any  benefit in  caring for an  occasionally-used 
asset.  Animals are often fed and tended by children.  With an increasing 
number  of young  children  now  entering  school  (after  emphasis  on 
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budget spending for  education purposes), this  fact  may  constrain  the 
expansion of  cattle numbers (Kristanto 1982).  The additional problems 
posed by ignorance of  breeding practices means that stock quality, as well 
as quantity, is  jeopardised. 
Leake (1980) maintains that smallholder cattle contribute little to the 
diet of the farm  family  since  they are  usually sold in  times of need or 
drought,  or at  the  end  of useful  life.  Indeed,  during  Repelita  Ill, 
production of  meat from cattle fell  by 0.9% per annum, although prelimi-
nary figures  indicate that the trend was  reversed  to a 3.6% per annum 
increase for Repelita IV (ROI 1988, Table 11.8).  Cattle act, however, as 
the small farmer's store of wealth and are considered second to cash as 
the most liquid asset for South Sulawesi farmers (Kristanto 1982). There 
is a strong domestic preference for fresh lean beef, and cattle are normally 
marketed locally in  rural areas.  There is also some inter-island transport 
of  cattle to provide for a large urban demand for meat which has resulted 
from growth in per capita income.  On the export fJ'ont  the Singapore 
Government's policy of phasing out livestock  farming  has  resulted  in 
investment in Indonesia's livestock sector to fill  this potential gap (EIU 
1989d, p. 31). 
3.11.2 Dairy cattle 
Dairy  cattle  might  be  considered  something of a  special  case  in  the 
Indonesian context since dairying in  a hot humid climate presents many 
problems, and there is the tendency to restrict it to higher-altitude areas. 
Friesian cattle were introduced by the Dutch to provide milk for expatri-
ate  families.  Most dairy  cattle  are  found  on  Java,  numbering  some 
207200 in  1986 out of a total of 222300 for  Indonesia (BPS  1988, 
Table 5.4.1), but dairying generally  is  a  small  industry in  comparison 
with the rest of the livestock sector. 
Early Government initiatives in  this sub-sector involved  the encour-
agement of foreign  investment  in  plants  for  the  production  of milk 
products  from  imported  milk  products and  butter fat  (Leake  1980). 
With imported milk products cheaper than domestic production, there 
was  little  incentive  for  local  expansion.  However,  the  Government 
decided on a policy of  support for smallholder daitying (presumably the 
main reason  being one of employment generation).  Since 1979 there 
have been further policy changes which introduced an import quota tied 
to the level of local milk supplies, set at 8: 1 in  1980, to decline to I: 1 by 
1988 (Remenyi 1986, p. 61), together with minimum farm-gate prices 
and a levy on imported milk set at 25% ad JJalorem. 
Repelita IV targets were set well above those achieved under previous 
plans and realised growth in milk production appears to have been 6.9% 
annually, with the Repelita V target set at 12.9% annually (ROI 1988, 
Tables 11.1; III.2).  Remenyi (1986) argued that achievement of  Repelita 
IV  targets  was  unattainable  without  major  research,  investment  and 
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erative development, nutrition, income generation and foreign exchange 
saving)  are  important factors,  beyond strict economic considerations, 
which  have  been  used  to encourage  the  development of dairying  in 
Indonesia.  The main constraint on the improvement of  dairy production 
levels  is  the same as  applies  to beef cattle, namely, the availability and 
quality  of fodder.  To  this  Remenyi  adds  the  fllrther  constraints  of 
marketing and poor reproduction rates.  Marketing offresh milk presents 
problems in  Indonesia with widespread  lack  of refrigeration, lack of a 
consumer tradition of milk  consumption, together with  high  costs of 
processing milk products putting milk beyond the means of low wage 
earners (without massive subsidies).  The poor reproductive performance 
of both domestic and imported cows indicates the unsuitability of the 
animals to the local environment, and Remenyi believes that all-purpose 
animals (suitable for draught, milk and meat), utilising suitable fodder, 
might present smallholders with a more viable alternative.  However, the 
vexed  question  of the  economic  rationale  for  dairying  in  a  tropical 
country still remains. 
3.11.3 Sheep) goats and poultry 
Apart from pigs which numbered some 6.2 million in 1986 (BPS 1988, 
Table 5.4.1), the other most numerous types of livestock are  poultry, 
goats and sheep in that order, with goats at 10.7 million being twice the 
population  of sheep  in  1986.  Both  pigs  and  chickens  are  farmed 
commercially but smallholders raising sheep and goats outnumber those 
keeping cattle (Knipscher, Boer, Sabrani and Soedjana 1983) and aver-
aged about 19% off.lrming households in  Indonesia in  1979, with 27% 
concentrated on Java.  Of the total population of  sheep and goats, 88% 
and 62%, respectively, were situated on Java in 1986 where land holdings 
tend to be small in size (averaging around 0.5 hectares or less).  Given 
the size of these holdings the keeping of  small ruminants makes sense in 
terms of  ability to raise, feed and market the animals.  Reproduction rates 
are also likely to be higher, at least for goats, given their known adapt-
ability to a large environmental range. 
Little research has been done on smallholder sheep and goats and the 
Knipscher et al.  (1983) study on three areas of]  ava  indicates the direc-
tion for future work.  The reproduction rate of  this sample was shown to 
be  much less  than their genetic potential (1.1  lambs/kids annually as 
against a  potential  3), mortality rates  were  high  for  sheep grazing in 
lowland  areas  (parasite  infections  suspected)  and  breeding  problems 
were evident (lack of  stud management). 
In the poultry sector, ':;llage chickens far  outnumber both layers and 
broilers of commercial enterprises,  being 105.7  million, 24.8 million 
and 10.9 million, respectively, in  1983 (BPS 1988, Table 5.4.2).  How-
ever,  Mink (1987, p.  170) notes  that the  size  of the  flock  fluctuates 
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widely  because of disease  losses  and celebratory slaughterings.  More-
over, despite the contribution to meat and eggs made by  the numbers 
involved,  there  are  constraints  on  improvement  (basic  genetic  stock, 
disease, quality of  scavenged feed and high chick losses).  Mink believes 
that while some grain  may  be  used  in  feed,  village  chickens are  more 
frequently fed household byproducts. 
Commercial poultry enterprises tend to be small, the more so since a 
September 1981 edict restricted the size of poultry farms  to 5000 hens 
(Arndt 1981, p. 5 fn.  3) or 750 boilers a week (Mink 1987, p. 167 fn.2). 
This restriction arose after complaints from small poultry farmers, hard 
pressed  by  large  commercial  producers.  During the 1970s there had 
been substantial foreign  investment in  the domestic feedgrain  industry 
and, when moves were made to restrict this industry to domestic invest-
ment, some of the foreign investors diversified into large-scale commer-
cial  poultry.  However,  the  1990  PAKMEI  deregulation  changes 
doubled  the  size  of smallholder  poultry  farms  and  allowed  foreign 
investment in  this sector if more than 65% of production was exported 
(IDN 1990, p.  6). 
Mink (1987, pp. 167-8) indicates that small scale, family-run enter-
prises  dominate the industry, and there is  a wide  range of managerial 
skills,  mostly clustered at t11e  lower end of the scale.  Improvement is 
limited  by  credit constraints, and productivity is  lowered by  problems 
with sanitation, water, disease and heat stress.  Feed preparation tends to 
distinguish small and large producers, as the latter usually mix their own 
preparations, while the former lack knowhow, capital or scale of opera-
tion, and depend upon purchased feed. 
Production of  poultry meat and eggs during Repelita IV is preliminar-
ily  estimated  to  have  achieved  growth  rates  of 11.4%  and  12%  per 
annum, respectively.  Projections for Repelita V are for a growth rate of 
production of  poultry meat of8.9% per annum and eggs 5.2% per annum 
(ROI  1988, Tables  11.8  and  IV.B.3).  In  March  1981  a  floor  price 
scheme for  broilers and eggs was  instituted (Daroesman 1981, p. 24), 
altllOugh it is seldom, ifever, called into play. The KUDs (cooperatives), 
as  well as  operating the floor price scheme, were also changed with the 
operation of BIMAS Ayam, the Government's credit scheme for poultry 
(Mink 1987, p. 168). 
The only Government intervention in the goat/sheep sub-sector has 
been  an  animal  distribution  ('dropping')  scheme,  where  animals  are 
provided on credit to increase the size of  the farmers' stock.  However, as 
repayment conditions were vague and not then operational, and adminis-
tration was haphazard, the results of  the scheme were uncertain (Knipscher 
et al.  1983). 
3.11.4 Problems and policies of  the livestock sector 
The one overriding factor which appears to face all of  the livestock sector 
68 is  the general lack of  suitable forage, poor quality of  what little forage is 
available,  and the consequent inadequate nourishment of much of the 
livestock.  The possible exception is  the stock able:  to graze on parts of 
rubber plantations where better forage is sometimes available.  Added to 
this are the general problems of livestock disease control and the serious 
lack of qualified veterinarians and supporting staff.  The upgrading of 
breeding and tackling of  specific problems related to each sub-sector are 
no less important than the forage issue, but the latter needs first priority, 
and  fortunately  this  has  been  recognised  and  research  begun  (some 
projects funded by ACIAR). 
Policy initiatives in  the livestock sector are based around broad meas-
ures to induce smallholders to increase their involvement with livestock 
population expansion.  Two schemes operate for cattle, one called paron 
(like  share cropping) and another called Sumba (based on the area  of 
Sumba in  East Nusa Tenggarra) whereby farmers either fatten cattle or 
engage in  a breeding program, and share the proceeds of sale with the 
Government or private  merchants (Leake  1980).  With both schemes 
credit is  provided  by the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRl) under its small 
industry KlK credit program.  Dairy policy includes import quotas and 
minimum farm-gate  prices,  but also  distribution of imported cows  to 
smallholders, artificial  insemination programs and public investment in 
providing infrastructure to milk  services.  The only scheme so  far  for 
sheep and goats is  restricted to 'dropping' of animals to farmers to help 
increase  numbers,  but the  haphazard  arrangement of the  repayment 
phase of  the operation, together with the ever-present forage constraints, 
may reduce the probability of  success in the long run. 
3.12  Forestry 
Much of the outer islands are  covered  in  stands of hardwood, mainly 
tropical rain forest, and timber was  the major resource (other than oil) 
which  attracted early  foreign  investment interest to  Indonesia  in  the 
1950s.  In fact, some joint ventures for exploitation were arranged just 
prior to the New Order Government takeover.  The initial  new foreign 
investment post-1967 was  by  way of direct private investment or joint 
venture with private or State enterprise (Thalib 1967).  Since 1984 no 
new  foreign  investment  has  been  approved  as  a  matter of policy,  al-
though existing concessions continue to be honoured. 
By  1971 there was  a  huge expansion of both volume and value of 
timber production and timber was  second only to rubber as  an  export 
earner.  Manning (1971) pointed to the need to distinguish between the 
potential conflict of  immediate gains, the long-run objective of  develop-
ing the wood industries, and exploiting the resource in such a way as  to 
generate future supplies.  Policy at that time embraced three elements: 
(a)  reafforestation  of areas  of Java,  Madura  and  East  Indonesia; 
(b)  converting  suitable-soil  forest  areas  to  agricultural  land;  and 
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(c)  classif)ring  the  remainder  into  potential  and  productive  forest 
(Manning 1971, p.  34). 
In the early 1970s log exports to Japan ,vere beginning to accelerate, 
but exploitation without provision for forest regeneration was evident as 
a particular constraint.  By 1972 the choice of  a policy of  industrialisation 
of the timber industty was  being discussed (Koehler 1972).  Domestic 
processing  for  export  (milling,  veneer  and  plywood,  pulp  and  paper 
manufacturing) was  considered as  an  option, to be financed  mostly by 
foreign  investment.  However,  Koehler  pointed  to  the  need  for  the 
Government to consider its strategies so that investors were motivated 
towards processing plants.  There was a tendency for investors to oppose 
policies  for  enhancing  timber  processing  (and  potential  employment 
creation), \-vhile  appropriating too much of the resource rent for  them-
selves.  In fact,  Ruzicka (1979) argued that on the whole the Govern-
ment probably failed  to achieve  full  rent appropriation  between  1972 
and 1977. 
In 1979 a Government decision was taken to progressively phase out 
the export of logs in  favour of encouraging local timber production in 
Indonesia (concessionaires were required to build plywood/veneer tac-
tories).  Export controls were to be tightened until total prohibition of 
log exports by 1985.  There had been an  increase in  the production of 
logs  as  timber prices  rose  in  1978 while  the gradual  increase  in  sawn 
timber is  evident in  the 1980s (BPS 1988, Table 5.3.4).  Both volume 
and  value  of plywood  increased  between  1981 and  1988 (BPS  1988, 
Tables 6.5.1; 6.5.2). Total exports of  timber, however, reached a peak of 
US$1806 million in  1980 and it was 1987 before exports exceeded that 
level.  Arndt (1981) argued that apart from the drastic effect on Japan 
and  Korea  (whose  plywood  industries were dependent on Indonesian 
logs), and the competition Indonesian exports were to meet within the 
region, there were serious doubts whether infrastructure, management 
and skilled labour constraints would permit the forced pace of develop-
ment which was desired by the Government.  The implementation of  the 
new policy coincided with a decrease in  world timber demand (Scherer 
1982), and the Government's insistence on the construction of  mills led 
to their operating, at the time, at only half  capacity.  In addition, the mills 
had difficulty meeting export standards, and the Government was com-
mitted to helping their financial viability by keeping domestic prices of 
logs below world prices. 
It was  1988 before plywood exports exceeded the total earned from 
log exports in 1979.  There is doubt that the short-term losses sustained 
will  be  outweighed  by  the  medium-term  gains,  despite  the  fact  that 
Indonesia  has  captured  70%  of the  worldwide  market  for  plywood 
(Schwarz 1989a, p.  86).  In 1986 the export of timber products from 
certain  tree  species  was  prohibited,  while  in  1988, exports of sawn 
timber valued  at  less  than  a  specific  amount were  also  stopped.  On 
1 January 1990 a new tax came into effect on sawn log exports, the aim 
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to divert  timber from  exports  to  the  domestic  furniture-making  and 
construction industries.  Furniture production, accorded protection as 
an infant industry, is expected to contribute to the non-oil export effort. 
In a move reminiscent of  the export ban on logs, the Government on 
1 January  1987 banned the export of raw rattan.  This was followed on 
1 July 1988 by a ban on exports of  semi-processed rattan.  From October 
1988  there  was  also  a  ban  on  cane  webbing (used  by  the  furniture 
industry),  which  is  made  f)-om  rattan  skins  (Vatikiotis  1989, p.  50). 
Apart  from  the  financial  costs  involved  and  the  possible  violation  of 
GATT membership status with the use of  non-tariff trade barriers, there 
is  also  concern that the policy  is  contrary to the spirit of deregulation 
espoused for  other sectors of the economy.  Moreover, the Chairman 
(Hasan) of  the rattan producers' association (ASMINDO), is also Chair-
man of  four other forestry-related associations, Plywood or Wood Panels 
(APIUNDO), Loggers, Sawmillers and Furniture Industry, in  addition 
to chairing the 'umbrella' organisation  for  all  forestI).-related associa-
tions.  AP1UNDO 'acts as  a virtual cartel determining export volumes 
and influencing prices', but in  response to these initiatives the major US 
plywood market is  moving to substitute lower-cost products (Schwarz 
1989a, p.  86- 8).  The policy-making  function  appears  to  have  been 
wrested  tt-om  the Forestry Ministry, according to Schwarz, and Hasan 
wishes  to  impose  a  centralised  APKlNDO-style  system  on  other 
forestry-based associations. 
Hunter (1984)  points out that although  the Government is  deter-
mined  to promote the development of the  forest  industry, this  policy 
may not lead to resource conservation.  He advocates the establishment 
of  exotic plantations  as a measure to supplement the management of  the 
existing natural forest.  Growing world-wide hostility to indiscriminate 
tropical forest logging resulted, by the late 1980s, in the banning of  total 
tree  felling,  and  the  initiation  of some  further  reaftorestation  and 
regreening programs in  Indonesia (EIU 1989d, p.  33).  Additionally, 
research is  continuing into other forest preservation measures including 
artificial propagation of tropical hardwoods, and another which involves 
tapping tropical hardwoods for resin (Goldstein 1989, p. 51).  The resin, 
called damar, is used as a superior alternative to synthetic varnishes in the 
tine arts area.  Exports ofdamar have risen from US$2.5 million in  1981 
to US$14.4 million in  1988. 
3.13  Fisheries 
Fish constitute a small but important contribution to Indonesian dietalY 
protein d1rough the exploitatior. of inland as well as salt-water fish.  The 
sector accounted for just under 2% ofGDP in 1987.  Although domestic 
volume of  production of marine fish  in  1984 to 1986 was treble that of 
inland fisheries, in  value terms the difference was much smaller.  On the 
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export  side  prawns  (shrimps)  have  made  a  valuable  contribution  to 
agricultural exports (US$498.  7 million in  1988), second only to coffee 
since 1985 in  value terms.  The volume of exports has also  been rising 
steadily during the period 1981 to 1988.  Japan is the key market taking 
77%  of exports in  value  terms during 1988.  Fish  exports (tuna and 
skipjack)  reached  US$98  million  in  1988, with Japan again  the major 
market. 
The development of the fisheries sub-sector has been relatively slow. 
During the 1970s there was  some capital investment in  the salted  fish 
industry, and research  into types of fish  processing and marketing was 
undertaken (Baharsyah and Hadiwigeno 1982).  Fishermen in East Nusa 
Tenggara were reported behind their fellow fishermen ofJava, Kalimantan 
and Sumatra in terms of  development with their use of  hundred-year-old 
boats without motors.  However, at  that time  there were  simply  no 
businesses  selling engines  for  them to buy  (Makaliwe  and  Partadireja 
1974).  Although close to good fishing waters the consumption of fish 
on  East  Nusa  Tenggara was  estimated  in  1974 at  less  than  half the 
Indonesian per capita consumption of  about 10 kg per year.  Part of the 
explanation might lie in  the lack of  salted fish  which, while being used in 
other parts of Indonesia, was considered too expensive in  this province. 
Moreover,  there  are  regional  preferences  for  varieties  of fish .  Food 
Balance Sheet data for 1986 indicate that per capita availability of both 
inland and marine fish  for that year was 11.47 kg. 
In addition to the problems of  perishability and marketing constraints, 
'fish is  not a staple food' (Krisnandhi 1969, p.  51) and the expenditure 
(income) elasticity of demand for fish  is  quite high.  An estimate by the 
ASEAN Study Team in  1980 was 1.06 (Teken and Soewardi 1982).  It is 
thought that there exists  a much greater potential for  improving con-
sumption  of protein  through  fish  than  through  the  relatively  more 
expensive animal protein. 
Rehabilitation of harbours and improvement of processing facilities 
were  used  as  a  basis  for  inviting  domestic  and  foreign  investment in 
modern fishing production.  The small-scale local fishermen have contin-
ued their traditional operations, but the use of motors has enabled more 
extensive and distant fishing  grounds to be  exploited, with the aid  of 
some foreign  fishing  under licence.  Inland fishing  is  pursued in  open 
water, but also  in  ft"esh  water and brackish ponds, in  paddy fields  and 
cages. 
Despite the export growth of  prawns, other fish exports were relatively 
static during most of the 1980s.  (1988 was a good year, when exports 
almost doubled.)  It appears that the marine fishing industry as  a whole 
has been subject to fairly slow growth considering the industry's possible 
potential.  However, this potential is  less easy to realise than, for exam-
ple, foresllY and minerals.  The reason appears to be the Government's 
prohibition on trawlers in an effort to protect traditional small fishermen, 
as well as a desire to conserve resources. 
72 Collier considers that Indonesian policy-makers are  faced  with a di-
lemma in  trying to expand fishing to improve nutrition, increase shrimp 
exports  and  modernise  the  fishing  fleet.  'Their dilemma  is,  that to 
accomplish these three goals, the impact on the traditionJI fishing indus-
try may cause social problems' (Collier 1981, p. 283).  The final conflict 
is once again between goals of  growth and equity. 
3.14  Concluding Remarks 
Booth and Sundrum (1981, p.  193) provide data  to suggest that the 
income terms of  trade for cash crop farmers (rubber, tea, sugar) declined 
in  comparison with rice and palawija farmers  between 1971 and 1977. 
In fact, the terms of  trade of  palawija producers (except of  soybean) rose 
more  rapidly  than of rice  farmers.  Most of the  improvement in  the 
income terms of trade is  attributed to prices  rising  more rapidly  than 
living costs.  Further data show production rising more slowly than price 
for all crops, although smallholder tea, rubber and sugar grew less rapidly 
than similar estate crops from  1966 to 1976. Only coffee and tobacco 
production  (smallholder  and  estate)  grew  at  a  similar  (if slow)  rate. 
Booth  and  Sundrum  feel  that cash  crop smallholders  were  'relatively 
more disadvantaged during the seventies compared to other sectors of 
the agricultural economy' (1981, p.  194). 
McCawley (1985) pointed out that despite improvements in technol-
ogy there was little in the way of  cash crop output growth showing up in 
the early 1980s and only modest growth continues for  tile smallholder 
cash  crops with the exception of spices.  The estate sector of palm oil, 
palm kernel and, to a lesser extent, tea sho\v higher growth rates for the 
1980s, but remain VlIlnerable to movements in international commodity 
markets. 
Commodity analysis earlier in  this chapter has  shown that each cash 
crop faces  particular restraining factors on either production, export or 
both.  Although there is  some use of high-yielding stock and increased 
awareness  of fertiliser  (mainly  by  estates),  there  is  nowhere  near  the 
emphasis on, and usage of, new technology that is  now common in  rice 
cultivation.  Smallholder yields tend to be lower than estates, extension 
services are stretched to the limit or non-existent, credit facilities may be 
poor or unavailable outside special schemes, quality control is  ignored 
outside the estates, and marketing and access to markets is difficult.  The 
Government made an effort during the 1980s to give more attention to 
the cash crops through various schemes, especially nucleus estates and 
specialised smallholder schemes.  However, Booth (1988, p. 237) argues 
that 'it has  been virtually impossible to implement effective policies to 
assist small-scale export producers, and this remains a major challenge for 
agricultural planners'.  The first moves towards some deregulation in the 
agricultural  sector  have  been  made  in  the  1990  PAKMEI  initiatives. 
These have attempted to simplify some of  the licensing procedures in the 
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poultry, cattle and  fishing sub-sectors, and  remove export controls on 
coffee, sandalwood, nutmeg and mace (IDN 1990, p. 6). 
The livestock sector is  unlikely to make significant progress until the 
forage  situation is  investigated and improved.  Programs of upgrading 
for both beef  and dairy cattle are underway and advice is being sought on 
all aspects of  cattle, sheep, goats and poultry (including overseas advice). 
However, real  progress may  await  further intensified  programs which 
coordinate all  the aspects of livestock management (e.g. breeding stock, 
forage, disease control and marketing). 
Timber products have been a large export earner over the years and, 
although the plywood and veneer industry have just managed to replace 
the  lost  revenue  from  log  exports,  debate  remains  about  the  policy 
methods chosen  to promote the development of the timber industry. 
Exploitation  and appropriate reafforestation  policies  will  be  needed if 
this sector is  to continue its contribution well into the future. 
Fisheries are providing a small, but growing, contribution to dietary 
protein and, in addition, one part of the industry (prawns) is  contribut-
ing strongly to agricultural exports.  Provision for future exploitation of 
this resource, together vvith appropriate conservation, should ensure tllat 
this sector continues to provide for  bOtll  domestic and  export needs. 
Careful  policy  coordination will  need  to  be devised  to overcome  the 
problems of potential conflict between traditional and modern tlshing 
methods. 
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Table 3.1.  Indonesia:  production of selected cash crops, smallholder and estate, 
1981-88 ('000 t). 
Crops  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988' 
Large Estateb 
Palm oil  752  834  891  I 080  I  159  1260  1477  2018 
Palm kernel  133  149  157  230  238  265  287  416 
Tea  85  74  89  102  105  136  135  144 
Smallholder' 
Rubber  943  586  674  715  734  1040  1 14 I  I  187 
Coconut  I 765  1 587  I 590  I 738  I 895  2091  2001  2047 
Coffee  314  262  287  303  292  339  358  394 
Tobacco  110  97  100  83  153  164  115  123 
Spice"  69  72  86  86  83  94  105  102 
Preliminary figures for  1988. 
Predominantly estate crops, but figures given are for estate and smallholder 
combined. 
Predominantly smallholder crops,  but figures  given  are  for  smallholder and estate 
combined. 
Cloves and pepper. 
Sources:  1981- 85, BPS  Statistik Indonesia 1985, 1987, 1988. 
1986-88, EUI (J989a) Country Report Indonesia p.  24. 
78 Table 3.2.  Indonesia:  agricultural exports, 1983-88, volume ('000 t). 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Coffee  241.2  294.5  282.7  298.1  286.2  298.7 
Tea  68.6  85.6  90.1  79.0  90.5  92.8 
Prawns  26.1  28.0  30.8  36.0  43.9  56.2 
Logs  2747.4  I  573.0  141.3  116.3  99.0  19.5 
Spices  79.4  71.2  63.5  75.4  78.6  97.2 
Rubber latex  39.1  39.4  38.0  45.9  46.5  51.9 
Tobacco  23.4  19.3  20.2  23.1  18.7  18.2 
Cassava  257.0  385.3  543.3  424.6  783.1  583.8 
Rattan'  81.2  89.8  82.8  104.5  (130.3)'  (56.5)" 
Fruit and vegetables  56.6  75.7  80.3  69.5  79.9  127.6 
Other  107.5  215.8  492.8  285.9  286.3  274.3 
Total  3727.5  2877.6  I 865.3  1 558.3  I 812.7  1 620.2 
Value (US$ m) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Coffee  427.3  565.2  556.2  818.4  535.4  549.5 
Tea  120.4  226.2  149.1  99.1  118.9  125.2 
Prawns  193.9  195.5  202.3  284.7  351.9  498.7 
Logs  290.7  172.4  8.9  2.1  1.7  0.5 
Spices  93.8  II 1.8  125.9  209.0  239.5  221.8 
Rubber latex  44.4  45.0  35.1  42.9  53.6  77.6 
Tobacco  40.5  32.9  43.1  62.5  57.4  42.7 
Cassava  27.9  32.3  45.6  49.8  89.6  67.7 
Rattan'  78.3  86.0  81.1  89.1  (151.8)'  (74.4)' 
Fruit and vegetables  10.2  18.1  22.2  19.1  22.0  34.0 
Other  45.4  47.5  118.2  77.4  195.9  291.4 
Total  1 372.8  I 532.9  I  387.7  1 754.1  I 665.9  I 909.1 
Since January 1987 included in  industrial products. 
Source:  BPS  Indicator Ekonomi, September 1989. 
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the Secondary Food 
Crops 
PART A:  Rice 
4.1  Introduction 
Rice is the tood staple ofT ndonesia.  There is a distinct preference for rice 
in  the  tood  consumption  pattern  and  this  has  been  strengthened  by 
cultural influences.  Furthermore, rice plays a key role as  a 'wage' good 
and, when this is reinforced by political overtones, it is not surprising that 
there is a long history of Government  intervention in  the rice economy. 
Traditionally, rice was grown with, or tollowed by, one of  the second-
ary crops (palawija) such as maize, cassava, tubers or legumes, although 
the cropping pattern varied considerably according to soil, region and 
climate.  Some 95% of  the rice crop is  now salllah grown (i.e. 'wet' rice). 
This contrasts with  'dry' or upland  rice  (padi lada11g)  which  is  seeded 
directly into the ground and rain-fed.  r  n the mid-1960s the proportion 
of padi lada11g was around  14%.  Yields of lada11g have barely doubled 
since  the  1960s while  salllah yields  have  nearly  trebled.  In  the early 
1960s lowland cropping \\',lS  onc of J"/lJl'rt/J  rice  during the wet season 
t()II()\ved  by maize or legumes during the dr\', unless raint:11l/irrigation 
allowed a second rice crop.  The upland c~'cle contended with less krtile 
soil  and  rice  planted  during  the  wet  SC1son  usuall\'  had  a  G1SS,1\'a  or 
legume intercrop.  [n  particularly dry seasons or regions only pa/rtll'zjrt 
\nlldd t(>rtl1  the intcrcropping pattern. 
The  introduction  of the  high-yielding  varieties  (HY\,)  in  the  bte 
1960s \\'.lS  con tined  to the \'olcanic Im\'land plains, ,lS  they required an 
assured water suppl\' to bcilitate expanded  krtiliser uptake.  New ,1t1d 
renovated  irrigation  projects extended  the  potenti,11  rice  area  and, to-
gether with  pesticides, credit and extension, resulted in  expanded pro-
duction through higher yields ,1I1d  double or triple cropping. 
4.2  Early Government Intervention in the Rice Sector 
Trade measures affecting rice  date back some three centuries, but it 
was e\Tnts tdlowing the Great Depression (farmers unable to pay taxes) 
which increased  colonial (;o\,ernment intel'\'ention.  floor and  ceiling 
price  arrangements  were  attempted  with  varying  degrees  of success. 
Agencies set lip to procure rice and operate market injection schemes on 
the Go\'ernment\ behalfwcre t(xerunncrs of  the present age ne\', B  CLOG. 
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The  immediate  post-independence  agency,  BAMA,  had  the  role  of 
providing rice  rations to the army, civil  service and other Government 
employees (now the 'budget group').  This function remains a continu-
ing responsibility ofBULOG.  The Kasimo Plan (1952) had the goal of 
rice self-sufficiency by 1956.  Its methods of  expanding production were 
based on the Dutch system of  agricultural extension ('oil spot' or gradual 
spreading  outwards  of a  demonstration  effect).  This  approach  was 
modified and perfected by  the subsequent BIMAS intensification pro-
grams of the 1960s and later.  The first BIMAS program was carried out 
as  a pilot project by students from Bogor Agricultural University in  the 
1963-64 wet season.  Initial results were excellent, but when the pro-
gram  was  expanded  the  following  year,  the  benefits  of the  original 
scheme were lost. 
4.3  Progress During the Late 1960s 
The New Order Government of1966 set out to restore stability, turning 
its attention to rice in an effort to restrain inflation and  maintain supply 
to the 'budget group'.  The BIMAS  program was  modified when the 
credit repayment requirement vvas  converted to cash  instead of repay-
ment in  kind and, in  1967 a new scheme, INMAS, provided inputs for 
farmers keen  to use  them, but not in  need of credit.  A change in rice 
policy  occurred  in  1968 when previously consumer-oriented interests 
were tempered by concerns for producers. The Farmer's Formula (rumus 
tani) set the price of  rice to the price of  imported urea in a ratio ofl:  1 in 
an effort to provide a production incentive.  This was the first time price 
targets formed part of Government policy.  In fact, quantity acquisition 
remained paramount at the time.  In an effort to recapture the success of 
the first BIMAS programs a new program, GlMAS GOTONG ROYONG 
(mutual self-help), was commenced in 1968.  The Central Bank paid for 
inputs and  farmers  were  given  no choice about participation.  It was 
unsuccessful, and abandoned in  May 1970 as a production and financial 
disaster.  The decision-making function had been withdrawn from farm-
ers  and  this  caused  resentment.  In  addition,  the  input  repayment 
requirement  (a  one-sixth  levy  on  production)  resulted  in  extensive 
avoidance of repayment as  farmers understated production. 
4.4  Problems of the Early 1970s 
A new program, PERFECTED BIMAS, immediately followed the aban-
donment of BIMAS G.R.  It was based on an initiative by the State  rural 
bank BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia).  The bank had set up 'village units' 
to overcome  problems of lending  to small  farmers.  To operate  the 
scheme and complement the credit element, the BRI established a village 
retailer of fertiliser (reducing late delivery) and a village warehouse (for 
rice storage while awaiting sale). The stored rice also served as a warranty 
82 for  further credit.  This scheme envisaged  the availability of increased 
numbers of  extension workers (replacing the original BlMAS students). 
The major change of PERFECTED BIMAS involved allowing the pri-
vate sector to sell fertiliser in the BlMAS market, originally the preserve 
of  the State-owned company. With proclaimed floor and ceiling prices in 
operation and BULOG purchasing in accordance with a price target, the 
years 1970 and 1971 were successful in production terms. 
4.5  The 1972 Rice Crisis 
Changes in  B  ULOG procurement, determined  by  delayed  funds  and 
stricter quality standards, resulted in  low acquisitions in  the first half of 
1972.  This was succeeded by a poor dry season crop following drought 
which  swept  across  Asia.  The  Asian  drought  reduced  the  potential 
import supply from traditional regional exporters.  Medium quality rice 
prices rose steadily during the second half of 1972, peaking in  January 
1973 at nearly twice the price 00  uly 1972. 
4.6  The 1973 (Cooperative) Failure 
Government reaction to the 1972 crisis was a reform of  domestic market-
ing and procurement arrangements by building up a nation-wide system 
of  rural cooperatives (BUUDs).  Unfortunately, the initiative was a 'top-
down' solution.  The BUUDs were expected to purchase paddy from 
farmers, process it in their own small mills (credit extended for establish-
ment), and sell the milled rice to BULOG. The floor price was set below 
the  existing  market  price  and,  despite  various  pressures  (including 
military enforcement), farmers were reluctant to sell  to the B UUDs.  A 
floor price increase and bans on inter-provincial rice  trade did little to 
change the situation, and procurement through the BUUDs was aban-
doned on 3 July  1973.  Indeed, the domestic  procurement target for 
1973 was  abolished completely.  Fortuitously, the second half of 1973 
coincided with the first oil price increase so that ample foreign exchange 
allowed  import of over  1.8  million  tonnes  in  1973  and  1.1  million 
tonnes in  1974. 
4.7  Repelita II and Major Policy Changes 1974 
The Second Five Year Plan (Repelita II) was inaugurated on 1 April 1974 
and, in  November, major policy changes were announced.  These in-
volved:  (a)  a 50% increase in the fertiliser price; (b)  an increase in  the 
floor price of paddy together with an  increase in  the credit package for 
BlMAS  crops  (including palalVifa);  and  (c)  BULOG's intention to 
purchase  only  dry gabah (threshed  paddy),  whilst  not  announcing a 
purchase price for milled rice.  The result, if not the objective of  the new 
policy, was to increase the influence of BULOG and the BUUDs at the 
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expense  of the  private  rice  market.  During  Repelita  IT  most of the 
structure of modern rice policy was put in place but the implementation 
process was  not onc of smooth progress.  four issues were important: 
tCrtiliser;  tloor and ceiling prices; the emergence of ll'CrClllJ (the brown 
planthopper  which  destroys  paddy  in  the  stalk)  and  problems  with 
BIMAS/INMAS.  These issues  each  appear to have  had considerable 
influence over changes during the 1970s. 
4.7.1  Fertiliser 
While tCrtiliser use had increased in the early part of  the decade it was to 
level otf by  1976, the result of price rises combined with a <";overnmcnt 
decision  in  1973 to give  the  B lTlTDs  sole  distribution  rights.  Policy 
changes in  1976 included a price reduction and the entry of the private 
trade into a  market tt-ce  of Government control.  Over the next three 
years consumption increased at a rate of  20% per annum. 
4.7.2  Floor pri  cc 
The floor price \\as in place by 1974 when it was c1unged tt'om a cost of 
production concept to an  incremental bendit/cost ratio based on the 
BIMAS package.  While changes to the tCrtiliser price were announced at 
the beginning of  the planting season (1  November), changes to the Hoor 
price operated t"om 1 february of  the next year.  Problems ofimplemen-
tation centred on bilure of the BCUDs/KUDs to purchase paddy on 
B ULOG's behalf  (mainly the result of  inadequate credit).  There \\'as also 
some  confusion  regarding  the  tloor  price  concept  and  most  brmers 
continued selling to middlemen.  B CLOG was importing large amounts 
of  rice during the 1970s.  Indonesia was the world's largest rice importCl" 
at this time, domestic procurement was  comparatively small and most 
was obtained at regional level or above. 
4.7.3  Ctilil1JJ price 
Traditionally, the ceiling price was not announced until the second half 
of  each calendar year as the lean months before the next main rice harvest 
approached.  from  1973 there were two ceiling prices established, onc 
being higher f()r ddicit areas.  Bv the early 1980s the Government ceased 
to announce the ceiling price.  During the 1970s the floor price contin-
ued to be increased yearly, the exception being 1979, when a second rise 
was  announced t()llowing quality imposition and consequent low pro-
curement.  At the same time, the Government attempted to hold ceiling 
prices down for urban consumers and contain inflationary pressure.  The 
result was a narrowing band between the two prices, making it unprotit-
able t(lr private stockholders and pushing the burden of  stockholding to 
BlTLOG (necessitating a warehouse construction program). 
84 4.7.4  Wereng problems 
The were1'lg first became evident as  a problem during 1975 on Bali  and 
Java.  Initially,  the  areas  affected  were  difficult  to  estimate  and  this 
remains true to the present.  Farmers were reluctant to report outbreaks, 
the control measures contributing to this reluctance.  The new resistant 
varieties of  that time were in short supply, and many farmers shifted back 
to traditional varieties which needed little fertiliser (large application of 
fertiliser appeared to be correlated with wereng damage). 
4.7.5  Problems of  BIMAS/INMAS 
The BlMAS program was rapidly expanded in  1974 with a 50% increase 
in  the number of farmers  included (to some 3.5  million).  By  1975, 
however, problems began to emerge as  less credit-worthy farmers were 
included and lVere1'lg damage brought repayment problems.  Some farm-
ers were excluded, whilst the drought of 1976 and a drier 'dry' in 1977 
contributed further problems.  Between 1974 and 1975, there was also a 
distinct fall  in  farmer numbers under the INMAS scheme.  It is thought 
that the  inability  of the BUUDs  to support the  floor  price  in  1974 
influenced many fanners against joining BIMAS.  Part of the problem 
appeared to result from village-level corruption (the pocketing of repay-
ment money), and a further factor may have been the low interest rate, 
which tempted farmers to withhold repayment.  Further changes in 1977 
allowed  INMAS farmers  credit in  kind  for  fertiliser  and  pesticide pur-
chase, and a partial amnesty on bad debts was declared for tlle 1979-80 
season.  The BIMAS outlook remained uncertain and, in 1979, a further 
program, INSUS, was  introduced.  It was based on groups of  farmers on 
contiguous plots acting together to make decisions on seeds, planting 
times and crop choices.  The BlMAS credit package was  phased out in 
1984 when the KUPEDES market-oriented program was introduced. 
4.8  The 1970s Experience 
The basic price policy structure put in  place during the first  part of the 
1970s suffered implementation problems as  weather, fertiliser,  lVerel'lg, 
BIMAS/INMAS participation rates and floor/ceiling price policy issues 
each contributed discordant elements.  Betvv'een 1974 and 1977 produc-
tion hovered around the 15  million  tonnes mark, but in  1978 several 
factors combined to contribute to the 17 million  tonnes figure.  These 
were:  favourable weather; increased fertiliser  usage; and availability of 
IR36 and IR38 to solve  JlJel'cng  problems and allow second and third 
crops  (a  shortened  growing  period).  In  addition,  BIMAS/INMAS 
problems ,vere tackled and the floor/ceiling price scheme operated fairly 
satisfactorily (albeit at a narrow band level and with quality impositions 
in  early  1979).  The  first  oil  price  increase  in  1974 had  allowed  an 
expanded budget to increase expenditure on infrastrucnlre, health edu-
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cation, industry and, not least, agriculture.  For agriculture this implied 
easy finance in several categories (e.g. irrigation, fertiliser, pesticide, food 
and fuel  subsidies; large and easy rice imports to sustain population and 
income growth; stock build-up; B ULOG warehouse construction; rural 
road  construction).  The  resources  boom of the  1970s had  resulted, 
however, in a loss of international competitiveness, as the terms of trade 
of  tradeable goods declined relative to non-tradeable goods.  It has been 
argued that the good 1978 harvest and a reduced inflation rate contrib-
uted to the Government's decision to devalue in late 1978.  A second oil 
price rise in 1979 once again temporarily changed the economic outlook. 
While the 1979 harvest was a little disappointing (adverse weather and 
JIlereng  resurgence),  the  scene  was  set  for  the  improved  production 
performance of  the 1980s, culminating in the peak 1985 harvest. 
4.9  Structure of the Rice Economy in the 1980s 
The 1980s commenced with a favourable outlook.  This resulted from 
major export increases (higher oil prices), a record balance of payments 
surplus,  healthy  foreign  exchange  reserves,  a  comparatively  moderate 
inflation  rate  and a  good rice  harvest (over 20 million  tonnes).  This 
encouraging picture was not to continue for the overall economy follow-
ing a series of  oil price collapses.  The rice sector, however, continued to 
perform particularly well  through to 1985.  Rice  accounted for 6.4% of 
imports  in  1980.  As  production  increased  imports  dwindled  to  nil 
(except for glutinous rice  not locally grown), and in  1985 and  1986 a 
small amount was exported, although at a subsidy. 
4.10  Production in the 1980s 
Overall  there  has  been  a  steady  increase  in  area  harvested,  yield  and 
production of rice  from  the  1960s to the  1980s despite  some trend 
variations.  Area  harvested  on-Java  fell  somewhat  in  the  1960s with 
concomitant stagnation in yields, although BIMAS checked the decline 
by the end of  the decade.  Off-Java area harvested, yield and production 
all  showed slow but overall  improvement over the 1960s, so  that the 
result for Indonesia as  a whole was one of temporary stagnation rather 
than  actual  decline.  There  was  a  decline  in  area  harvested  on-Java 
between 1975 and 1977 as  BIMAS ran into difficulties, although yields 
continued to rise.  Credit for the production increase benveen 1980 and 
1985  was  shared  almost equally  between  Java  and  the other islands. 
Yields continued to grow both on-Java and otf-Java between 1980 and 
1985, although the latter were slightly greater than the former. 
Production  increased  steadily  during  1980-85  from  20.2  to  26.5 
million tonnes, although for the dtought year of 1982 the increase was 
only half a million tonnes, to bring a total of  22.84 million tonnes.  The 
fertiliser price was increased in November 1982 from Rp70 to Rp90jkg 
86 (the first  increase since  1976), but at the same time the floor price of 
gabahwas increased from Rp135 to Rp145/kg.  The fertiliser: rice price 
ratio remained more favourable  to farmers  than it  had  been  in  1977, 
although slightly below the peak year of 1982.  Production in  1983 was 
24 million tonnes.  The high rate of  procurement and low rate of market 
injection  brought a  build-up of BULOG stocks  to  reach  2.7  million 
tonnes by  mid-Janual1'  1985.  In the  1985  season  the  floor  price  of 
gabah rose from Rp165 to Rp175/kg while the fertiliser price rose from 
Rp90  to  Rp100/kg.  The  fertiliser  price  ratio  was  still  favourable, 
although the floor price increase was  only 6%  while the fertiliser  price 
increased by  11 %. 
Consequently, there was no shift out of rice for the 1985 season and 
with  large  stocks  and  low  market  injections,  BULOG  in  early  1985 
imposed qualitative  restrictions.  Farm-gate prices  fell  during the wet 
season harvest of 1985, but BULOG stocks continued to build to more 
than 3 million tonnes by September 1985.  Poor quality rice,  together 
with the lower level of  world rice prices (following Indonesia's exit as the 
world's  leading  rice  importer)  did  not  allow  BULOG  the  option of 
exporting without subsidies.  A further warehouse construction program 
was instituted, plus hiring-in of private storage, and stock holding costs 
began to escalate.  To deal with the problem a team of outside experts 
(the Falcon Team) was  invited to asses  the situation and ofkr advice. 
The Government accepted their advice to retain the existing floor price 
for 1986, and increased the price of  pesticides.  After the accelerated oil 
price  decline  of early  1986, the  Government  increased  the  price  of 
fertiliser  by  25%  to  RpI25/kg, slightly  more  than  suggested.  This 
attempt to dampen production incentives for 1986 brought the desired 
results as the increase was less than half  a million tonnes. The production 
target  for  1987 was  28.0  million  tonnes, with  a  final  figure  of 27.3 
million tonnes (the result of drought and renewed wel'cng attack), while 
production reached 28.3 million tonnes in  1988. A reported 7% increase 
brought 1989 production to 30.4 million tonnes. 
4.11  Consumption in the 19805 
The Indonesian population in 1987 was estimated at 169.9 million, with 
a growth rate of2.1  % per annum.  Population is projected to grow at this 
rate for the foreseeable naure. At the same time there was slower growth 
in  per capita  income during the mid-1980s.  However, stronger eco-
nomic conditions in  the late 1980s have improved income growth and 
this, together with population growth, indicate a demand for rice around 
the 2.5% per annum level at least into the 1990s. 
Levels ofIndonesian rice consumption are not known with ,lny degree 
of  precision as the two basic metl10ds of  calculation (food balance sheets 
and household expenditure surveys) yield substantially different results. 
The per capita availability of rice from the Food Balance Sheets show a 
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general upward trend, especially from 1977 to 1983.  A slight downward 
movement in 1984 and 1985 possibly reflects higher stock levels as well 
as  consumer satiation with poor quality rice.  Household consumption 
surveys (SUSENAS) show an increase in annual per capita rice consump-
tion  between  1976  and  1980  (107 kg  to III  kg),  but  there  was  a 
decrease in  1984 to 107 kg.  It has been argued that the reason for this 
decrease appears to be a decline in  per capita rice consumption in  the 
high expenditure classes (especially urban areas).  This is consistent with 
more rice consumption outside the home (not recorded in SUSENAS 
data).  SUSENAS data also  show aggregate rural  per capita  rice  con-
sumption in  1980 and 1984 as  exceeding that of urban areas, reversing 
the 1976 trend.  However, per capita consumption off-Java  exceeded 
that on-Java, unchanged from 1976. 
Estimates of demand  parameters  for  rice  have  been  calculated  for 
Indonesia from  cross-sectional and time series  data.  The estimates of 
income (expenditure) elasticity of  demand follow the expected declining 
trend over time  as  incomes increase.  Timmer (1971)  made  an  early 
(Jakarta-only)  estimate of expenditure elasticity  at  between  0.25  and 
0.35  and  an  all-Java  'best  estimate'  of 0.65.  Estimates  tl-OI11  1976 
SUSENAS  data  vary  between  0.47  and  0.69  for  all-Indonesia.  An 
estimate  by  Mears  (1981)  using  time  series  data  was  0.319  tor  all 
Indonesia (years 1969-79). The latest estimates of  expenditure elasticities 
are incorporated in three econometric models of  the toodcrop sector (see 
Rosegrant et al.  1987, World Bank 1987, Tabor et al.  1988). These vary 
from 0.17 for rural areas to 0.26 for Java  (0.29 ofT-Java) to 0.29 for all 
Indonesia.  Timmer (1985) has  postulated a  tlgure of 0.20 for  1990, 
although other writers suggest tlgures around 0.10. 
Most estimates of (own) price elasticity of demand for rice have been 
calculated  from  cross-section  data.  Estimates  for  the early  1960s  by 
Jones were -0.28 (urban) and -0.49 (rural).  Use of 1976 SUSENAS 
data provided estimates of around - 0.63  and - 0.84 tor all- Indonesia. 
Mears (1981) considered the 1976 figures  high and expected a tlgure 
closer to -0.40. Latest estimates ft'om econometric models range through 
-0.25 (rural), -0.17 to -0.20 (Java) and -0.19 (ofT-Java). 
Estimates of  cross-price elasticities from statistical studies are generaUy 
considered to be poor.  The traditional relationship berween the three 
major staples (rice, maize and cassava) indicates that any increase in  the 
price of  rice would be likely to result in an increase in the consumption of 
maize and cassava (i.e. positive cross-price elasticities).  The dTect of an 
increase in the price of rice on the demand tor the remaining palaJlJUa is 
1110re  uncertain.  There is  a reasonable degree of unaminity of view on 
the small change in the demand tor rice which price changes in palaJlJija 
would bring. 
4.12  Rice Prices 
Because  rice  has  always  been an  important (though slowly  declining) 
component of the cost of living, every effort has  been made to contain 
88 rice prices as a means oflimiting inflation. The average rate of  increase of 
rice  pri..:es  between  1968  and  1978  was  6%  in  Jakarta  and  7.3%  for 
Indonesia.  At  the  same  time  the  Cost  of Living  Index  for  Jakarta 
(excluding rice)  rose at an  annual rate of 15%.  The Jakarta Real  Rice 
Price Index declined by 35% from 100 in June 1970 to 65 in December 
1978 (Mears 1981).  Part of the decline was  the result of productivity 
growth and part was lower costs of production.  However, by including 
expensive rice varieties in the composition of  a Rural Real Price Index, it 
is  possible to show an  income gain for  farmers.  Rice varieties differ in 
terms  of taste,  texture  and  price  commanded, and  knowledge of the 
varieties  included  in  an  index  is  necessary  for  judging real  rice  price 
changes. 
The large rice import bill at the end of  the 1970s seemed to indicate a 
need to provide greater farmer  incentive.  While  farmgate  prices  rose 
relative to consumer prices during the 1970s, the rice:fertiliser price ratio 
continued to rise into the 1980s, from 1.01 in 1977 to a peak of 1.93 in 
1982.  This  production incentive succeeded  in  helping to deliver  the 
large harvests of  the 1980s.  At the same time BULOG's buying price for 
milled rice from the KUDs was becoming virtually the same as its release 
price  to  distributors.  Thus,  without  an  increase  in  the  retail  price 
BULOG was  having to absorb the wholesale marketing margin in  sub-
sidy.  As the large harvests of  the 1980s came in BULOG stocks began to 
grow.  Releases were small, and the growing stocks combined with lack 
of physical  storage  space  and  problems of managing  large  stocks  to 
substantially increase the cost of the storage subsidy. 
BULOG's reaction  to growing stocks was  to restrict acquisition to 
higher-quality grain, resulting in reports offalling farmgate prices for the 
1985 wet-season harvest.  Data on prices received  by  Javanese  farmers 
tend to confirm the 1985 fall  in farmgate prices.  Yet Jakarta wholesale 
prices  for  rice  have  risen  steadily during the 1980s and the Real  Rice 
Price Index has  risen in  Jakarta by nearly 30%  during 1980-88.  (This 
contrasts with  a decline  in  the same  index of 35%  between  1970- 78 
mentioned above.)  However, the terms of  trade for rice farmers declined 
after 1979, reached a lowpoint in  1985 and have shown only marginal 
improvement since then. 
4.13  Marketing and Storage 
The seasonal and geographic concentration of  the rice harvest (monsoon 
and Java dominated respectively) emphasises the relative importance of 
marketing  and  storage.  Traditionally,  the west to east  sweep  of the 
north-west monsoon dictated the  main  harvest.  The later south-east 
monsoon  is  important to certain  areas  and, combined with  extended 
irrigation and increased HYV cropping, allows a year-round harvest. Yet, 
despite this partial smoothing out of  seasonal variation, some 70% of  the 
total rice harvest occurs during the three to four months of  the main wet 
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season.  Moreover,  Java's  predominance  as  the  foodgrain  producer 
necessitates  adequate and  timely  transport to deficit  areas.  A  further 
important fact  is  that the shorter growing span of HYV rice  has meant 
harvesting  taking  place  before  the end of the wet season,  increasing 
moisture uptake during harvesting and complicating dl)'ing.  Added to 
this constraint is  the large number of small  marketings especially from 
Java. 
No  precise  estimate  is  available  of the  marketed  crop  but  Mears 
(1987) estimates annual marketings of 50%  , double his  1950 estimate. 
Other studies have suggested 60 to 70% as the marketed surplus, and this 
may be correct for certain larger commercial farms in particular provinces 
during the main season.  Part of the reason for increased marketings is 
the larger harvests,  increasing cash  needs of rural  areas  and perceived 
riskiness of storage.  A further factor  is  probably farmer confidence in 
BULOG's ceiling price, as they sell more post-harvest and expect to buy 
later at comparatively reasonable prices.  Of  the marketed crop, BULOG 
procures quite  a  small  proportion  (3-5% during the  1970s, rising  to 
8-9% during the early  1980s).  By  the mid-1980s procurement fell  as 
stocks increased.  The private market is responsible for moving the bulk 
of the marketed crop.  The role of the private  market is  quite diverse, 
varying between provinces and consisting of thousands of big and small 
traders  operating  at  various  levels.  Private  traders  tend  to  purchase 
higher-quality  rice  above  the  floor  price,  or poor  quality  rice,  with 
BULOG concentrating on the medium qualities.  BULOG's narrowing 
band between the floor and ceiling price has  crowded out the longer-
term profitability of private storage. 
The potential for the benefits of  increased production to be outweighted 
by accompanying problems was clearly emphasised in 1985. The imposi-
tion of  quality standards needed more guidance, and farmer awareness of 
proper post-harvest handling procedures was  poor.  Appropriate meas-
ures  are  now being instituted to cope with  these  problems.  Farmers 
previously appeared unaware of  quality deterioration resulting from piles 
of newly-harvested paddy left in  fields  for several  days  (involving heat 
build-up and yellowing of  grain).  The storage crisis of 1985 resulted in 
BULOG requesting villages to resurrect the traditional village rice barn, 
as well as increasing its own construction program.  It became imperative 
to look to trained staff to implement techniques for maximum preserva-
tion of  stocks combined with minimum deterioration of  eating quality. 
4.14  Research 
Rice  breeding began at Sogor in  1905 and six  regional stations were 
established between 1926 and 1945.  One of the breeding results was 
Peta, parent stock of  the IRlU variety IR8, which helped to lead the rice 
revolution of the 1960s and  1970s.  The International Rice  Research 
Institute (IRRI) was set up in the Philippines in  1962, releasing the first 
90 of its  varieties in  1966, coinciding with the establishment of the New 
Order Government.  There have  been  close  links  between  IRRl and 
Indonesian rice institutes and, by the mid-1970s, around 50% of  the rice 
area was planted to IRRl varieties.  The variety IR36 helped overcome 
JIlereng  problems during the late 1970s and its shorter growing period 
allowed multiple cropping, contributing to the production success of  the 
1980s.  By  1985 it was estimated that over 60% of Indonesia's rice area 
was planted with IR36 or close relatives.  Concern is now expressed that 
new biotypes of pests could devastate large areas if IR36 succumbed, so 
that continuous research must provide alternative varieties. 
The research branch of the Ministry of Agriculture (AARD) oversees 
the work of six  research institutes, coordinated by the Central Research 
Institute for  Food Crops (CIUFC).  Future research  priorities include 
hybrid  rice,  quality  improvement,  pest  and  disease  control,  fertiliser 
efficiency and use of  crop residues.  Hybrid use demands good organisa-
tional  capacity  of the  industry  to  multiply  and  distribute  seed  each 
season.  Moveover, the growth span of  some hybrids can  be longer than 
the HYV types, although further research  has  been  reducing this con-
straint.  The large  harvests of 1984 and 1985 emphasised the need to 
improve quality (given storage costs) together with drying and general 
post-harvest  handling  problems.  The  large  budgetary  costs  of the 
fertiliser  subsidy  have  been  used  as  a  reason  to  investigate  fertiliser 
efficiency.  It is  thought that the subsidised price may have contributed 
to excessive use or inappropriate application of fertiliser. 
Given  the  importance of research  to the  future  of the  agricultural 
sector, expenditure has been modest.  The CRIFC budget for 1985-86 
is only 4.7% of  the overall budget allocation to agriculture and irrigation, 
or 0.3% of  agricultural GDP (excluding forestry) for 1985.  In addition, 
the  bulk of the  research  remains  devoted  to  rice,  with  tew  resources 
assigned to palaJllija. 
4.15  Present Policies 
The  1985 problems of the  rice  economy prompted  BULOG to seek 
assistance  from  olltside experts in  assessing options.  Answers  to three 
basic  questions were  sought:  (a)  problems of large  procurement and 
relatively small market sales (resulting in  build-up and aging of  stock for 
BULOG);  (b)  low  prices  for  farmers  in  February-April  1985; and 
(c)  stable  retail  prices  (leading  to  problems  for  the  private  sector  in 
storage, long-run farmer income and financial viability for BULOG). 
The  Falcon  Team  of experts  made  three  main  recommendations: 
(a)  peak 'operational' stocks should be 1.5 million tonnes in addition to 
an 'iron' or buffer stock of  1.0 million tonnes, with the remaining surplus 
disposed  of by  immediate  measures  and  reduced  production  growth 
(achieved by keeping the existing floor price and increasing the fertiliser 
price); (b)  floor and fertiliser price policy should by lIsed for 1:\'10 to three 
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years to reduce production incentives relative  to alternative crops; and 
(c) a three-pronged funding mechanism for BULOG should be adopted, 
each  prong  corresponding  to  a  stock  level  (with  operating  stocks 
financed  in  the normal  manner from  BRI credit and the buffer stock 
funded from the Budget). These recommendations were modified slightly 
by  the government, in that while  the stock figures  were adopted, the 
buffer stock was  purchased outright, maintenance and interest charges 
for  1986-87 were  covered,  and  an  intention  was  expressed  to cover 
maintenance costs for the 'buffer stock' for the future.  While the floor 
price was retained as suggested, pesticide prices were increased and, after 
some  delay,  the  fertiliser  price  was  increased  to  slightly  more  than 
originally recommended. 
4.16  The Rice Economy in the Late 1980s 
The Falcon Team suggestions resulted in a production growth of only 
1.8% for 1986, allowing B  ULOG to dispose of  excess stocks.  There were 
fears, however, that farmers were showing too much sensitivity to price 
policy, and an  increase in  the floor price was  announced for  the  1987 
season, with the existing fertiliser price retained.  Anticipated drought 
was allowed for in  the new program SUPRA-INSUS launched in Febru-
ary,  1987.  Even  so,  JVereng  attack  and  drought  resulted  in  actual 
production of 27.25 million tonnes, only 240 000 tonnes above 1986 
figures.  BULOG stocks were  able  to cope with demand and imports 
were unnecessary (glutinous rice excepted). 
Following fairly  modest subsidy figures for fertiliser during 1985-86 
and  1986-87 of Rp477  billion  and  Rp467  billion,  respectively,  the 
realised  figure  for 1987-88 increased to Rp756 billion  (exceeding the 
previous  high  of Rp732  billion  in  1984-85).  This  resulted  in  the 
Government  indicating  a  budget  figure  of only  Rp250  billion  for 
1988- 89, and shifting the remainder of the subsidy off-budget to be 
funded  by  bank credit, a system  continued with  the 1989-90 budget 
(subsidy reduced to Rp155 billion).  The large increase in  the fertiliser 
subsidy  in  1987 may  be  accounted  for  by  several  factors,  including 
possibly the lack of increase in the fertiliser price in that year, expanded 
fertiliser usage under the SUPRA-INSUS program and a partial return to 
triple cropping (banned earlier to assist wereng control). 
More favourable weather allowed a production increase of  4%  in  the 
1988 season to 28.34 million tonnes of rice.  A 10.5% increase in the 
floor  price  appears  to have  sustained  farmer  incentive  (despite an  8% 
increase  in  the fertiliser price).  BULOG stocks of one million  tonnes 
were reported after the wet season harvest, although these fell  to only 
300 000  tonnes  by  the end of 1988.  A  very  favourable  harvest of 
30.4 million  tonnes was  reported for  1989 and mid-year stocks were 
estimated at 2.4 million tonnes, giving rise to a BULOG announcement 
of possible  exports.  However,  low  rainfall  delayed  the  main  season 
92 planting in  late  1989, so  that the  1990  harvest  was  expected  to  be 
slightly below that of 1989. 
4.17  Prospects for Foodcrop Diversification 
The rice  problems of 1985, the dramatic decline  111  the international 
price of oil  in  1986 and a  further devaluation provided policy makers 
with crucial decisions.  The Government settled upon a restructuring of 
the economy, away from dependence on oil revenue to a more diversified 
export base.  A series of 'packages' incorporating reform and deregula-
tion of the trade and financial sectors has  been undertaken, and future 
changes foreshadowed.  However, as yet, the deregulation push has not 
impinged significantly upon the agriculture sector.  Growth in GDr has 
recovered from a low point of2.5% in 1985 to an estimated 7% in 1989, 
the result primarily of  growth in non-oil exports. 
While the rice sector has shown improved performance in  1988 and 
1989 it must remain of  some concern, given the problem of  , fine-tuning' 
production relative to domestic consumption and an allowance for  rea-
SOluble stock levels.  It appears that rice  farmers are significantly influ-
enced  by  price  policy,  possibly  highly  responsive  to  fertiliser  prices 
directly,  or  to  tlle  rice/fertiliser  price  ratio.  Thus,  phasing  out of 
subsidies as a first step towards greater economic efficiency in the agricul-
tural sector may need to be more gradual than initially hoped. 
At the same time, the attainment of  self-sufficiency has brought some 
appreciation of the need to consider a more diversified food  base.  The 
palalVija crops have  been  comparatively neglected.  Yields  are  low  by 
neighbour-country standards, and a large number of farmers are reliant 
solely  upon palalVija  for  income.  Given  that the income elasticity of 
demand for rice in  Indonesia has declined over the past 20-30 years and 
wiB  continue to do so, per capita rice consumption will  peak and then 
decline as consumption diversifies into food wim higher income elasticities 
(e.g. poultry).  These foods, in turn, form part of  the derived demand for 
the palaJvija,  in  addition to the palalVija)s contribution to basic  food 
needs, nutritional diversity and additional protein.  Even so, there are 
quite  challenging  problems  to  be  overcome  in  pressing  ahead  with 
foodcrop  diversification,  while  formulating  policies  which  will  lead  to 
sustained growth in  the rice  sector, albeit at a lower level  than in  the 
previous decade, and also working within the confines of a substantially 
reduced budgetary framework. 
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PART B:  Secondary Food Crops 
4.18  Introduction 
While rice  is  the preferred staple of the vast majority, palawija play  an 
important role in the food sector.  This role covers:  (a)  substituting for 
rice  when  price  and  seasonal  variations  make  it  expensive  or scarce; 
(b)  providing nutritional balance and variety; (c)  providing feedgrain 
for  livestock; and (d)  providing cash  income (and foreign  exchange). 
The major crops listed  as  palawija are  maize  (corn), cassava,  soybean, 
groundnuts (peanuts) and sweet potato.  Mungbeans and sorghum are 
relatively  minor,  although  a  floor  price  scheme  commenced  for  the 
former  in  1979,  and  the  latter  tends  to  replace  maize  in  dry  areas, 
principally for feedgrain. 
During  the  early  1900s  palawija  became  important,  contributing 
around  half of the food grain  production by  the 1930s.  The non-rice 
crops were grown on JaJPah (flooded rice land) during the dry season, or 
throughout the year on  upland  fields,  usually,  but not necessarily,  in 
rotation with upland (or dry) rice.  Some upland and dry areas were (and 
remain) monocropped according to soil and climate.  The rice intensifi-
cation schemes of the 1960s and later influenced both the pattern and 
harvested area of paiaJVija.  While foodgrain production in  the rain-fed 
uplands was  largely  unaflected, the high-yielding varieties  (HYV)  pro-
gram induced changes in rice production on the volcanic lowland plains. 
The increased rice production was often achieved at the expense of  the 
palaJPija crops, at least in the early years.  There was some progress with 
improving  maize  yields  towards  the  end  of the  1970s,  and  13lMAS 
(production intensification)  palaJllija  programs existed  tt"om  the early 
1970s.  Thus, non-rice crops were not ignored in Government planning 
(Repelita II stressed food  rather than rice self-sufficiency), but 13 IMAS 
palaJVija were never afforded the same degree of resources and research 
effort as  rice. 
4.19  Palawija Research 
Indonesia  has  had  close  links  with  the  International  Rice  Research 
Institute (IRRI), and information on new strains has been quickly trans-
ferred  and absorbed, but early  links  with  dryland crop institutes were 
tenuous.  At the beginning of the 1980s little work had been done on 
dryland soils, their response to fertilisers, genetic research or processing 
problems.  There are  indicators that this has changed.  The CRIFC has 
strengthened ties with major international institutes.  Furthermore, the 
United Nations in  1981  set up a centre for course grains, pulses, roots 
and  tubers (CGPRT Centre) at 13ogor,  concentrating on problems of 
these crops in the Asia-Pacific area. 
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Part of the neglect of palawija results  from  basic  consumer attitudes, 
with  maize and cassava  considered inferior goods.  There is  a distinct 
preference  for  rice,  and  a shift  to rice  consumption  is  regarded as  an 
indicator of  increasing welfare and higher social status.  A rice consump-
tion  pattern,  where  rice  alone  contributes about 90%  of total  carbo-
hydrate calories, covers some 45%  of the population.  Two other main 
consumption patterns cover the remaining provinces in  roughly equal 
proportions,  a  rice- maize-cassava  pattern  and  a  rice- cassava/sweet 
potato-maize  pattern.  There  are  minor  pattern  variations  in  some 
provinces and two (East Timor and Irian Jaya) are excluded in this broad 
classification.  The  estimated  consumption  in  the  predominant  rice 
pattern area was  140.5 kg and 152.0 kg per capita in  1976 and 1980, 
respectively, compared with  116.19 kg and  130.7 kg per capita avail-
ability as calculated in  the Food Balance Sheet for the same years. 
4.21  Nutritional Considerations 
While a  rice  diet is  preferred, it  is  not necessarily  superior, as  rice  is 
deficient in  Vitamin A which is  important for eyesight and skin.  Yellow 
maize has a significant Vitamin A content and is  higher in  protein than 
rice.  Fresh or dried cassava, low in protein, may be nutritionally superior 
to  a  rice  diet  if consumed  with  legumes  and  leafy  green  vegetables. 
Legumes also rank highly in terms of  iron, essential in preventing anaem-
ia  deficiency. Polished rice provides only very small q uan tities of  iron. 
Nutritionally, increased consumption of  palawija would be desirable, 
especially the protein-rich legumes, in  addition to fruit and vegetables 
and other protein sources (e.g.  fish  and chicken).  Some palaJvija (e.g. 
soybean and maize) serve a dual purpose in  providing for direct human 
consumption and animal feed.  While dietary needs are complex it seems 
clear  that  balanced  agricultural  production  as  well  as  nutritional 
education are important for adequate nutrition. 
4.22  Monocrop Disadvantages 
The rice intensification programs tended to push saJJlah fanners towards 
rice  specialisation.  A  major  disadvantage  of rice  monocrop  culture 
became evident between 1975 and 1979 with the emergence of JJlcreng. 
By  1978  the  introduction  of IR 36  controlled  the  problem  and  its 
concomitant early maturity allowed commencement of  dou ble and triple 
cropping.  However, this latter attribute discouraged a two months break 
between crops to minimise the canyover effects of  (possible) infestation. 
In 1982 a new biotype of wcreng emerged in  certain areas, but further 
resistant varieties were available.  An  IRR1-supported integrated system 
of biological control of JIlcreng was introduced in  1986, to overcome a 
new outbreak.  Virus diseases (e.g. tungro) cause production losses also if 
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variety rotation is  not followed .  The sucess of  the rice program tended 
to  limit  interest  in,  and  search  for,  alternative  food  crop  strategies. 
Further, existing  nutrition  imbalances  may  have  been  exacerbated  by 
crop specialisation.  Drought and pests still have the potential intermit-
tently to wreak havoc, while there is the distinct possibility that the HYV 
have  reached  (or soon  will)  the  peak  of their  yield  potential.  The 
introduction of  hybrid rice offers further potential gains in yields, but the 
costs are difficult to assess as yet. 
4.23  Sugar Cane 
Sugar cane is  grown throughout Indonesia but Java  is  the climatically 
favoured area (East Java in particular).  Before World War 1I Java was the 
second  -largest  world  exporter,  and  sugar  provided  three-q uarters  of 
exports.  Production dropped dramatically in the 1950s, but improved in 
the 1970s.  Imports have continued into the 1980s despite an emphasis 
on self-sufficiency. 
In  1975  a  policy  change  shifted  emphasis  from  'estate'  to  'small-
holder'  production  (called  TRl).  Javanese  farmers  were  no  longer 
required to place land at the disposal of mills, and were given credit to 
produce cane on their  land, with mills managing input supply, advising 
on  techniques,  cutting,  transporting  and  milling  the  cane.  The 
extensification aspect of TRI brought unirrigated  land under cane, and 
from 1981-82 eight hectares of salVah under rice  had to be included in 
the  INSUS  program  for  each  hectare  removed  from  rice  to  sugar. 
During 1970-84 area under sugar trebled while production doubled (a 
steady decline in yield and extraction ratio).  B ULOG controls imports 
and over the same period domestic prices doubled when world  prices 
were falling.  Although categorised as  an estate crop, sugar needs to be 
taken into account when considering rice or palawija.  Moreover, it has 
the potential to reduce employment opportunities. 
There is substantial capital investment in mills and the industry domi-
nates short-term finance  to the agricultural sector (averaging 32%  be-
tween  1985  and  1988).  Resources  devoted  to  sugar  may  be  more 
productively  diverted  elsewhere,  but  the  self-suffIciency  question  re-
mains on the policy agenda. 
4.24  Cropping Systems 
The cropping pattern from lowlands to upland basically results from soil 
type and water availability.  Rich  volcanic lowland soils produce sawah 
rice  with  possibly some palaJlJija  if rainfall/irrigation is insufficient for 
further rice crops during the dry season.  Upland areas have a complex 
cropping pattern, partly influenced by soil  type  but, Inore importantly, 
the timing, onset, and length of the wet season.  Dependence on rainfall 
largely  determines  which  crops are  grown, where and when.  Size of 
96 holdings also influences cropping decisions and intensity, particularly on-
Java  where  average  size  is  less  than  0.5  hectares.  There  is  less  size 
constraint on the outer islands where cultivation can  be extensive and 
pure stands of  maize and cassava are more likely to be found. 
Upland rice  is  normally given first  priority at  the beginning of the 
rainy season  if the length of the season  allows.  In West Java,  where 
rainfall is relatively assured, rice may be intercropped with maize, cassava, 
peanuts and soybeans.  The pattern usually starts with rice  and maize, 
followed by cassava.  Later soybean and/or peanut replace the harvested 
rice.  Where  rainfall  is  less  certain  (e.g.  Central  and  East  Java),  only 
maize, cassava and legumes may form the cropping pattern. 
The ability  to cover  the  land  with  crops  year  round  improves  soil 
fertility and provides a continuous supply of  staple foods, partly avoiding 
production peaks, drying and storage problems.  Current research stresses 
the place of  high-yielding, early-maturing varieties, but these seem better 
adapted to monocropping, which  needs less moisture than intercropping. 
Yet,  while pure stands appear to give  higher yields, they may  be more 
susceptible to pests and diseases.  Measurement of  production and yield 
is more complicated in intercropping and figures may be biased in either 
direction.  An advantage of inter  cropping is the potential nutrition ben-
efits, as crop combinations compensate for individual crop deficiencies. 
4.25  Regional Focus of  Agricultural Production 
Java contains some 40% of all  cultivated agricultural land and produces 
the bulk of palalPija crops.  Of total production in  1988, Java produced 
between 60 and 68% of maize, cassava and peanuts, 58% of  soybean and 
45% of sweet potato.  However, lack of suitable land for expansion on 
Java mostly results in switching between crops if area targets are set.  The 
outer islands are relatively underpopulated, soils are less fertile and many 
areas are cropped under shifting cultivation. While irrigated rice land has 
been extended, comparatively little extra dry land cultivation has  been 
initiated.  Given the finite supply of fertile Javanese land, soil conserva-
tion needs in  upland regions, and diminishing yield  potential for  HYV 
rice  in  salPah areas,  outer-island lands  must receive  closer attention if 
food  production is  to keep  pace with  population and income growth. 
Transmigration targets are having some impact on this problem. 
4.26  Price Trends 
Between 1969 and 1980 it is  estimated that the prices of both rice and 
palawija declined in real terms, the only exception being peanuts.  How-
ever,  if price  trends of rice  and palalPija are  compared, the latter in-
creased faster than the former between 1971 and 1977, but the reverse is 
true from 1978 onwards (once again excepting peanuts).  During 1986 
average wholesale prices of mungbeans and soybean increased between 
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24 and  26%,  maize  and  cassava  were  relatively  stable,  while  peanuts 
declined by  3.5%.  All  six  palawija crops showed increases in  wholesale 
prices between 1986 and 1987, varying between 6 and 30%, but between 
1987  and  1988  average  wholesale  prices  increased  significantly. 
lVlungbean, cassava, peanut and sweet potato prices increased on average 
benveen 28 and 45% ,although maize and soybean were in the 14 to 16% 
range.  Regional palawija prices were largely unaffected by the rice crisis 
of 1985.  Benveen June 1984 and June  1985 the index of the average 
price of rice for the three provinces of Java  fell  by  between 8 and 11 % , 
but palawija remained about the same (except for a 4% fall  in East Java). 
Regional  palalllija prices  continued to increase during 1986 to  1988, 
with  the exception of Central Java  where prices  fell  by  3.3%  between 
June 1987 and  June 1988. 
4.27  External Trade 
Indonesia has  been a substantial exporter of dried cassava  (gaplelz)  tor 
livestock since  1975, and  has  been  both an  importer and exporter of 
maize during the 1970s and  1980s.  Peanuts were exported intermit-
tently  during  the  1970s,  but  imports  began  in  1975  and  averaged 
39 000 tonnes during 1982 to 1988.  Soybeans  have  been imported 
since  1975,  and  between  1981  and  1989  averaged  364  000  tonnes 
annually  (excluding  soy bean  meal  and  processed  products).  Small 
mungbeans exports  in  the early  1970s turned  to imports  in  the late 
1970s and  1980s.  These are around 2000 tonnes in  most years,  but 
intermittently higher. 
With  the exception of  gaplelt  (subject to little  Government restric-
tion), palawiJa have  been  mainly imported, in  varying quantities, and 
controlled through licensing procedures, and to an extent, import taxes. 
Exports have  been  relatively  minor except for gaplelz,  and control has 
been exerted through licensing and export taxes.  B ULOG is  the sole 
importer of  soybean and soybean meal (through assigned agents) and has 
become, de facto,  sole  importer of maize  since the early  1980s.  The 
major influence  on  palalvija trade  has  been  the exchange rate  policy 
pursued  by  the government.  The exchange  rate  became  overvalued 
following the 1974 oil price increases, discriminating against agricultural 
exports by rendering them uncompetitive.  Licensing procedures otTered 
some  protection  for  domestically  produced  palawija against  cheaper 
imports.  The 1978 and 1983 devaluations temporarily brought domes-
tic palawija prices closer to, or equal to, world prices.  How long the 
benefits of  the 1986 devaluation last are yet to be seen.  Trade liberalisa-
tion since 1984 has  been aimed mainly at the industrial sector and the 
palawija  were  not  affected.  However,  the  PAKMEI  1990  package 
indicated  the  beginning  of some  reform  to  export  regulation  of 
agriculture. 
98 4.28  Maize 
Maize (corn)  is  grown mainly,  but not exclusively,  as  an  upland crop 
under rain-fed  conditions, as  part of a monocrop or intercrop system. 
White  and  yellow  maize  are  grown,  the  former  for  domestic  human 
consumption and a small amount for the noodle industry.  Yellow maize 
covers some 65%  of producing areas,  and  is  preferred  by  the  poultry 
industry for its higher carotene level. 
During the 1980s Java  and Madura  have accounted for between 66 
and  74%  of total  production,  with  Sulawesi  and  East  Nusa  Tenggara 
accounting for a further 17 to 23%.  Maize survives on relatively marginal 
soils and in uncertain climatic conditions, making it the principal crop of 
upland East Java.  During the 1980s East Java accounted for some 42% 
of total production.  Yield  growth for Java  has  been marginally higher 
than  for  all-Indonesia.  There are  two distinct harvests,  the  main  one 
being between  December and March, two to three months before the 
main rice harvest.  The main crop accounts for about 60% of  production 
in  East and Central Java, but between 75 and 93% in other areas. 
4.28.1 Maize production 
During the  1970s the area under maize remained fairly  constant while 
production increased at a rate of nearly 3%  annually as  a result of rising 
yields.  Although production grew between 1970 and 1986 at over 4% 
annually, there were some disappointing years  (e.g.  downy mildew in 
1975 and 1976; 1979 was a wet  year and there was a drought in 1982). 
Figures for 1985 show a reduction in area and production but not yield. 
Reasons are not clear but several factors may have contributed:  (a) price 
support for  rice  makes  it  financially  more attractive; (b)  a longer wet 
season increases rice  plantings; and (c)  the harvesting date complicates 
production tlgures, as  two crops can be recorded in one year. 
The maize  production system  is  extremely diverse.  In addition  to 
distinctions between sawah and upland, crop frequency and productivity 
vary.  Sawah areas are reasonably uniform, but irrigated sawah (covering 
about 11% of planted area) is  more productive than the rain-fed sawah 
(covering about 10%).  The former  may  have  one or two  high-yield 
crops,  the  latter  usually  has  two  crops.  The  upland  system  divides 
between multiple and single cropland, covering about 55  and  24%  of 
planted area, respectively.  Single cropland includes parts of  East Java and 
Lumpung (high  productivity areas)  but is  mostly  intercropped, often 
with longer duration, higher-yielding varieties.  Local varieties are shorter-
duration but lower-yielding. The major cropping system (multiple crop/ 
upland) may produce three crops per year, but the last depends upon the 
length of  the wet season. The first crop is the major one, using HYV, but 
possibly not yet enough fertiliser for highest potential yields.  Second and 
third crops may  be of traditional local  varieties.  The two major white 
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maize areas are included in the latter system, but white variet.ies are not 
fertiliser-responsive  and  little  research  has  been init.iated.  Indonesian 
maize  yields  have  been  improving,  but they  are  st.ill  below  those  of 
neighbours and developed countries. 
4.28.2 Maize consumption 
Maize demand involves three main components:  (a) staple food, const.i-
tuting  about  three-quarters  of production;  (b)  animal  feed;  and 
(c)  industrial  use  (oil,  starch,  glue,  sweeteners).  Livestock  use  is 
estimated  at  over 20%  of production  and  industrial  use  is  very  small 
(maybe 1  %).  The main harvest provides a cheap source of  calories for the 
poor at a time when rice prices tend to rise.  Consllmption is  highest in 
this  quarter  and  then  tapers  off.  vVhite  maize  is  predominantly for 
human consumption, yellow maize serves  both humans and livestock, 
but human consumption predominates.  Maize  has  a  poor image for 
consumers, is classed as 'inferior' and is consumed basically in rural areas, 
with  consumption some 25%  higher on-Java.  A negative expenditure 
elasticity (varying between -0.31 and -0.55) is revealed from household 
survey data, but time series data (Food Balance Sheets) indicate positive 
elasticities between 0.72 and 1.77.  Feed mills dominate commercial use 
of (yellow)  maize.  Both livestock  and industrial  usage  demand year-
round  supply  which  necessitates  storage  (difficult  and  expensive  in 
tropical areas) or imports. 
4.28.3 Maize cropping patterns 
The  single  most  important  factor  affecting  maize  cropping  patterns 
(apart from land size) is the length and the timeliness of  arrival of  the wet 
season.  Maize takes second place in the rice-dominated cropping calen-
dar, although less so in East Java \-vhere it is monocropped or intercropped 
with cassava and legumes.  Previolls patterns demanded early maturing, 
local (low-yielding) varieties.  While this constraint remains operative for 
some fanners, the shorter time span of HYV rice  has allowed an  extra 
degree of  Hexibility to others by allowing use oflonger-duration HYV or 
hybrid maize.  Increased fertiliser and new varieties tend to shift farmers 
to  monocropping, which  makes  less  demands on  moisture levels  but 
appears more labour-intensive. 
4.28.4 Maize mal,keting 
The main harvest is often during the rainy season.  To keep for more than 
a short period maize must be  dried to 14%  moisture content to avoid 
aHatoxins.  In wet conditions farmers must dry it by the heat of kitchen 
fires.  In disposing of surplus  the  farmers  sell  direct to consumers, a 
middleman/trader or the cooperative.  The proportion marketed differs 
among the major systems, varying between 40 and 80%  in sawah areas 
100 and 30 to 80%  in  upland systems.  Broadly speaking, 50% appears to be 
marketed.  The amounts marketed range from small offerings provided 
by  many farmers,  to large volumes trucked directly to feed mills.  The 
main  harvest produces about 60%  of total production, but higher on-
farm  consumption at that time reduces storage needs.  The rest of the 
harvest is spread fairly  evenly over the remainder of the year. 
4.28.5 Maize research 
As a result of  the downy mildew problem (more evident in monoculture 
than intercropping), it became obvious that new varieties were necessary. 
Harapan and Arjuna were released in the late 1970s.  Arjuna out·  yielded 
other varieties,  proved  disease-resistant  under  humid  conditions  and 
solved  the  problem  of short  maturity  (90  days)  to  fit  the  cropping 
calendar.  Several other varieties were  released, higher yielding but  of 
longer maturity, until the emphasis switched in  1983 to hybrids.  Virtu-
ally  no  research  has  been  done  on  white  varieties  (only  Bromo was 
released), and this is a serious constraint in the two major growing areas. 
Problems  of research  are  exacerbated  by  lack  of regular  distribution 
facilities  for improved seeds (both open-pollenated and hybrid), and is 
partly the reason some farmers have opted against hybrid use. 
4.28.6 Maize floor price scheme 
A floor price scheme for maize commenced in East Java in  1978 and was 
extended country-wide in  1979.  B  ULOG was to buy dried yellow maize 
from the KUDs, but few had ever marketed maize or were equipped to 
dry it.  The floor price was set at an incremental benefIt-cost ratio (but 
with the constraint that the price should not exceed half the rice price). 
Initially the floor price was set higher than the peak harvest price, so that 
BULOG had to subsidise the consumer price.  Later the domestic price 
rose (higher than world market prices) and the floor price stayed below 
domestic prices through to 1988. 
Between 1970 and 1974 Indonesia was  a small maize exporter until 
the overvalued exchange rate reduced competitiveness.  During the rest 
of the decade small amounts of maize were exported and imported, but 
in all  years a net import situation resulted.  The Government intervened 
from  time  to  time  (e.g.  in  1979  export licences  were  suspended  to 
stabilise domestic prices).  Trade continued to be restricted by a system 
of import and export licences with BULOG the present de  facto  sole 
licenced importer.  By 1984 (after the 1983 devaluation) domestic prices 
were once again  competitive, and exports resulted in  that year from  a 
fortuitous combination of circumstances (bad weather and a temporal), 
reduction in  US exports). 
The livestock industry, whose products have high income elasticities 
of demand, has contributed to the emergence of a year-round demand 
for  maize.  However, problems of drying  and storage  increase  costs, 
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making imports cheaper in  pre-harvest months.  BULOG's subsidised 
sales to feed  mills to keep costs stable removes the incentive to invest in 
drying and storage facilities.  It is  not clear at which point in  the market 
chain drying and storage can be performed most economically. 
4.29  Cassava 
Cassava  is  grown throughout Indonesia, often in  small  plots or house 
gardens, but the main production areas are the hilly regions of}  ava and 
Madura.  It is bulky, perishable and must be consumed within a few days, 
or transformed into either starch or dried, thinly-sliced roots (gap/ell). 
Starch  is  used  for  snack  foods  or  industry,  while gaplek  is  exported 
(mainly to the  EC as  feedstock)  or consumed  by  the  relatively  poor, 
especially  in  the  rice  pre-harvest quarter.  A  major difference  between 
cassava and rice or maize is  the length of the growing season.  Rice and 
maize  need,  respectively,  3  months  and  4.5  months  to  grow,  while 
cassava requires at least 8 months. 
4.29.1 Cassava production 
Areas planted to cassava  have  not grown significantly over the past 30 
years.  The main retarding factors include:  (a) extended rice programs 
and irrigation; (b) soil erosion in upland Java; (c) relatively high prices of 
competing staples; and (d) some shift to perennial cash crops.  Cassava 
tends to be cultivated on hillsides subject to various degrees of erosion 
(classified from 'moderate' to 'severe').  In badly depleted soils cassava is 
often the last crop grown.  Production has fluctuated, but the long-term 
growth  rate  benveen  1970 and  1988  is  about 2%  per annum.  Java 
accounted for 62% of production in  1988 although this has  fallen  from 
over  70%  at  the  beginning of the  1980s.  Lampung and  East  Nusa 
Tenggara are other important producing areas.  Area harvested declined 
by over 200 000 ha during the 1980s, the bulk of this on Java. 
4.29.2 Cassava consumption 
While rice provides at least half of total calories, maize and cassava each 
provide about 10% , with the former slightly more important.  However, 
there are marked regional variations, with urban dwellers having a basic 
rice diet, including only small amounts of fresh cassava and virtually no 
maize.  Rural d"vellers are classified by  region with Madura consuming 
nearly all  fresh cassava and West Java including some fresh cassava in its 
rice-dominated diet.  Central and East Java have a high consumption of 
both  maize  and  cassava,  while  Yogyakarta  and  the  Central  Southern 
Coast have the highest consumption of  gaplek.  In addition to regional 
variations  seasonal  factors  are  of importance, especially  for  the  poor. 
Following the rice harvest quarter, fresh cassava, and thengaplell, substi-
tute  for  the  seasonally-expensive  rice.  In  the  final  rice  pre-harvest 
102 quarter, maize and gaplefz are relatively cheap substitutes.  Expenditure 
elasticities for gaplek are negative or zero while fresh cassava varies.  For 
urban consumers they are moderately large and positive.  Fresh cassava 
has a negative price elasticity for  rural consumers but positive for urban 
consumers (possibly a 'quality' effect). 
4.29.3 Cassava cropping patterns 
Some cassava  is  grown in  pure stands mainly on the outer islands, but 
mostly it is intercropped with grains, legumes and sometimes vegetables. 
The intercrops vary  with district and  rainfall,  malUng  production and 
yield estimates difficult.  Upland rice  takes precedence if soil and mois-
ture are satisfactOlY, but if rainfall  is  uncertain, cassava is  better adapted 
to soil and climate variation.  Although needing moisture in early life it 
can then tolerate long drought periods.  Cassava does not grow well in 
excessively moist soil, cannot be grown under flooded sawah conditions, 
and moisture intolerance puts an  upper limit on harvesting.  It can  be 
'stored' in the soil to a certain extent, but is  usually harvested between 
8 and 12 months after planting. 
4.29.4 Gaplek 
Gaplek is made by sun-drying peeled and thinly-sliced roots.  It can then 
be stored for several months.  Flour from the pounded dry roots is  used 
as  an admixture in baking.  Gaplek)s calorific value is  roughly similar to 
those of rice and maize but the protein content is  lower.  If consumed 
with  legumes  and  vegetables,  and  especially  if the  leaves  (containing 
protein)  are  also  eaten, it  can  provide  the  basis  of an  adequate diet. 
While gaplek is  used  in  the  EC for  livestock  it  is  rarely  used  for  this 
purpose in  Indonesia.  Protein deficiency requires supplementation by 
soybean or fish  meal (both expensive) and farmers prefer maize. 
4.29.5 Starch 
Starch  is  produced  by  peeling and grating  fresh  roots  and  filtering  a 
liquid from the residue.  After water is  removed the starch is  dried and 
used  in  coolUng,  either for  home or commercial  purposes.  A  small 
proportion is  used in  the textile,  paper and  pharmaceutical industries. 
Starch-malUng requires a plentiful supply of clear water, and West Java 
leads  in  starch  production with  over half of harvested  roots  used  for 
starch.  Overall,  starch  accounts  for  about  23%  of production  and 
imports have been occasionally necessary.  Starch is  used for making the 
snack food, kntpuk. 
4.29.6 Cassava marketing 
Although there are regional variations, about two-thirds of the crop is 
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marketed.  Of this,  starch  accounts  for  some  23%,  exports  (mainly 
gaplek) about 15%, and the balance could be fresh roots orgaplek.  The 
marketed share of  cassava appears to be higher than for other crops, and 
is an important source of  cash income.  The bulkiness and perishability of 
fresh  roots means quick marketing, and while gaplek can  be stored for 
3-4 months, storage losses are higher than for grains (mould and insect 
pests).  Marketing is  handled by village traders who deal in  fresh  roots 
and gaplek, or wholesalers who deal only in gaplek.  Transport costs are 
the major item of marketing but infrastructure development (plus a fuel 
subsidy)  has  reduced  costs.  Competition  is  increased  by  the  quick 
transferral of  price information.  While credit is mostly informal, Govern-
ment institutions are now entering the field. 
4.29.7 Cassava reseal'ch 
Improved cassava  yields during the 1970s and 1980s are  presumed to 
have resulted from fertiliser use on other intercrops.  Little research has 
been done on improved varieties but two local strains, Adira I and  II, 
show promise with moderate levels of  fertiliser.  Yields may be improved 
by changing the method of fertiliser application and better choice and 
treatment of  cuttings. 
4.29.8 Government policy 
The  cassava  industry  operates  without  specific  Government  policies, 
excepting irregular export bans.  Gaplek is exported to the EC which sets 
an  export-determined floor  for  domestic prices.  The import price  of 
starch from Thailand (plus transport and tariff) sets a ceiling price. Some 
past trade  policies  have  had a depressing effect on production (e.g.  a 
1973 export ban and starch imports in 1976). 
4.30  Soybean, other grain legumes and tubers 
The grain legumes (soybeans, peanuts and mungbeans) and sweet pota-
toes tend to be the product of  upland intercrops, although in some areas 
they are grown on rain-fed  saJVah  during the dly season.  Floor price 
schemes were introduced for the three legumes in  1979, but prices set 
have  generally been below domestic free  market prices, which  in  turn 
tend to exceed world market prices.  Legumes have been providing an 
increasing percentage of  total calorie and protein consumption since the 
late 1960s.  Some (mainly imported) soybean is processed into tahu and 
tempe in  traditional bean curd mills  and, in addition to soybean grain, 
there is now increasing importation of  meal for animal food.  Production 
of  sweet potatoes has remained virtually static since 1968. 
4.30.1 Soybean pl'oduction 
Soybeans were once a specialisation of East Java and all-Java accounted 
104 for 80% of total production in the early 1980s, but by 1988 the propor-
tion  has  fallen  to  around  60%.  Area  under  production  has  almost 
doubled since 1971, the largest proportion being on the outer islands. 
Production  also  increased  on the outer islands  (particularly Sumatra) 
with an eight-fold increase between 1970 and 1988.  Yields  have  been 
increasing over the same period (over 2%  annually) but remain low by 
world standards. 
4.30.2 Soybean consumption 
Consumption of  soybean has been rising steadily throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Imports of  grain started in 1977 and have averaged 360 000 
tonnes annually during 1981 to 1986.  In addition, import of soybean 
meal  for  animal  feed  has  increased  rapidly  over  the  past  ten  years, 
reaching 313 000 tonnes in 1986.  Soybean meal complements maize in 
feed rations.  Generally, soy bean and other legumes tend to be consumed 
in  the producing area, but Java  leads consumption, and urban exceeds 
rural consumption.  Consumption is  expected to increase with growing 
incomes (an expenditure elasticity of  0.98 has been estimated). 
4.30.3 Soybean cropping patterns 
Cropping patterns tend to vary  between  districts.  East Java  tends to 
monocrop soybean after rice, Sumatra appears to intercrop, while Cen-
tral  Java  varies  between  the  n\'o.  Yields  seem  not  to  va11'  between 
monocropping/intercropping, but appear to be lower in  upland than in 
lowland areas.  Seed type  ma~ '  be int1uelltial, as some upland brmers lIse 
local, short maturity seeds to tit their needs.  Improved seeds arc often of 
longer maturitv.  vVhilc other crops benefit ti'o!1l  fertiliser use, this is  not 
necessarily so with  soybean  (which  absorbs nitrogen  b'om  the air  and 
returns it to the soil).  Some areas respond to phosphatic tCrtiliser and in 
certain acid soils lime is  beneficial. 
-1:.30.4 Soy/mTll nlarltctilJ/f 
M:trketing  is  spread  ()\'Cr  large  ~lreas,  with  t:lrmers  presenting  small 
scattered otferings.  farmers sell to \'illage traders, middleman/traders or 
\\'hole .~alcrs for large crops.  The KUD should be an option, but B  LTLOC's 
purchases  arc  small.  In  191'lS  B  L  1 LOG  imported  302  000 tonnes of 
grain, 175 000 tonnes of meal and procured dOl11estical\v 29 000 tonnes 
of grain.  Imported grain and meal is  the monopoly of B l'LOG, which 
appoints distribution agents,  So"beall is  the most heavily protected of 
the t(lod commodities.  Qualin' control is a problem ~lS grain is graded by 
tr.1tkrs and B CLOC; sets its  own standards.  Distinct preferences have 
emerged as  local  soy  manubcturers demand domestic seeds  till'  taste, 
while tcmpc and tCed industries prefer larger imported beans. Real district 
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and rural market prices have  been virtually static since the mid  1970s  . 
..J.30.S S'OVbCflIl  l'CJCflrc/J 
Soybean  research  is  disad\'antaged  by  lack  of .1n  internatiolul  centre 
concentrating on production in  the  tropics.  In  1974 CRIH. rekascd 
Obra, the main  \'ariet\' planted, which  has a  maturity span ot- 90 davs. 
This mav bc too long r()r certain cropping patterns. Two earlier-matur-
ing varieties wCI'e  released  next, but with  disadv~lntages of IowCl'  yields 
and poor rust resistance.  In  19R4 Dempo was rekased.  It shares Obra's 
vield  and  maturit\'  p~lttern, hut is  more rust-resistant.  Production and 
distribution  of sccd, poor quality  and  timely  delivery,  ~lre  major con 
straints on the industry  . 
..J.30. (J Soy/mm price J1IjijiOl't j'(bWlC 
The price support schemc institutcd in 1979 is in1pkmentcd through the 
KlTDs,  but the tloor price  has  been  mostlv lowCl'  than current markct 
prices, and B lTLOG procurement is  about 3  'X,  of domestic production. 
Isolated  and  sm~lll  scattered  markctings contribute to high  marketing 
costs and  10\\' producer rcturns.  Thc situation appcars  eX~lccrbatcd b\' 
the low tloor pricc, poor seed qualit\,  ~lIld distribution, 10\\' world market 
pricc kading to imports and possibk producer disincenti\·c. 
4.30.7 Pea 11 1It."  (rrl'lIllIldlllltS) 
Peanuts, consumed both as  a vegetable and snack tood, are  a valuable 
protein source.  Java produces about three-quarters of  total production. 
Yields of 0.9 t/ha compare unfavourably with Malaysia'S 3.5 t/ha, but 
varieties suitable to tropical conditions are not easily developed.  Produc-
tion growth was just over 4% per annum from 1970 to 1988, but imports 
have been necessary since 1979.  Domestic prices are more than double 
world market levels  and BULOG controls imports, restricted  to a sole 
importer.  While  peanuts  are  not as  diftlcult to store as  other crops, 
humidity and aflatoxin development must be considered. 
4.30,8 Mungbeans (green grams) 
Mungbeans are  also  covered by  the 1979 floor price scheme although 
production is small (284 500 tonnes in 1988),  Imports, averaging 6000 
tonnes during the  1980s, have  been relatively  minor.  Mungbeans are 
normally consumed as  sprouts or porridge and constitute an additional 
protein  source.  Harvested  area  was  315  500  ha  in  1988 and  yields 
averaged around 0.65tjha during the 1980s.  Mungbeans are a potential 
replacement for soybeans in drier areas although some liming would be 
necessary in acid soils. 
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Sweet potatoes are the staple ofIrian Jaya although 45% of  production is 
on Java.  Mainly upland-grown during the dl)' season, they are  bulky, 
transport costs are high and marketing is  poorly developed.  Harvested 
area fell  by 31% between 1970 and 1988, but also fluctuates, particularly 
on Java.  Over the same  period production stagnated despite a slight 
yield  improvement  from  6 t/ha  to  8.7 t/ha.  Yields  of 25 t/ha  on 
research plots indicate the large gap.  Although three new varieties were 
released between 1978 and 1984, their penetration to farm  level  is  not 
evident and fertiliser use is considered low or non-existent. 
4.31  Wheat Flour 
Sporadic attempts at wheat growing have been unsuccessful and imports 
have grown steadily over the past 30 years.  A high point was  reached at 
1.74 million tonnes in 1983, but imports have declined since then in the 
wake of large  rice  harvests, budgetary constraints and a price increase. 
Imports during the  1950s, some concessional)"  were  used  to contain 
inflationary pressure, but commercial purchases now dominate, with the 
USA supplying over 60% of imports in  1984.  There is disagreement on 
the role of wheat in  Indonesian food policy.  Some argue it is  a widely-
traded commodity internationally, its per calorie price is  lower than rice 
and it is  thus a sensible alternative to rice imports.  Others point to its 
high  income  elasticity  and  predominant consumption  in  urban  areas. 
The use of tariffs is  suggested in controlling supply and demand, rather 
than BULOG's sole import control and the monopoly profits on domes-
tic  milling.  Large investment in  the milling/baking industries must be 
considered in any food policy reformulation. 
4.32  Future Prospects for Secondary Food Crops 
Rice policy has been the cornerstone of food policy strategy tor the past 
15 years with concomitant relatively slow progress in pa/awija , except-
ing maize.  Success with rice cannot be replicated with pa/awija.  Rice is 
now 95%  sawah-grown, while  paJawija represents a  great diversity  of 
production  techniques  and  is  mainly  upland-produced.  Rice  is  the 
preferred staple with maize and cassava facing consumer discrimination, 
and  sweet  potato production  virtually  stagnant.  The  legumes  form  a 
special  categol),  because of dietal), protein  and, while  production has 
been growing steadily from a small base, all  have been supplemented by 
controlled  imports,  especially  soybean  which  includes  livestock  feed 
demands.  Java dominates pa/aJVija and total foodgrains production but 
two provinces, East and Central Java,  accounted for over 45%  of total 
maize, cassava,  mungbean and soybean production and 39%  of peanut 
production  in  1988.  The  two  systems  of sawah  and  palawija  are 
interlinked in  the sense that sawah land is  interchangeable bet\veen wet 
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rice and most palawija crops, although the reverse  is  not true.  Many 
farmers own plots of  each type (often some distance apart), and decisions 
on cultivation invariably involve consideration of  both systems.  Hence it 
is  not feasible  to consider changes in palawija area without noting the 
possible consequences for sawah. 
4.33  Prospects for Maize 
Mter the release of Harapan 6 the growth rate of maize output acceler-
ated to 7%  annually  between  1979 and  1986.  Future production in-
creases may be absorbed in several ways:  (a) domestic human consump-
tion; (b) livestock industry; (c) processed forms of  maize; and (d) export. 
Since  virtually  no dried  maize  is  consumed  in  urban  areas,  domestic 
human consumption increases  need consideration.  They may  depend 
upon  relative  price  changes  between  rice  and  maize  in  rural  areas. 
Processed  forms  of maize  may  increase  consumption  in  urban  areas. 
Demand from  livestock sources is  expected to increase, especially when 
income  growth  recovers  from  the  mid-1980s  downturn.  However, 
maize price fluctuations induce changes in the maize proportions used in 
feed rations, as do price and proportion changes in complementary feed 
products.  Problems of drying and storage need resolution  to contain 
seasonal price rises and consequent resort to subsidised imports.  Indo-
nesia is  disadvantaged in  exporting by a lack of bulk handling facilities, 
and the narrow margin of  comparative advantages induced by the 1986 
devaluation  could  be easily  eroded.  Hybrids  have  provided  a  further 
option for some farmers, but the seed multiplication and annual distribu-
tion continue to exert constraint (financial and other.vise). 
4.34  Prospects for Cassava 
The rice intensification programs have financially benefited the lowland 
farmers but upland farmers, relying upon cassava for cash income, have 
not been favoured in  research, intensification or soil  rehabilitation pro-
grams.  Negative  consumer attitudes  may  be  changed  by  processing 
measures used in other countries, increasing the storage life of fresh and 
dry roots.  The yield  gap between existing varieties,  new varieties and 
experimental  plots  is  extremely  large.  Better  root  choice,  handling 
procedures and fertiliser (including application measures) offer potential 
for  future  productivity  growth,  even  with  declining  areas  under 
production. 
4.35  Prospects for Legumes and Tubers 
It is likely that income growth in the 1990s will continue to influence the 
strong demand for legumes, increasingly met by imports unless domestic 
production  improves.  A  1986  soy bean  intensification  plan  increased 
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imports, including livestock demand, were equal to 64.5% of domestic 
production.  After the  1986 devaluation  domestic soybean  prices  re-
mained more than double the world price (real and nominal).  Demand 
for different seed types by industry, poor seed quality, lack of  producti,on 
facilities  and  timely  delivery  are  important constraints.  Peanuts  and 
mungbeans suffer similar seed problems and continuing basic research is 
needed.  There is  some prospect that pigeon pea, easier to grow than 
soybean and suitable for drier areas, will increase legume output. 
4.36  Future Policy Issues 
Indonesia has  reached  the incongruous posItion  where  rice  yields  are 
among the highest, if not the highest, in  Asia  while pa/awija yields are 
among  the  lowest.  There  are  three  major  constraints  involving  the 
palawija:  (a) socioeconomic (consumer resistance and rice  preference); 
(b)  infrastructural  (roads,  shipping,  port  handling,  communications, 
markets); and (c) technical (seeds, fertilisers, cropping patterns, exten-
sion, storage, drying, credit).  Of these three major constraints, the last 
presents policy makers with the major challenge. 
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Crop Models 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter a review is completed of  the four contemporary modelling 
projects allied to ACIAR Project 8362.  These are reported by Tabor et 
al.  (1988)  (the Ministry  model), Rosegrant et al.  (1987) (the IFPRI 
model),  the  World  Bank  (1987a,b  )  (the  World  Bank  model),  and 
Johnson et al.  (1986) (the FAPRI model).  These four documents form 
the basis of the review.  In addition to this  work, Timmer (1986) also 
provided guidance for the ACIAR Project at some crucial points. 
All of  the research mentioned above was being performed at the same 
time as  the ACIAR project.  As  a consequence there was  useful  inter-
action between the modellers from  the different groups.  The culmin-
ation  of this  collaboration  was  the  International  Workshop  held  in 
Jakarta in January 1988.  A significant conclusion of the workshop was 
that while  the general impacts of agricultural price policy in  Indonesia 
were understood, more detailed analysis was  required if the price policy 
instruments were to be used with precision. 
5.2  Relationships between the Models 
The overall relationships between the five  models can be seen in  Figure 
5.1.  IFPRI, the World Bank and Ministry models were developed more-
or-less  independently of each other.  The FAPRI team made few  of its 
own parameter estimates, drawing most of  its information on elasticities 
from  the  IFPIU  model.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  ACIAR model  used 
previous estimates from all of  the other models and from other sources. 
While this suggests that the latter two models are more modest than the 
rest, their contribution has  been to concentrate on modelling the effect 
of price policy instruments more completely. 
The horizontal dimension of  Figure 5.1 is an index of  comprehensive-
ness of  the various models.  In constructing this index the characteristics 
that were  taken  into account were  number of food  commodities in-
cluded, regional disaggregation, income class definition on the demand 
side, and extent of the macroeconomic component of the model.  Each 
of these characteristics is  considered in  Section 5.4.  Suffice it to say  at 
this point that the Ministry model was considered the most comprehen-
sive.  It is particularly impressive in terms of  the number of  commodities 
included (seven) and its macroeconomic content. The remaining models 
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are close to each other on an overaJl comprehensiveness index, and could 
easily  change  their ranking depending on the weighting  givCl1  to the 
components of the comprehensiveness index. 
5.3  Structure of the Models 
As the Ministry model is the most comprehensive, discussion commences 
with a consideration of  it.  Then similarities and differences between this 
model and the others arc examined. 
5.3.1  Structurf of  the Millistl:V Model 
A flow diagram of the structure of  the Ministry model is shown in Figure 
5.2.  The  two  main  components  arc  a  t()()d  crop  sub-model  and  a 
macroeconomic sub-model.  The core of the t()od crop model, as  in  all 
the models considered, is a set of  demand and supply functions.  For each 
crop  there  arc  three  estimating equations.  Demand  t()r  each  crop  is 
dependent on consumer income, own  price, price of competing crops 
and population.  An  almost ideal demand system estimation is  adopted. 
On the supply side, an area equation and yield equation arc estimated t()r 
each crop.  Thus, supply ofcach crop is the product of  area harvested and 
yield, with area harvested dependent on own price, price of competing 
crops, area targets set  by  the Government, and  lagged  harvested ,1[ea. 
Yield is a function of output and input prices. 
When the model is  used in simulation mode, demand and supply arc 
closed otf using  food  gap  (stock changes and/or net imports)  as  the 
equilibrating mechanism.  A fixed proportion of the generated supply is 
used for seed, waste and non-food use (see Figure 5.2).  The remainder is 
available for human consumption and confronts the simulated demand, 
with  any  surplus  or  deficit  being  taken  up  in  stock  changes  or net 
imports.  A similar equilibrating mechanism applies to all  four models. 
Finally,  in  the  Ministry  model,  food  crop  output  links  to  the 
macroeconomic sub-model as a component of GDP. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, GDP is the sum offood crop output, mining/ 
defence production and industrialjservices production.  GDP then de-
termines private consumption expenditures and hence links back to the 
food crop sub-model through consumer incomes.  Equations estimated 
by the Ministry team to establish the macroeconomic sub-model are (a) 
mining/defence production as  a function of the petroleum price index, 
(b) industrialjservices production dependent on food crop prices, non-
food prices and inflation, and (c) private consumption as  a function of 
production in the food, mining/defence and industrialjservices sectors. 
Crop prices, input prices and area targets are manipulated within the 
model to assess  the impact of price subsidies, input subsidies and area 
targets.  In Figure 5.2 the points labelled (P) show where the main policy 
instruments  are  modelled.  A  significant  interaction,  unique  to  this 
112 model, is  the influence of food price policy on industrial/services pro-
duction.  Another is the explicit way in which area targets are recognised 
and analysed as a policy instrument. 
.5.3.2  Structul'e of  the IFPRI Model 
The structure of  the IFPRI model is shown in the flow diagram of  Figure 
5.3.  The obvious first difference between it and the Ministry model is 
the lack of  a macroeconomic component.  This means that in the IFPRl 
simulations there is  no feedback from  the quantity of food  crops pro-
duced to GDP and through personal consumption expenditure back to 
the  food-producing sector,  and  there  is  no explicit  modelling of the 
influence of Government food price policy onto the macroeconomy and 
hence onto personal consumption. 
Like the Ministry food-crop model, the core of the IFPRl model is  a 
set of  crop demand and supply functions.  However, there are significant 
differences in  the model structures at this point.  While there are sets of 
estimating  equations  for  area,  yield  and  food  dernand,  just  like  the 
Ministry model, the explanatory variables are  somewhat different.  For 
each crop, area is dependent not on price, as  in  the Ministly model, but 
on own expected  revenue,  expected  revenue of competing crops and 
lagged area.  In addition to crop prices and krtiliser prices, crop yields 
are dependent on  the variables  representing lagged yield  and shifts  in 
technology. The technology shift variables (proportion of modern var-
ieties, proportion of area irrigated, proportion of area under intensifica-
tion and trend) are particularly important because they permit analysis of 
non-price policies like investment in irrigation. 
Demand  for  food  in  the  IFPRl  model  is  estimated  as  per  capita 
demand dependent on per capita consumption expenditures, own prices 
and prices of other food commodities.  For all  commodities except rice, 
the IFPRl team used previous estimates of  demand elasticities (Rosegrant 
et al.  1987, p.  5.13). 
Another minor difference between the Ministry and IFPIU models is 
in the method of  closure of  the gap between demand and supply of food 
crops.  While the Ministry projections treat this as  a food gap to be met 
from either stock changes or net imports, the IFPIU analysis has stocks 
fixed  at a particular absolute level  for each commodity and assumes the 
gap is  filled only by net imports. 
Returning to Figure 5.3, the points at which policy enters the model 
and  hence  the  types  of policy  considered  are  indicated  by  (P).  As 
mentioned above, in addition to consumer and producer price support, 
and fertiliser subsidies, Government investment in  irrigation facilities  is 
included in  this model. 
.5.3.3  Structure of  the World Banlz Model 
The structure of  the World Bank model (shown in Figure 5.4) resembles 
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the IFPRI model, being a food crop model with supply estimated as  the 
product of area and yield, and demand estimated on a per capita basis. 
The structure of the area equations is  the same in  both models and the 
structure  of the  yield  equations  is  similar,  with  the  vVorld  Bank 
(a)  excluding the proportions of the area irrigated and intensitled and 
(b) using the ratio of crop-to-fertiliser prices as  an explanatory variable 
rather than crop and tcrtiliser prices separately. 
The most significant diftcrences between the two models are  in  the 
method of estimating the demand relationships and in  the method of 
closure of the model when used in simulation mode.  In estimating the 
demand relationships as well as own price and price of  competing crops, 
real  GDP  per  capita  was  used  by  the  World  Bank  modellers  as  an 
explanatory variable rather than per capita consumption expenditures. 
In the vVorld Bank projection exercises, the model is closed in a more 
complex manner than in the other models.  The equilibrating mechanism 
f()r  each crop is  through per capita net imports, which are  the sum of 
demand  plus  ending  period  stocks  less  supply  and  beginning  period 
stocks,  with  all  variables  measured on  a  per capita  basis.  Moreover, 
stocks are  not simply measured as  a proportion of output, but a stock 
function is estimated \vith current supply, the previous level of  con  sump-
tion and own price as explanatory variables. 
The  intluence of policy  in  the  simulation  runs of the World  Bank 
model is shown by (P) in Figure 5.4.  It is clear that the emphasis in this 
model is  on output price policies and input subsidies. 
5.3.4  Stmcturc ofthc FAPRI Model 
The FAPRI team made no independent estimates of  the various relation-
ships,  but  used  previous  estimates  of parameters  such  as  elasticities. 
Hence, discussion of the structure relates to the use  of the model  in 
projection exercises.  The structure is  the simplest of the t()lIr  models 
considered and is  shown in Figure 5.5.  Again, supply is  the product of 
area and yield.  The area nll1ction is similar to that of  the Ministry model 
with own price and price of  competing crops together with lagged area as 
explanatory variables.  It is  easy  to envisage  this  lagged  area  variable 
being adjusted in projection exercises to represent area targets, as  in the 
Ministry model. 
The yield function in the FAPRI model resembles that of the IFPRI 
model except that it excludes the technology shift variables.  Thus, yield 
is  a function only oflagged yield, crop prices and tertiliser price. 
On the demand side, eonsumption per eapita of  ea  eh crop is a function 
of lagged consumption, own price, prices of competing crops and in-
come per capita.  This again is similar to the IFPRI model except t()r the 
additional variable lagged consumption. 
In the closure of the model the F  APRI team employs net imports as 
the mechanism for drawing demand and supply together.  Net imports 
are equal to quantity demanded for human consumption plus seed, teed 
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difference  introduced at this point by  the FAPRI team  is  to have  the 
levels of  stocks as a fixed proportion of  demand rather than supply. 
The policy emphasis in  the FAPRI model is  on output price policies 
and input subsidies, although, as  mentioned above, area  targets could 
also easily be incorporated. 
5.4  Some Details of  the Models 
5.4.1  Commodity coverage 
The crops included in  each of the four models are shown in  Table 5.l. 
The inclusion of wheat (on the demand side) in  the World Bank and 
F  APRI models is  a reflection of their price policy orientation in a partial 
equilibrium  framework,  and  its  exclusion  in  the  Ministry  and  IFPRI 
models reflects their production orientation. 
Sugar is  included in  the Ministry and IFPRI models,  but excluded 
from the other two.  This may reflect the difllculty of estimating econo-
metric relationships, acknowledged by Rosegrant (1987, p.  5.13), for a 
commodity which  has  been  subject to various  forms  of Government 
regulation. 
In terms of harvested area, the first six  commodities in Table 5.1 are 
the most significant food crops.  Of the other three crops, wheat is  not 
grown commercially, and sweet potatoes and mungbeans are each grown 
on almost 300 000 ha  (Johnson et al.  1986, p.  48; Tabor et al.  1988, 
p. 44), which is about half the area devoted to groundnuts.  It therefore 
seems appropriate that sweet potatoes and mungbeans are overall consid-
ered minor commodities and represented only in one model each. 
5.4.2  Disaggregation of  the models 
The three types of disaggregation included in  the models are regional, 
rural  and urban, and by income class.  The IFPRI model is  the most 
disaggregated  of the  four,  with  supply  regionally  disaggregated  and 
demand disaggregated into three income classes and by mral and urban 
areas.  Supply first  is  disaggregated into Java  and off-Java,  then using 
dummy variables into East, Central and West Java, North Sumatra, other 
Sumatra, South Sulawesi, other Sulawesi and other Indonesian. 
The  Ministry  and  World  Bank  models  have  a  regional  definition 
similar to each other.  On the supply side the regions are Java and off-
Java, and on the demand side all-Indonesia demand functions are esti-
mated (except for  maize in  the World Bank model which has  the two 
demand functions for feed and all  other uses). 
In the FAPRI model, the crop supply function relates to all-Indonesia, 
and demand is disaggregated into rural and urban functions.  In fact the 
demand functions  are  based  on IFPRI estimates  for  medium  income 
categories of  rural and urban dwellers. 
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In summary, the Ministry, the World Bank and the FAPRI models are 
highly aggregated.  In contrasts, the IFPRI model succeeds in achieving 
a modicum of disaggregation both regionally and by income class. 
5.4.3  Estimation and projection periods 
The three modelling groups that made their own estimates of demand 
and supply functions (the Ministry, IFPRI and the World Bank) used the 
same  underlying data covering the period  from  1969 to 1985.  They 
then completed some simulation experiments to analyse  the impact of 
price changes.  The projection periods for these simulations were for the 
Ministry 1987 to 1992, for IFPIU 1985 to 2000, and for  World Bank 
1987 to 1995. 
There are a number of differences  between the models discussed  in 
earlier sections which would lead to the expectation that the results tt"om 
these various projection exercises would not be the same.  Apart from the 
structure, commodity coverage  and  level  of disaggregation,  there  are 
differences in  the values of key parameters like the production response 
to fertiliser that are embedded within each model.  Another difference is 
the  base  period selected  for  the projection.  For the Ministry and  the 
World Bank this was  1986, for  FAP1U  it was  1985 and for the IFPRI 
model it was the mean of 1984 to 1986, with allowance being made for 
commodities like cassava which had an  atypical year in  1986. 
5.5  Some Results 
In  each of the models there are two types of results, viz.  the estimated 
functions  which  are  the  basis  of the projections and  the  projections 
themselves.  Representative of the first type are the elasticities shown in 
Table 5.2.  While the discussion will  restrict itself to the all-Indonesia 
elasticity values, it is clear that there are regional differences. 
The Ministry'S estimates of both the rice area and rice yield elasticity 
with  respect to own price are  higher than IFPRI's, with the other two 
groups between the extremes.  At the extremes the short-run own price 
elasticities of  supply work out to be 0.20 and 0.49.  That is, taking all the 
results  together, a  10%  increase in  price of rice  would  be  expected to 
increase production by between 2.0 and 4.9%. 
If  the impact of  fertiliser price on rice supply is now considered we find 
elasticities ranging from -0.03 to -0.16, with IFPRI's values being the 
highest on this occasion and the Ministry'S the lowest.  This means that 
in the IFPRI model a similar effect on rice output will result from a given 
proportional increase in fertiliser price or reduction in  rice price.  To be 
more  precise,  no  change  in  output  could  be  expected  from  a  10% 
increase in fertiliser price combined with an 8% increase in rice price.  The 
no-change-in-output combination  from  the  Ministry  model  is  a  10% 
increase in fertiliser price combined with a 0.6% increase in rice price.  It 
is clear that such elasticity values are different and would be expected to 
116 provide different policy prescriptions. 
Turning to consider the demand e1asticities  portrayed in  Table 5.2, 
the contrast is again between the Ministry and IFPRI models.  However, 
this time the differences are not so pronounced, with own price elasticity 
of  demand for rice ranging from -0.13 (Ministry) to -0.25 (IFPRI, rural 
middle  income) and  income  elasticity  of demand  from  0.10  (IFPRI, 
urban middle income) to 0.30 (FAPRI, rural). 
Given  these  differing  e1asticities,  there  is  a  surprising concordance 
benveen the projections made using the various models.  An  example, 
concerned with a policy of  reducing fertiliser subsidies, is shown in Table 
5.3.  Although there is  some difficulty in comparing results 6:om differ-
ent models because of differences in  (a)  the bases  used  for  the projec-
tions,  (b)  reporting of results  for  different years,  and  (c)  the precise 
defmition of the policy under analysis, some general agreement can  be 
observed. 
The target which is  the centre of attention is  the level of self-suftic-
iency in rice.  The first observation is  the close correspondence between 
both the policy analysed and the target results of the IFPRI and World 
Bank studies.  The correspondence between the results is so close that it 
would be easy to envisage the nvo sets of results being placed in a single 
sequence and being presented as  if they came from a single model. 
Although the results from the remaining nvo models do not accord so 
closely with the IFPRI and World Bank models there is still a tairly close 
correspondence if allowance is  made for the exact nature of the policy 
being analysed.  With the FAPR! analysis, for example, a lesser reduction 
in  fertiliser subsidy is  envisaged, and there is  a correspondingly higher 
level of  self-sufficiency in the projections. 
In terms of the impact on rice self-sufficiency presented in Table 5.3, 
the Ministry model also seems to agree closely with the others.  How-
ever, such agreement may  be slightly spurious when the policy tlut is 
under analysis is examined more closely,  This is a 20% increase each year 
in  nominal fertiliser prices, with rice prices increasing at 8%  per year in 
nominal terms. Such a policy entails a more rapid increase in fertiliser-to-
-rice  price  ratio  than  the  other models,  and  tl1erefore  a  more  rapid 
reduction in  self-sufficiency might be expected in  the results.  The fact 
that effects on rice self-sufficiency of  a similar order of magnitude to the 
other models are  observed in  the Ministry analysis is  largely due to its 
lower elasticity of output of rice  with  respect  to the price of fertiliser 
discussed earlier. 
5.6  Lessons 
The review of the four models highlighted several key features common 
to them.  Importantly, the structure of their food crop sector is  similar 
even  though  each  emphasises  particular  explanatory  variables.  The 
common structure reflects the state of the art in  this type of modelling. 
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There was also some similarity in the type of  policy analysis completed 
using the models.  All the teams performed projection exercises in which 
the target variables were quantities of production and consumption of 
(and hence self-sufficiency in) both rice and palawija.  They showed the 
likely  impact on production and consumption of policy  changes, and 
indicated that different combinations of  policies could be used to achieve 
self-suftlciency targets.  Such analysis  did  reflect the overriding policy 
concerns in  Indonesia, and some general prescriptions were developed 
on the basis  of model results.  For example, taking the  model results 
together, the  International Workshop in  Jakarta  (January  1988) con-
cluded that rice output could be maintained close to the self-suftlciency 
level following a reduction in fertiliser subsidies. 
While  these  quantitative  results  are  useful,  they  do  not  provide  a 
complete picture.  Significantly, little information was  provided on the 
relative cost of using alternative policies to achieve  self-sufficiency tar-
gets.  The provision of  this type of  information became the central target 
of the ACIAR project.  It was  the opinion of the leaders of this project 
that  the  pioneering  work  in  estimating  the  underlying  demand  and 
supply parameters had progressed far enough, and that a more compre-
hensive  policy analysis  was  now more appropriate.  By  integrating the 
previous  estimates  into  a  consistent  policy  model  that  measured  the 
impacts  of policy  changes  on  (a)  social  and  governmental  costs  and 
benefits and (b) the distribution of such costs and benefits, an attempt 
could be made to obtain a reasonable picture of  the trade-otTs involved in 
policy selection.  Thus the contribution of the AClAR project would be 
to  augment  the  results  already  achieved  by  extending  them  into 
additional dimensions of the policy space. 
In pursuit of this objective, the previous models provided the empiri-
cal  ammunition and Timmer (1986) was  influential  at the conceptual 
level,  particularly with respect to Indonesia's international rice trading 
stance. 
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Table 5.1.  Crops included in  the various models. 
Ministry  IFPRl  World Bank 
Rice  X  X  X 
Maize  X  X  X 
Cassava  X  X  X 
Sugar  X  X 
Groundnut  X  X 
Soy bean  X  X  X 
Sweet potato 
Wheat  X 
Mungbeans  X 
Table 5.2.  A sample of elasticity value from  the various models. 
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Sources:  ,  Tabor (1988, pp. 94,141), h  Rosegrant (1987, pp. 5.27, S.32), 
Notes: 
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' World Bank (l987b, Appendix I, pp. 3, 11 ),  d  Johnson (1986, pp. 8,9). 
' Java,' off-Java, g  rural medium income, " urban medium income, 
, Java revenue elasticity, i off-Java revenuc elasticity,' yield elasticity, 












Base (1984- 1986) 100.00 
1990  95.37 
1995  93.15 
World  Bank'·  Base (1986)  101.03 
FAPRI" 
Sources: 
1991  94.44 
1995  93.04 
Base  (1985)  101.27 
1990  96.69 
1992  95.10 
·'Tabor et al.  (1988, p.  219). 
"Rosegrant et al.  (1987, p.  6.57). 
'World  Bank ( 1987a, p.  68). 
"Johnson (1986, pp. 24,25, 65). 
Policy change 
20% increase each year in 
{
nominal fertiliser prices, 
with rice prices increasing 
at 8% in  nominal terms 
{
Phased elimination of fertiliser 
subsidy by  1991, with 
rice  prices fi xed 
{ Removal of fertiliser 
subsidy by  1991 
{ 
50% reduction in  fertiliser 
subsidy by  1993, with 
rice prices fixed 





Figure 5.1.  Relationships between the five  models. 
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Figure 5.2. Flow diagram of the ministty model. 
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Figure 5.3.  Flow diagram of the IFPRl model. 
124 Figure 5.4.  Flow diagram of the World Bank model. 
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Crop prices 
(P) 
Figure 5.5.  Flow diagram of the FAPRI model. 
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6.1  Introduction 
The detailed description of the Indonesian food production sector pro-
vided in the previous chapters is vital for understanding such an intricate 
system.  To complement this and provide a tractable analysis of  contem-
porary food policy it is necessary to draw together the significant compo-
nents of the earlier description  and  focus  attention on  only a few  key 
relationships.  This process of concentration brings together low struc-
tured,  low  value  data,  and  transforms  it  into  the  highly  structured, 
informative  construct we  call  a  model.  In  this  chapter, this  focusing 
process  is  outlined  by  describing  the  methodology of policy  analysis 
adopted in  our research.  Then, in  Chapter 7, the modelling technique 
that was developed is  applied to several Indonesian food policy issues. 
The  methodology  adopted  is  a  partial  equilibrium  framework  for 
measuring the effects of the instruments of Indonesia  food  policy on 
producers, consumers, government, and  overseas  producers and  con-
sumers.  A linked commodity-by-commodity approach was used so that 
results can be presented at various levels from a completely disaggregated 
analysis of  eight food commodities (rice, maize, cassava, sugar, ground-
nut, soybean, sweet potato, and wheat) by these five  societal groups, to, 
at the other extreme, a single aggregate estimating the impact of policy 
on all  groups across all commodities (i.e.  an Indonesia-wide outcome). 
The framework  developed  is  necessarily  a simplification of the  real 
world  which  highlights  the  key  features  of the complexities of policy 
regulation and agricultural markets. The instruments that are considered 
are domestic floor-and-ceiling price schemes and fertiliser subsidies; and 
trade restrictions and subsidies.  Other policy instruments are ignored as 
being  beyond  the scope of the current analysis  and  presumed  to  be 
unchanging in  their effect or included only as  an accounting item. 
6.2  Policy Instruments 
The main price-policy instruments used for food crops are subsidies on 
various  inputs,  and  output price  support through  a  floor-and-ceiling 
price scheme.  In the case of rice, the key  instruments are floor prices, 
which are used to maintain a minimum market price tor rice delivered to 
the agricultural  cooperatives;  various  input subsidies  (which  apply to 
these inputs irrespective of the crop to which they are  applied); ceiling 
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prices, which limit the amount that consumers mllst pay to purchase rice; 
and storage-cost subsidies.  The introduction of  implicit export subsidies 
on rice in  1985 added a ne\\' policy instrument to the list.  \Vhile there is 
a Hoor price policv ti)r maize, Rl'LOG intervention in  the maize market 
is relativc\v slight compared with the rice market.  This is, in part, because 
of the greater political  importance of rice  and the  tact tlut nurketing 
channels tilr maize  arc  less  dearly defined.  Control over imports and 
exports is  the principal means by which the government intluences the 
maize  market.  Rl' LOC;  is  the sole  importer of wheat but does issue 
processing contracts to the private sector.  Output price policies have not 
been dtccrive till'  the other food crops, though brmers growing these 
crops do bendlt ti'om the input subsides that have been used. 
In addition to these price policies the government devotes consider-
able resources to the development and dissemination of improved tech-
nologies.  The BIMAS programs were designed to increase production 
through the use of improved seeds, tCrtilisers, pesticides, water manage-
ment, improved cultural practices and the development of brmer coop-
eratives.  A  par~ll\c\  scheme,  I~MAS, which  lacked  a  credit clement, 
aided brmers who desired to use modern inputs.  Yet another of  this type 
of scheme is  I~SUS .  Under this scheme about 50 to 100 brmers with 
contiguous plots \\-ere  encouraged to make joint decisions about seeds, 
planting times, and crop choices other than rice.  Hence, some policy 
instruments can be viewed as  supply shifters (e.g. tCrtiliser subsidies and 
technological  innovations),  while  others encourage  output expansion 
along supply functions (e.g. producer price supports). 
The tilOli-crop model is designed to analyse the impact of the various 
price policies that arc currently used [1\' the Indonesi~lIl gO\·ernment. It is 
composed of a set of partial equilibriulll demand and supply equations 
tilr  LlCh  of eight  commodities.  The  cOlllmodities  covered  are  rice, 
maize,  cassava,  sugar,  groundnut,  soybLlI1,  sweet  potato  and  wheat. 
They account te)r more than 9()% of  the country's caloric intake.  (iiven a 
set of  policy parameters such as output price supports or input subsidies, 
this model can  be solved fe)r  the quantitjes of production,  ~lt1d amounts 
of (;overnment revenue and expenditure, export receipts, payments telf 
imports, and economic surpluses. 
The  model  is  clpable of analvsing the price  policies  te)r  the  \'~lrious 
commodities mentioned ab()\'e, \·iz. the floor-and-ceiling price scheme, 
input subsidies and export subsides.  These policies in\"()lve  the Govern 
ment in  the rcgubtion or till)f types of prices, viz. consumer and  pro-
ducer  prices  of felod ,  Elnn  input  prices,  ~lIld  export  prices  of food. 
C:h~lllge s in the various policies arc simulated in  the model  b~ '  alter,ltion 
in  the level  of these  prices.  The  imp~lCts on the  \'~lrioLTs  quantin· and 
expenditure Ie\'els  arc  taken to represent the dkcts of polic\' changes. 
Therefore attention is focused on the implications of  altering the agricul 
tural price policies of Indonesia telr  the Go\,ernment's  budgcr, tc)r  pro-
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sectors of the economy. 
6.3  Model Fundamentals using the Indonesian Rice Market as 
an Example 
6.3.1  The no-policy situation 
Agricultural economists make extensive use of demand and supply func-
tions to represent the  behaviour of consumers and  producers.  These 
functions  show  relationships  between quantities  demanded  (and sup-
plied)  and  important explanatory variables,  including the price of the 
commodity  concerned.  The  impacts  of policy  changes  can  then  be 
observed by  using these demand and supply functions because the types 
of policy under consideration influence the price or restrict the quantity 
of the various commodities. 
Figure 6.1 shows a conventional downward sloping demand function 
(D) and upward sloping supply function (S) for a commodity of  interest. 
Given  that the purpose is  to develop a diagrammatic representation of 
the Indonesian rice market, we can think of  the commodity as being rice. 
Then, step-by-step, the complexities of the rice market can be included. 
Also  shown  is  an  excess  supply  from  other countries  (ES).  This 
indicates the quantities of  rice that are imported into Indonesia at various 
levels of price.  The situation that would occur in  the Indonesian rice 
market in the absence of  any Government policy intervention is shown at 
the price level OA.  This is the free market equilibrium price without any 
policy intervention.  At this price the quantity of rice  imported OQ3 is 
exactly equal to the shortfall between domestic supply OQ) and domestic 
demand OQ2' 
6.3.2  The fertiliser subsidy policy 
The first component of  policy to consider is  the fertiliser subsidy policy. 
This part of the analysis  is  commenced using a figure  representing the 
fertiliser market.  In Figure 6.2, demand (Or)  and supply (Sf)  functions 
for  fertiliser are shown.  Without the fertiliser subsidy the equilibrium 
price in  the fertiliser market is  OP" with the quantity OQn demanded 
and supplied. 
In Indonesia the tarm price offertiliser is subsidised.  In Figure 6.2 the 
subsidised price that farmers pay is  OM.  At this price farmers demand 
the  higher quantity OQIT  In order to maintain this demand price of 
OM, a subsidy of MN per unit of output must be offered.  This means 
that the price that suppliers offertiliser receive is ON.  At this price, the 
quantity which suppliers wish to place on the market is OQf2' exactly the 
amount that is demanded. 
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A final item to be shown in this diagram is the Government cost of  the 
subsidy.  This is  equal to the subsidy per unit (MN) multiplied by the 
marketed quantity (OQI2).  Hence, the subsidy cost is represented by the 
area KLMN. 
I n order to show the impact of  the krtiliser subsidy on producers and 
consumers of rice it is  necessary to move back to the diagram represent-
ing the  rice  market.  In  figure  6.3  the  direct impact of the  krtiliser 
subsidy is  to shift the rice supply curve from So  to SI .  This shift occurs 
because the costs of production arc lower as  a result of the subsidy, and 
each rice producer tlnds it protitable to supply a higher output at every 
rice price level.  A more technical way of  describing the same eVLnts is to 
observe  that  the  supply  function  can  be  regarded  as  the  horizontal 
summation of individual tirms' marginal cost curves.  Then the subsidy 
has the eHcct of lowering the marginal cost of producing every level  of 
output. 
As  the supply curve shifts from \  to SI' the domestic production of 
rice  expands and displaces some imports.  Thus the krtiliser subsidy is 
seen to encourage domestic production which,  ~lt the margin, becomes 
more competiti\"( vis-a-vis imports.  In Figure 6.3 the equilibrium price 
(at which imports equal the domestic supply shortbll) is  OH once the 
krtiliser subsidv is in place.  At this price the quantity  OQj is supplied by 
domestic rice tanners, OQ, is consumed, and the difkrence OQ. ; minus 
OQj (= OQ,,l is  imported. 
It is  no\\' possible to describe the costs and bendits of the krtiliser 
subsidy policy on producers and consumers.  Treating the areas  below 
the  two supply functions  as  total  costs, so  tlut the  areas  above  these 
curves  but  below  the  price  line  arc  producer  surpluses,  the  policy-
induced increase  in  producer surplus of rice  producers is  measured  by 
DEFG minus ACDH.  Thus producers gain as  a  result of the surplus 
generated by the increased output, but lose from the dilution of price. 
The gain to consumers occurs as a result of  the Elll  in the market price 
of rice  that results  trom  the  output-expanding dkct of the  krtiliser 
subsidy  policy.  This  gain  is  sho\\'n  by  the  change  in  the  consumer 
surplus, and is  measured by area ABJH. 
I n  this  net social  benctit ti-amework,  the net domestic eHect of the 
krtiliser subsidy policy is the sum of  changes in the three aggregates:  net 
government cost, producer surplus and consumer surplus.  This is  meas-
ured lw area EFGCBJ in Figure 6.3 minus area KLMl': in  Figure 6.2.  In 
a dosed economy situation this total would in  fact be negative, indicat-
ing a net domestic loss.  Ho\\'ever, the bct that Indonesia is a large trader 
on international rice markets means that its domestic tCrtiliser policy can, 
lw altering the In·el of  domestic rice production and thereby influencing 
the international price of  rice, eftectively transter eHiciency losses abroad. 
Such  losses  to  foreign  rice-producing  countries  are  measured  by  the 
surplus area AYZH in Figure 6.3.  While the sum of the domestic and 
international  dtccts  of the  policy  must  be  a  loss,  the  bct  that  the 
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social benefit in  Indonesia. 
6.3.3  The floor-and-ceiling price policy in conjunction with the fertilise1' 
subsidy policy 
The second major component ofIndonesia's rice price policy is the floor-
and-ceiling  price  scheme.  This scheme  is  operated  by  BULOG,  the 
Government rice  storage and  trading agency.  By  means of its  buffer 
stock  and  trading  activities  it  defends  pre-specified  floor-and-ceiling 
prices of rice.  The objective  is  to stabilise  price, so  that the  average 
domestic consumer and producer prices during any season could end up 
above or below those which would occur without the policy in  opera-
tion.  In Figure 6.4 average consumer prices are raised from OH to OT 
under the  influence  of the  floor-and-ceiling  price  arrangement, while 
producer prices are  increased to OR.  This configuration describes the 
situation in  the rice market in  1985. 
As  a  result of the  fertiliser  subsidy  and  the  floor-and-ceiling  price 
policy, output is  OQg and consumption of rice  is  OQ7'  The surplus is 
OQs minus OQ7 (=OQ9) and  is  exported under subsidy by  BULOG. 
Again there are four aggregates to consider to assess the impacts of the 
combined policies:  net government cost, producer surplus, consumer 
surplus and overseas surplus etfects.  Again also, both the rice market and 
the fertiliser market must be analysed to show these effects. 
In the fertiliser market shown in Figure 6.5 there is a shift to the right 
in the demand for fertiliser function.  This represents the response of  rice 
farmers as  the price of rice  is  increased from OH to OR in  Figure 6.4. 
They value  fertiliser  more  because  its  use  in  producing  rice  is  more 
profitable once the rice price increases.  Under free-market circumstances 
this increased demand for fertiliser would bid up its price to a level higher 
than the original farm-gate price OM.  However the Indonesian Govern-
ment wishes to maintain the price to farmers at the level OM.  In order to 
achieve this the per unit subsidy must be increased to N' M.  This enables 
fertiliser  suppliers  to  receive  the  price  ON'  and  stimulates  them  to 
produce more to meet the extra demand. 
The first component of  the government cost of  the combined fertiliser 
subsidy and floor-and-ceiling price policy is  shown in  Figure 6.5 as area 
K'L'MN'.  This is  the fertiliser subsidy component, and is  measured as 
the per-unit-subsidy N'M multiplied  by  the quantity of fertiliser  used 
OQf3' 
The second component of  the government cost (the floor-and-ceiling 
component) is shown in Figure 6.4.  In order to achieve the rice prices 
OR for producers and OT for consumers, the Government must procure 
the quantity QloQg, at the price OR.  Mter procurement, the quantity 
Q 10Q7  is  then  resold  domestically,  at  price  OT,  and  the  rest 
(Q7Q S =OQ9) is exported under a per unit export subsidy of UU'.  The 
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government cost of the tloor-and-ceiling price policy is  then seen to be 
the sum ofa consumer subsidy and an export subsidy, and is  measured by 
the area WSS'Ll'CW'. 
The eftCets  of the combined tloor-and-ceiling priee  policy and ferti-
liser subsidy policy on produn:rs, consumers and overseas  rice  market 
participants are also shown in  figure 6.4.  The gain to producers is  the 
producer surplus occurring with  both policies  in  operation  minus the 
producer surplus with none.  It is measured as the area VSfG minus area 
ACVR.  This gain  is  more than vvith  onl\' the  fertiliser  subsidy  policy 
because the tloor-and-ceiling price policy is  effecti\'ely a rice  price sup-
port  policy  for  producers,  so  that  the  final  policy  configuration  is  a 
combined tCrtiliser subsidy and output price support policy. 
The gain  to consumers ti'om  the combined policy  is  shown  by  the 
consumCf surplus area ABCT.  This is  a smaller g<lin  than \\'ith  just the 
fertiliser  subsidy  policy,  but still  a  gain  compared with  the  no-policy 
situation;  a  result \\'hich  reflects  the  bct that  the  tlnal  price  (OR)  is 
between the price with the fertiliser subsidy only and the no-policy price. 
Onee  again  the  net  domestic  effect  of the  policies  is  the  sum  of 
changes in net go\'ernment cost, producer surplus and consumCf surplus. 
Howe\,er, the sum  provides no simpk observabk areas  in  the  \'arious 
fIgures, as was the case with the fertiliser subsidy policy alone.  :-.Je\·erthe-
less, the separate eHects are sumnurised in  Table 6.1.  Also shown there 
is  the overall  surplus impact on overseas  markets of the two domestic 
policies.  The net loss 0\'CfSC1S  is  AYA'  minus E'f'G' in  Figure 6.4.  In 
this  instance  it is  possible that this overseas  eHect  is  a  net gain.  This 
would be the case if  the subsidised exports from Indonesia were sufficient 
to drive down international prices to the position where overseas con-
sumer gains  exceeded overseas  producer losses.  If,  however,  this  net 
overseas effect is a large loss, it is again possible that there would be a net 
domestic gain from the operation of  the fertiliser subsidy and f1oor-and-
ceiling price policies. 
6.4  Elaboration of the Model to Include Other Food 
Commodities 
The analytical description of  the previous section has been presented as if 
the  policies  under consideration  had  an  impact only on  rice.  More 
realistically,  policy effects on the other seven  food commodities which 
are included in the model must be assessed.  In this context, each crop is 
influenced by both direct and indirect effects.  The direct effects occur as 
a result of the fertiliser subsidy, which makes the application of fertiliser 
cheaper not only for rice, but for all  crops.  The indirect effects occur as 
the  policy-induced  price  of one  crop  makes  it  more  competitive  in 
production or consumption than others.  For example, maize production 
may suffer as a result of  the producer price support afforded rice through 
the floor-and-ceiling price scheme.  Likewise, maize consumption may 
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Diagrammatic representation of these commodity-by-commodity in-
teractions  becomes  cumbersome  and  the  more  elegant  mathematical 
representation is  preferred.  A system of  seven supply and eight demand 
equations is used to achieve this representation (there is one fewer supply 
equation because wheat, although consumed, is  not produced in  Indo-
nesia).  In contrast to the description provided in Section 6.2, each of  the 
supply equations has  quantity dependent on the price of all  the com-
modities in  the model and the price offertiliser.  The demand equations 
also  have  quantity  as  the  dependent  variable.  Quantity  demanded 
responds to price of all  the other commodities, and the level of income 
measured by real gross domestic product. 
The food-crop model is described in  the following set of equations. 
The variables q'i and Pi are quantity supplied and price, respectively, of 
commodity i (i=1, ...  ,8); the Pj  are prices of other crops;  and the Pk  are 
input  prices.  On  the  demand  side,  qdi is  the  quantity demanded  of 
commodity i and y is  income. 
Together, equations 6.1 and 6.2 amount to a system of 15 equations 
with 15 independent endogenous and eight exogenous variables.  The 
exogenous  variables  are  either  policy  instruments  (like  rice  price)  or 
heavily influenced by international prices under a small-countl1' assump-
tion (like soybean price).  The list of exogenous variables  is:  GDP per 
capita, producer price of  rice, consumer price of  rice, and prices of  maize, 
cassava, soybean, wheat and fertiliser. 
These equations define the data needs of the analysis.  To make the 
model operational requires a set of  demand, supply and income elasticities 
together with  base  period  prices  and  quantities  for  each  commodity. 
Tables 6.2 to 6.7 outline the current base values for each year from 1985 
to 1988 together with a description of  sources.  Given uncertainty about 
the value of the elasticities, sensitivity analysis is a key component of  any 
policy appraisal. 
Having established this multicommodity model for each of the above 
four years, there are several alternative methods by which policy appraisal 
can  proceed.  In  general  two  have  been  applied  and  these  are  now 
described. 
First, observing that the base  model solution incorporates the actual 
policies  being  pursued,  it  is  possible  to  compare  this  solution  with 
another which removes all policies.  This would be an analysis conceptu-
ally similar to that presented in  Section 6.2, but for  the l11ulticrop case. 
Such an analysis would show gains and losses across the variolls groups in 
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society (by commodity or in  aggregate) which result from  the Indone-
sian food price policies. 
Second, using the base model solution as a starting point, it is possible 
to adjust the policy instruments marginally and produce a second solu-
tion showing, by comparison, the effects of  such marginal shifts.  Given 
that a primary target of the Indonesian food  policy during the period 
under consideration was the maintenance of selfsufficiency in  rice, the 
policy appraisal that is presented in the next chapter examines alternative 
marginal shifts in policy which all  would achieve this target. 
Table 6.1. Surplus effects of  combined policies (areas refer to Figure 6.4 unless 
otherwise stated). 
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AYA'  - E'F'G' Table 6.2.  The major food crops: 1985. 
Wholesale  Floor  Area  Yield  Production  Consumption 
pricc  price 
Commodity  (Rp/kg)  (Rp/kg)  ('000 ha )  (t/ha)  ('000 t)  ('000 t) 
( I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rice  (milled)  360.85  175.00  9902  3.9(b)  24316  23987 
Maize  208.34  110.00  2440  1.77  4330  4375 
Cassava  59.93  1272  10.9  14057  12496 
Sugar (refined)  604.17  273  91.2(c)  1677  I  854 
Groundnut  I  181.90  (  a)  510  1.04  528  545 
Soy bean  508.35  300,00  896  0.97  870  I  143 
Swcct potato  70.53  256  8.4  2 161  2  161 
Wheat  217.75  1 317 
(a) Floor price for groundnut last set at Rp425/kg on 1 Novembcr 1981. 
(b) Yield in  gabah (threshed paddy). 
(c) Yield in  sugar cane. 
Fertiliser price: Rpl00/kg (Hobohm 1987, p,  25), 
GDP  1985:  Estimate  Rp80  119,6  billion,  constant prices  (BPS  National  Income of 
Indonesia 1984- 1987, Table 2), 
Sources:  Col. 1 : Wheat, cif pricc, Tabor et, al.  (1988, p,261 ),  All  others  BPS 
Harga Perdagangan Besar di Jakarta, Triwulan 2, 1989 (Jakarta Wholesale 
Prices),  For rice, see Table 2, Col. 7. 
Col. 2: BULOG: Statistik Bulog, 1969- 1984; Statistik Bulog, 
1969- 1987. 
Col.  3-5 : BPS  Bulctin  Ringkas,  December 1987 and  Food Balance Sheet 
1985; FAO Production Yearbook 1986, Vo!. 40, p, 161  for sugar. 
Col. 5- 6 : BPS  Food Balance Sheet 1985, 
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Table 6.3.  The major food crops:  1986. 
Wholesale  Floor  Area  Yield  Production  Consumption 
price  price 
Commodity  (Rp/kg) 
( I) 
Rice  (milled)  431  15 
Maize  206.54 
Cassava  64.28 
Sugar (refined)  622.22 
Groundnut  I  141.00 
Soybean  641.66 
Sweet pot,1(O  70.96 
Wheat  217.23 
(Rp/kg)  ('000 ha)  (t/ha) 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
175.00  9988  4.0(b) 
110.00  3  143  1.88 
I  170  11.4 
303  86.5(c) 
(a)  601  1.10 
300.00  I 254  0.98 










(a) Floor price for groundnut last set at Rp425/kg on  I  November 1981. 
(b) Yield  in  gabah (threshed paddy). 
(c) Yield in  sugar cane. 
Fertiliser price: Rpl25/kg from  3 April  1986 (Hobohm  1987, p.  25). 
('000 t) 
(6) 








GDP  1986:  Estimate  Rp83  318.2  billion,  constant  prices  (81'S  National  Income of 
Indonesia  1984- 1987, Table  2). 
Sources:  Col.  1 : Wheat, cif price, BPS  Bulctin Ringkas, March 1987, p.  72, 
converted at Triwulan 2, 1989 (Jakarta Wholesale Prices).  For rice, 
sec Table 2, Col.  7. 
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Col.  2 : BULOG: Statistik 8ulog, 1969- 1984; Staristik  Bulog, 
1969- 1987. 
Col.  3- 5  : HI'S  Buletin  Ringkas,  December 1987 and  Food  Balance Sheet 
1986; FAO Production Yearbook 1988, Vol. 42, p. 207 tor sugar. 
Col.  5-6: BPS  Food Balance Sheet 1986. Table 6.4.  The major food crops: 1987. 
Wholesale  Floor  Area  Yield  Production  Consumption 
price  price 
Commodity  (Rp/kg)  (Rp/kg)  ('000 ha)  (t/ha)  ('000 t)  ('000 t) 
(1 )  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rice (milled)  489.58  190.00  9922  4.0(b)  24970  24990 
Maize  267.56  110.00  2626  1.96  5 155  5 373 
Cassava  76.53  I  222  11.7  14 356  13206(d) 
Sugar (refined)  646.16  335  86.0(c)  2 128  2087 
Groundnut  1 250.94  (a)  551  0.97  533  579 
Soybean  756.68  300.00  1 101  1.06  1 161  1420 
Sweet potato  82.48  229  8.8  2013  2013 
Wheat  237.62  1 664 
(a) Floor price for groundnut last set at Rp425/kg on 1 November 1981. 
(b) Yield  in  gabah (threshed paddy) 
(c) Yield  in  sugar cane 
(d) Net gaplek (dried cassava) imports converted back to cassava at rate 0.36. 
Fertiliser price:  Rpl25/kg (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  Country  Report  Indonesia, 
No.l ,1988, p.31 ) 
GDP  1987:  Estimate  Rp86  307.1  billion,  preliminary  figure,  constant  prices  (BPS 
National Income of Indonesia  1984- 1987, Table 2). 
Sources:  Col. 1 : Wheat, cif  price, BPS Buletin Ringkas, March 1988, p.55, converted 
at exchange rate Rp1644 = US$.  All  others BPS  Harga Perdagangan 
Besar di Jakarta, Triwulan  2, 1989 (Jakarta Wholesale Prices). For rice, see 
Table 2, Col. 7. 
Col.  2 : 13 ULOG: Statistik Bulog, 1969- 1984; Statistik Bulog, 1969- 1987. 
Col.  3- 5 : BPS  Buletin  Ringkas, March 1989 and Food Balance Sheet 
1987 (forthcoming); FAO  Production Yearbook 1988, Vol. 42, p.  207 for 
sugar. 
Col.  5- 6 : BPS  Food Balance Sheet 1987 (forthcoming). 
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Table 6.5.  The major tc,od crops: 19XX. 
\Vh,,!cscl!c  Hoor  Area  Yield  Producti()11  C:onsumpti(,n 
price  price 
Commod  i  tv  ( Rp/kg)  I Rp/kg)  l'OOOlu)  (t/ha)  ('000 t)  ('000 tl 
III  (2)  1;:1)  (41  IS)  (6) 
Rice (milled)  504.6X  210.00  10 131'  4.I(b)  2S <)75  26770 
Maize  303.;;9  115.00  3406  I<)S  66S2  ()  67H 
C  :aSS;\\';l  99,97  1 30;:1  11.<)  IS 471  14S:'l1!d) 
SlIg;lr (relined !  71600  314  <)9 .O! c)  2  17S  1  1;:13 
C;rollndnllt  I  ()76.3H  (a)  60S  0.<)7  SS9  ()17 
Soy bean  S7/.n  325.00  1  177  I.OH  170  1 ?Hii 
Sweet potato  119.32  14S  1'.7  21S9  2  IS9 
\Vhe;lt  2.W.56  (,49 
(a) l'loor price ti,r groundnut bsr set ;H  Rp425/kg on  ="o\'ember I<)SI. 
I b) Yield in  gab'lh I threshcd p;lddl'l 
(c! Yield in  sug;lr cme 
(d) Net g;lplck (dried cassa\'a) imports cOI1\Trted back to C.lSS.\\·.l  .H  rate 0.36. 
Fertiliser  price:  Rpl3S/kg (Economist  Intelligence  l:nit, Countr)'  Report  Indonesia, 
No.1  I<)HH,  1'.311. 
C;!)P 19RH:  Estimate Rp90 450 billion, constant priccs, based on Economist Inrelligence 
l'nit, Country Report Indonesi;l, No. 3, 19R9, p. 1 estinute of4.S% real  growth ratc of 
C!)], tc,r  I<)RH . 
SOllrces: 
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Col.  : Wheat, cif price, HI'S  Hulctin Ringkas, "!arch 19H<},  p. :iX, 
cOIlITrted.H exchange rate Rpl(,X(,  ~ '(-'SS ..  \U  otilers HI'S  H;lrga 
Pcrdag.mg.m Iksar di  J;lkarLl, T,'iwulan 1, 19X9 I Jakarta \Vh,,!csale Prices). 
ror rice, sce Table 2, C,,1.  7. 
Col. 2  : H  1. 'LOC;: Statistik BlIlo!,(,  1969· 191'4; St.ltistik Hulog,  1<)(,<)- 191' 7. 
Col.  3-5  :  Ill'S  Huletin  Ringk.ls,  October  19R<)  and  hlOd  H;lbnce  Sheet 
19RR  I prelimin;\I'\' ti!,(ures); l'A() Production Ye;lI"book  19XX, 
Vol. 42, I'.  207. 
Col. S  6: HI'S rood Balance Sheet 19XX  (prelimiILll'l' tigures\. Table 6.6.  Demand e1asticities used for cross-commodity analyses. 
Rice  Corn  Cassava  Sugar  Gr. nut  Soybean  Sw.  pot. Wheat  Income 
Rice  - 0.60  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.36 
Corn  0.34  - 0.80  0.28  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.01 
Cassava  0.10  0.15  -0.55  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.14  0.02  0.01 
Sugar  0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.70  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.50 
Gr, nut  0,05  0.05  0.05  0.02  -1.00  0.10  0.03  0.02  0.65 
Soybean  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.12  -0.90  0.02  0.03  0,50 
Sw.  pot.  0.01  0.05  0.10  0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.25  0.01  0.01 
Wheat  0.12  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.80  0.55 
Table 6.7.  Supply c1asticitics used for cross-commodity analysis. 
Rice  Corn  Cassava  Sugar  Gr. nut  Soy bean  Sw.  pot.  Fertiliser 
Rice  0.30  - 0.05  - 0.01  -0.02  - 0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.15 
Corn  - 0.12  0.50  - 0.02  - 0.02  -0.02  -0.02  - 0.02  -0.20 
Cassava  - 0.08  - 0.01  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  - 0.02  -0.05 
Sugar  - 0.02  - 0.02  0.00  0.30  0.00  000  0,00  -0.15 
Gr. nut  - 0.01  - 0.02  0.00  0.00  0.40  - 0.02  0.00  -0.10 
Soybean  -002  - 0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.40  0.00  -0.15 
Sw. pot,  -0.01  - 0.02  - 0.02  0.00  0.00  000  0.25  -0.05 
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Figure 6.1.  The Indonesian rice market with no policy intervention. 
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Figure 6.2.  The eftect of the fertiliser subsidy on the fertiliser market 
with no price support for rice. 
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Figure 6.4.  The Indonesian rice market with fertiliser subsidy and 
floor-and-ceiling price policies. 
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Figure 6.5.  The impact in  the  fertiliser  market of a floor-and-ceiling 
price policy in conjunction with a fertiliser subsidy. 
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7.1  Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in 1985 it was proclaimed that Indonesia had 
achieved  self-sufficiency  in  rice.  To achieve  this  target  had  required 
considerable policy intervention in  terms of both output price support 
(through floor-and-ceiling price schemes) and input subsidies.  Prior to 
achieving  self-sufficiency,  the  government  expenditure  costs  of these 
policies  (and  the  welfare  costs)  tended  to  be  overlooked.  This  was 
perhaps understandable given the high level of  revenues that the Indone-
sian Government was collecting from taxes on oil and the desire to attain 
the morale-boosting reward which would come when rice self-sufficiency 
was achieved. 
Since  1985  there  has  been  some  introspection  about the costs  of 
achieving self-sufficiency using the price policy instruments.  Although a 
prime policy objective  remains one of balancing increases in  rice  con-
sumption with increases in output, emphasis is  now given  to achieving 
this  at minimum  government cost, with  minimum welfare  losses  and 
with minimum disruption elsewhere in the economy.  In this last regard, 
there has been an acknowledgment that past rice price support policy has 
had  a  detrimental effect on the secondary food  crops  by  drawing  re-
sources  away  from  them.  The  desire  is  now  to  avoid  this  and  to 
encourage production and consumption of these crops. 
This chapter reports on the application  to these issues of the  price 
policy model described in Chapter 6.  Of  particular interest was discover-
ing a mix of policies which would come closest to achieving the various 
targets.  Given that Indonesia can expect rice consumption to continue 
to expand for some time to come, a significant finding is  that consider-
able  Government  expenditure  will  be  required  to  encourage  output 
expansion in order to match this growth in consumption. 
7.2  Background 
Since the start of  the system of  five-year national plans in 1969, the food-
producing sector has received special attention.  At first this was because 
growth in agriculture was essential if overall economic growth was to be 
achieved.  Though still a significant sector of the economy, accounting 
for just over 25% ofGDP in 1986 (BPS 1987), alternative goals relating 
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to  employment  and  sdfsutlieieney  became  predominant  during  the 
period 1972 to I9RS. 
The vears  1972  ~lIld  1973 saw instahility in  international commodity 
markets  associated  \\'ith  ~1  fi)ur-ti)ld  increase  in  crude-oil  prices.  Al-
though there were gains to Indonesia as  an exporter of  oil, some turbu-
lence  was  transmitted  to  the  domestic  economy,  and  especially  the 
Indonesian policv-making process. 
first,  ti)reign  exchange earnings increased and  this  led  (()  domestic 
money  supply  ereation.  This  would  probably  have  created  a  larger 
intlationary problem  had the Government not restrained its  own fiscal 
activity  by  maintaining  .1  hudget surplus.  Another dkct of the inter-
national oil price inereases \\ ' ~lS to increase the Indonesian Government's 
revenue ti'om taxation on oil companies.  This was to enable it to increase 
its development expenditure, especially in agriculture, \\'hile maintaining 
the budget surplus. 
Next, the world rice  market sufkred a severe shortage in  1973 and 
1974.  Despite having the required ti)reign exchange ri'om  the s:des of 
oil,  Indonesia  \\'as  unable  to purchase sutlicient imports of rice  as  its 
major supplier, Thailand,  restricted  exports (Timmer  19R6,  p.  S).  A 
signiticant dh:ct of this \\'as to stimulate a ne\\' drive on the part of  policy 
decision-makers in  Indonesia ti)r domestic ti)Oli  security and especially 
ti)r  sdf-sutliciency in  rice.  The  poJic~ '  response  was  to establish  both 
output price supports in the ti>rIl1 of  higher tloor prices ti.)r rice producers 
and  input subsidies across a  number of purchased inputs.  These have 
continued as the main thrusts of  agricultural polic~'.  Onc consequence of 
these policies Ius heen the achievement ofself-sutticiency in rice in 1985, 
and the continuation of production at dose to self  sutliciency since. 
E\'Cnts of  the early 1980s combined to alter the set of  policy objectives 
further.  falling international prices of oil meant that the country bced 
severe  balance of payments problems throughout the decade.  In ad-
dition, Government expenditure  has  been  constrained  as  oil  revenues 
have fallen.  As  a n:sult some development projects have been deterred, 
and overall economic growth has been less than it would otherwise have 
heen.  Sundrum (19RR, p. 37) estimates the rate of  economic growth as 
2.9% per annum het\\'een 1981 and 1986.  This compares with an annual 
a\'erage growth rate of 7.7%  ti'om  1967 to 1981. 
Throughout this unstable period, t()Oti  security and the attainment of 
self-suflieiencv  in  rice  remained  a  dominant objective  In  each  year 
between 1977 and 1984 producer support prices t()r rice were increased 
in real terms.  In addition, substantial subsidies ti.lr tCrtiliscr were contin-
ued.  These policies were a considerable drain on the hudget at a time of 
restricted Government revenue.  It is  dear that the attempt to achieve 
rice selfsuHiciency was heing given priority. 
Since 1985, when rice output first exceeded rice consumption, there 
has been continuing questioning about the level of  support given to rice 
producers.  Apart  from  the  problem of finding  the  required  level  of 
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resources were being drawn away from the production of the palalVifa. 
The policy stance towards the palalVifa was one of  neglect in comparison 
to the enormous policy efforts devoted to rice.  However, following the 
attainment of self-sufficiency in  rice, there have been reductions in  real 
producer prices of rice and in the level of  fertiliser subsidies.  One effect 
has been to encourage palawifa production (EIU 1989, p. 22) while rice 
output has  continued to grow.  Another is  that Government expendi-
ture, particularly on fertiliser subsidies, is expected to fall  considerably. 
Currently, there are several sub-strands to the Government's growth 
policy.  There are continuing attempts to reduce dependence on oil both 
as a foreign exchange earner and as a contributor to the budget. This has 
achieved  partial  success  as  exports of commodities like  manufactured 
timber products have  expanded.  However, oil  remains  the dominant 
export product.  Second, the Government has been encouraging foreign 
investment, and Schwarz (1989, p. 74) argues  that the flow  of funds 
from abroad, particularly into investments in  the manufacturing sector, 
has 'helped rescue GDP growth from mid-decade stagnation'. 
Such efforts have partly directed attention away from the food produc-
tion  sector.  However,  with  consumption  of rice  increasing  as  the 
population and income levels  increase, the self-sufficiency  must be  re-
garded as  fragile.  The policy stance is one of attempting to keep output 
expanding while keeping Government expenditure on food policy pro-
grams to a minimum. This is a fairly difficult path to follow given the size 
of the  food-producing sector.  In  addition, despite  significant  recent 
employment growth in the manufacturing sector, the Government must 
ensure that farm incomes are kept high enough for agriculture to absorb 
labour. 
7.3  Policy Evaluation 
In this section, an evaluation of  food price policy based on the food-crop 
model is described.  Mter describing the base policy situation in 1988, an 
analysis  of the  policies  pursued  by  the  Indonesian  Government from 
1985 to 1988 is  completed.  This policy analysis has three components. 
First, the net social costs and Government costs are revealed by compar-
ing  model  solutions with  and  without the policies  that were  actually 
pursued.  Second, there is  an  evaluation of the net social  and Govern-
ment costs of achieving the rice self-sufficiency levels of 1985 to 1988, 
but by different levels of  the policy instruments. Third, the unconstrained 
maximisation of net social  benefit using fertiliser subsidy policy  is  de-
scribed. 
7.3.1  The policy situation 1985 to  1988 
Since proclamation of rice self-sufficiency in  1985 production and COI1-
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sumption have expanded in parallel, with the country maintaining a small 
deficit or surplus year by year.  Except for sweet potatoes, the other t()od 
crops considered in the analysis showed an  upward trend in production 
with yields also increasing in general (see Table 7.1).  At face value, given 
that overall  production of these  t()Od  crops has  been expanding more 
rapidlv than population growth, this seems a favourable outcome.  How-
ever, \\'ithin the Indonesian Government there has  been some concern 
about the fiscal  costs of the policies that have been adopted to achieve 
this outcome.  In particular, the fertiliser subsidy policy has received close 
scrutiny. 
In 1985-86 the cost of fertiliser subsidies is  estimated to have been 
about 42'Yr,  of total development expenditures f()r  agriculture and irriga-
tion  (World  Bank 1987, p.  16).  The actual  costs  for  the  fiscal  years 
1985-86 to 1987-88 were  Rp 477 billion, Rp 467 billion and Rp 756 
billion respectively (BPS 1989). The response to this problem was three-
t()ld.  There  were  some  minor attempts  to  improve  the  dliciency of 
fertiliser distribution and marketing.  Second, prices to farmers have been 
increased,  but again  this  was  only  a  marginal  change.  Third,  it  was 
decided to tinance the tertiliser su bsidy tl-om sources ou  tside the budget. 
This last adjustment is  the one which has the largest potential effect on 
reducing the  budget cost of the fertiliser subsidy.  It achieves  this  by 
dderring payment of subsidies to the State-run fertiliser bctories, and 
permitting the factories to finance  losses by borrowing t1-om  the banks 
(Booth 1988).  Thus, given that [:mners pay the same price as previously 
t()r fertiliser, a component of the Government's current budget ddicit is 
transferred to the fertiliser factories [()r longer-term financing. 
The wholesale market situation for rice, the main [()()d crop, in 1988 is 
shown in figure 7.1. The picture is  bid\' representative of  the [(Hlr years 
of  our survey in which there was either a small surplus or a small ddicit in 
rice  production.  The domestic demand  and  supply CUITes  take  these 
positions under the influence of the fertiliser subsidy and price support 
policies.  The quantity A (=25.97 million tonnes) was produced and B 
(=26.77 million tonnes) was consumed.  The difference of 0.79 million 
tonnes consisted of imports and stock changes.  The c1ose-to-self-suffi-
ciency position was  maintained  by a  domestic price  regime above  the 
international  market, with  B  LTLOG  importing rice  at  a  price  roughlv 
52%  of the average domestic price.  This type of relationship between 
domestic and international prices  has  been  maintained  between  1985 
and 1988 so that BULOli has been collecting an implicit import tax  in 
the rice-ddicit years and paying an  implicit export subsidy in  the rice-
surplus years. 
In the first part of the analytical work the dkcts of the policies that 
were [()llowed bv the Indonesian Government between 1985 and 1988 
were  estimated.  figure  7.2  provides  a  comparison  in  the  1988  rice 
market  between  the  actual  situation and  the  estimated  position  if all 
policy intervention had been removed.  As  a  result of removal of the 
148 fertiliser  subsidy  the  supply curve  for  rice  and  the other domestically 
produced food crops shifts to the left.  The domestic demand curve for 
rice shifts right under the influence of the cross-effect of rising prices of 
other food commodities.  Given that price support is  removed also, the 
domestic and intervention  prices  are  equalised at Rp 487.11/kg. and 
about 4.85 million tonnes of rice are imported. 
More details of  the effects of  the policies that were followed are shown 
for rice in Table 7.2 and for the secondary food crops in Table 7.3.  The 
general effects for rice are that output was stimulated significantly by the 
policies (by about 14% in  1988) while demand was lower.  The effect on 
consumption was stronger in  the later years as  the gap in price between 
the higher-priced domestically produced rice and imports increased. 
Given that there is  some uncertainty about the eHect of Indonesia's 
trading in  rice  on the international market, some alternative estimates 
were made to assess  the importance of ditTerent values for  the import 
elasticity of demand. The results of a sensitivity  analysis  in  which  the 
elasticity of import demand was altered from - 3.0 to -6.0 are shown in 
t11e  last section of  Table 7.2.  Clearly the magnitude of  the impact of  the 
price support and tertiliser subsidy policies is dependent on this elasticity. 
Nevertheless, using either of the elasticity levels, the analysis shows the 
effects of the policies to have been to stimulate rice production and to 
reduce consumption. 
Table 7.3 shows the eHects offertiliser subsidies and price support for 
rice on the secondary food crops.  The fertiliser subsidy tends to expand 
production of these crops, while price support for rice  tends to reduce 
production.  The  analysis  reveals  that  the  first  of these  influences  is 
stronger  t<lr  all  the  crops  studied;  their  output  being  higher  in  thc 
solutions with the policies included.  The crops most strongly affected 
arc maize and so"bean. 
On the consumption side the intluences of the two policies arc  more 
complex.  For nuil.e, sugar,  groundnut and sweet  pOLlto  the  overall 
impact of the  policies  is  that consumption  increases.  The  dominant 
underlying dkcts arc  the price  reductions t<lllowing output expansion 
under the intluenee of the tCrtiliser subsidy and the cross-price dfect of 
an increase in consumer price of  rice.  For cassa\".l and soybean, consump-
tion blls as  a result of the policies.  This is  because there is  only a small 
price reducing effect of the  fertiliser  subsidy, with  price  being largely 
determined by internatiOlulmarket influences.  Hence, the consumption 
level of  the t\\'o crops is determined by a positive cross-price effect as  the 
price of rice  rises, and a negative cross-price dkct as  the prices of other 
crops bit.  Overall, the second dtect is  larger than the first. 
Estimates of the components of net social benefit  of the policies that 
were followed arc shown in Table 7.4.  Given the number of  interactions 
among commodities that arc embedded within the model it is difficult to 
describe the underlying commodity-by-commodity elements of each of 
the  aggregates.  Nevertheless,  some  commentary on  rice  is  provided 
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given that it is  by far  the dominant crop, and effects in  the rice market 
comprise a large proportion of the overall outcome. 
In 1985 the domestic price of rice was lower than it would have been 
if the fertiliser subsidy and price support policies had not been in place. 
The converse is  the situation in  the other three years.  As a consequence 
there is  a consumer surplus gain in  rice  (and across all  commodities in 
aggregate) in  1985, but losses in  1986, 1987 and 1988. 
The change in  producer surplus is  positive in  each year.  It has two 
components.  The first is  the positive effect of  the shift to the right in the 
supply function resulting from the fertiliser subsidy.  Second, there is  a 
change in  producer surplus as  a consequence of a change in  the level of 
rice price support.  In 1985 this last effect is negative for rice and positive 
in  substitute commodities as  the producer price of rice  is  lower than it 
would otherwise have been without the policies.  In the remaining years 
the opposite is the situation. 
There are  two components of the net Government cost.  First,  the 
fertiliser subsidy involves a cost equal to the procurement cost fi·om  both 
domestic manufacturers and importers less the subsidised resale price to 
farmers.  Second, there is an export subsidy on rice in  1985 (a cost) and 
an import tax  in  1986, 1987 and 1988 (a  revenue) which enables the 
domestic price of rice to be maintained. 
The sum of changes  in  producer and  consumer surpluses  and  net 
Government cost resulting fi'om  the fertiliser subsidy and price support 
policies is the net social benefit in Indonesia.  Although small in  relation 
to the redistributional effects of the policies, the estimate of net social 
benefit is  actually positive (see the explanation in  Section 7.3.3).  This 
benetit to Indonesia occurs as  a  result of its  domestic policy imposing 
social costs on rice exporting countries.  These social costs are indicated 
in  the final  row of Table 7.4.  They occur because of the fact  that the 
international  rice  market  is  a  residual  market and  Indonesia's trading 
actions in the market have significant influence on the price. 
7.3.2  Maintaining se/Fsufficiency in rice by means of  alternative policies 
In order to further appraise the policy options available to the Indonesian 
Government, the policy space close  to the set of policies  actually fol-
lowed was  examined.  That part of the  assessment related  to reduced 
fertiliser  subsidies  is  reported  here.  The  policy  alternative  described 
maintains the level of  self-sufficiency in rice achieved in  each of the four 
years studied by reducing fertiliser subsidies and increasing price support 
to rice  producers.  The fertiliser price was  adjusted upward by 20%  to 
represent the effect of  the Government's attempting to reduce its budget 
commitment to subsidy expenditures.  The response was  a  fall  in  rice 
output which  would  have  reduced  the  level  of self-sufficiency  if the 
second  policy  of increasing  the  producer price  of rice  had  not been 
introduced.  A  countervailing  price  support  policy  which  increased 
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at its original levels year-by-year. 
The impact of  these policy changes on net Government cost and other 
significant aggregates is shown in Table 7.5.  While the changes do result 
in  reduced  fertiliser  subsidy  costs,  there  is  overall  an  increase  in  net 
Government cost.  In  other words  the policy  mix  involving a  higher 
proportion of price support and a lower proportion of fertiliser subsidy, 
while maintaining rice self-sufficiency, is more costly to the Government. 
The other major effect of  the policy change is a transfer to producers 
measured  by  a considerable  increase in  producer surplus.  Overall  the 
policy change amounts to a transfer from the Government to producers, 
with  consumers  and  the  net  social  benefit  being  almost  unaffected. 
Given  the  pressure  on  the  Indonesian  Government  to  constrain  its 
expenditure  over  the  study  period,  it  is  easy  to  see  why  this  policy 
alternative is  unattractive. 
An additional unattractive feature of  the policy is its negative effect on 
production of  secondary food crops (see Table 7.6).  Maize production is 
affected the most, falling by about 5.5%.  On the consumption side the 
effects  of the  policy  change are  slight.  Sugar, groundnut and  sweet 
potato, which have a strong price response to the falling supplies, suffer 
slight  falls  in  consumption.  Meanwhile  maize,  cassava  and  soy bean 
which have a limited price response have slight consumption increases. 
While there are other policy manipulations of this type which can be 
analysed,  they  are,  for  various  reasons,  not considered  feasible.  For 
example, we did assess  the impact of reducing fertiliser subsidies while 
maintaining rice  self-sufficiency  by  increasing both producer and con-
sumer prices of  rice.  This does in fact reduce the overall net Government 
cost, because consumers effectively pay for the price support to produc-
ers.  However, such a policy is not considered politically feasible because 
it involves additional consumer price increases at a time when substantial 
price increases have already occurred. 
Next, one could consider the opposite type of  policies to these; that is, 
increases  in  fertiliser  subsidies and  reductions in  price support.  Once 
again, there are political (and administrative) constraints.  Lower prices 
for rice  producers could be achieved only if consumer prices also were 
lowered.  Indeed lower prices for producers would automatically flow on 
to lower consumer prices.  It would be impossible to maintain a regime 
in which low producer prices co-exist with high consumer prices because 
the Government does not exercise the necessary control over rice mar-
keting.  As  a consequence, the type of policy adjustment which involves 
an  increase  in  fertiliser  subsidies  is  one  in  which  both  producer and 
consumer prices  are  lower.  Such  a  policy  would  have  higher overall 
Government  costs  because  the  increased  costs  of fertiliser  subsidies 
would not be offset by significant reductions in the cost of  price support 
for rice. 
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7.3.3  An optimal policy? 
A  final  issue  that arises  is  the concept of the optimal level  of fertiliser 
subsidy if the objective is  the unconstrained maximisation of net social 
benefit.  That is,  ignoring the effects on f()reign  exchange saving, the 
level of self-sufliciency and distributional consequences, is  there a ferti-
liser subsidy policy that maximises net social  benefit?  To examine this 
issue,  the  fertili~;er  price  in  the  version  of the  model  f(n  1988  was 
parameterised, holding all  other policies at their original level. 
The results f()r  net social benefit and net Government cost are shown 
in figure 7.3.  In terms of  maximising net social benefit, the best option 
is  a  fertiliser  subsidy policy which  involves  a  fertiliser  price  higher by 
about 30%  than the actual  price  in  1988.  The remarkable  feature  of 
figure 7.3 is  the size of the gradient of the net-benefits-to-the-Govern-
ment function.  This is explained by the t:lct that, as the In'el of  fertiliser 
subsidy is  reduced, there are  both direct and  induced  henefits  to the 
budget.  The cost of the  policy  is  reduced  directly,  and  the  induced 
benefits  flow  in  terms  of higher  import  taxes  collected  as  domestic 
production f:lllS. 
However,  the  negative  aspects  of this  optimal  policy  must  also  be 
acknowledged.  It involves considerable losses to producers (reduction in 
producers' surplus =  Rp 478 billion), relatively small losses to consumers 
(reduction in consumer surplus =  Rp  14 hillion), an increase in  f(m:ign 
exchange  cost of Rp  676  billion,  and  a  flll  in  the  b·el of rice  self 
sufliciencv to 90.7'X, from 97.0%. 
7.4  Summary and Conclusions 
The overall  objective  of the  research  reported  here  was  to assess  the 
impacts of the f()()d  policies t()llowed  hy  Indonesia between  1985 and 
1988, and to demonstrate the  henefits and costs of some alternatives. 
There  were  three  components of the  work.  First,  by comparing the 
actual situation with a no-policy scenario, it was shown that the policies 
followed produced a net social benefit.  This arose principally because, by 
using policies to encourage domestic output, fewer imports of rice were 
needed so that the international price was t()rced down.  Thus compared 
\vith the no-policy position, Indonesia benefited from the lower priced 
imports. 
Second, if maintaining the level of rice selfsufticiency is  imposed as 
the highest level ohjective, a variety of  policy combinations would achieve 
it.  For example, a reduced fertiliser subsidy could be replaced by higher 
output price support.  The alternatives that were examined had virtually 
no effect on net social benefit.  That is,  there is  a [liriy flat  net-social-
benefit response function in the vicinity of  the policies that were actually 
pursued when the self-sufticiency constraint is  imposed. 
Third, under an objective of  unconstrained maximisation of  net social 
henefit, it is  possihle to show both that there is  an optimal level of the 
152 fertiliser subsidy policy, and that such a policy may have disadvantages in 
other dimensions.  In 1988, the optimal policy was to increase the price 
of  fertiliser by about 30%. 
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  the  outcomes  actually 
achieved by Indonesian policy makers were encouraging.  A balancing of 
the various objectives would seem to imply that a level of  rice output just 
below self-sufficiency is  appropriate.  Such a level was achieved in  1986, 
1987 and  1988.  In this situation, the foreign  exchange costs  appear 
reasonable, revenues from  import taxes can  be  raised to finance part of 
the fertiliser subsidy, and the support policies do not over-encourage rice 
producers at the expense of  secondary food crops. 
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Jakarta. Table 7.1.  Indexes of output of the major food crops (means of 1983- 85= 100). 
1985  1986  1987  1988 
Rice  104.12  105.96  106.92  111.23 
Maize  88.33  120.77  105.16  135.70 
Cassava  104.58  99.03  106.80  115.09 
Sugar  105.94  127.86  134.34  137.40 
Groundnut  103.94  126.38  104.92  115.94 
Soybean  120.00  169.24  160.14  175.17 
Sweet potato  99.27  92.74  92.47  99.17 
Table 7.2. The effect of fertiliser subsidies and price support for rice on production 
and consumption of rice. 
1985  1986  1987  1988 
('000 t) 
(a)  Actual situation 
Production  24 316  24744  24970  25975 
Consumption  23987  25162  24990  26770 
Surplus  329  - 418  - 20  - 795 
(b) Situation without fertiliser 
subsidy and price support 
Production  21  552  21  912  21  529  22 716 
Consumption  24 113  25594  25946  27536 
Surplus  - 2561  - 3682  -4417  -4820 
(c) Sensitivity analysis 
(Situation without fertiliser subsidy and 
price support, with import demand elasticity 
increased fi'om - 3.0 to - 6.0 at Rp330/kg) 
Production  21  017  21  199  20710  21  829 
Consumption  25 170  27047  27586  29366 
Surplus  -4 153  - 5848  -6876  - 7537 
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Table 7.3. The effect of fertiliser subsidies and price support for rice on production 
and consumption of secondary food crops ('000 t). 
Actual situation  With policies removed 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Maize 
Production  4330  5920  5 155  6652  3673  5077  4353  5673 
Consumption  4375  5984  5373  6678  4399  5976  5305  6627 
Surplus  --45  -64  - 218  - 26  -726  - 899  -952  -954 
Cassava 
Production  14057  13312 14356  15471  13518 12848  1383214926 
Consumption  12496  12094 13206  14552  12692 12251  13351  14722 
Surplus  1 561  1 218  I  150  919  826  597  481  204 
Sugar 
Production  1677  2024  2128  2  175  I 545  1879  1 955  2010 
Consumption  I 854  I 942  2087  2  133  I 722  1797  1916  1968 
Surplus  - 177  82  41  42  -177  82  39  42 
Groundnut 
Production  528  642  533  589  SOl  610  502  558 
Consumption  545  676  579  617  517  644  549  586 
Surplus  -17  - 34  --46  -28  - 16  -34  --47  -28 
Soybean 
Production  870  I 227  1 161  1 270  773  1079  1024  I  129 
Consumption  I  143  1602  1420  I 785  I  156  I 617  I 431  1799 
Surplus  - 273  - 375  -259  - 515  - 383  - 520  --407  -530 
Sweet potato 
Production  2 161  2091  2013  2 159  2  123  2057  1976  2  122 
Consumption  2 161  2091  2013  2  159  2  123  2057  1976  2 122 
Surplus  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Wheat 
Consumption  1 317  I 610  I 688  I  588  I  321  I 612  1 683  1 586 
156 Table 7.4.  Effect of price support and fertilisn  subsidies on producers, consumCl"S, net 
Government cost  and overseas producers (eight crops). 
1985  1986  1987  1988 
(Rp  billion) 
Change  in  producer surplus  734.07  I 053.79  I 692.89  I 628.54 
Change in  consumer surplus  3901  - 171.24  - 598.77  -446.3 1 
Net Government cost  772.65  754. 15  I 043.99  939.56 
Net social  benefit in  Indonesia  0.43  128.40  50.13  242.67 
Change in  surplus abroad  - 180.38  - 368.02  - 536.52  - 621.53 
Table 7.5. The eHeet of reducing fertiliser subsidies and increasing  rice price support 
on producers, consumers cmd  government cost (eight food  crops). 
1985  1986  1987  1988 
(Rp  billion) 
Change in  producer surplus  728.03  886.50  1011.21  I 063.70 
Change in  consulller surplus  - 12.07  - 10.25  - 7.79  - 10.08 
Change in  net Government cost  698.17  855.83  1 972.01  I 022.77 
Change in  net social  benefit  17.79  20.42  31.41  30.85 
in  Indonesia 
Change  in  fe rtiliser subsidy costS  - 254.99  - 309.21  - 360.49  -409.00 
Change in  surplus clbroad1  +  +  +  + 
A Sl1ull  positive  clunge as  a result of increased imports of  secondary tood crops. 
157 POLICY EVALUA TlON 
Table 7.6. The effect on secondary food crops of reducing fertiliser subsidies and 
incrcasing price support to r rice while maintaining the level oh-ice 
self-sufficiency ('000 t). 
Actual situation  With policies removed 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Maize 
Production  4330  5920  5 155  6652  4094  5597  4874  6289 
Consumption  4375  5984  5373  6678  4382  5994  5 382  6689 
Surplus  -45  -64  - 218  - 26  - 288  -497  -408  -400 
Cassava 
Production  14057  1331214356  15471  13788  13056  1408015174 
Consumption  12496  12094 13206  14552  12554  12  151  13  268  14621 
Surplus  1561  1 218  1 150  919  I 234  905  812  453 
Sugar 
Production  1677  2024  2  128  2  175  I 638  1979  2081  2  127 
Consumption  I 854  1942  2087  2 133  I 815  1 897  2040  2 085 
Surplus  - 177  82  41  42  - 177  82  41  42 
Groundnut 
Production  528  642  533  589  520  632  525  580 
Consumption  545  676  579  617  537  666  571  608 
Surplus  - 17  - 34  -46  - 28  - 17  - 34  -46  - 28 
Soybcan 
Production  870  I 227  I  161  I 270  842  I  187  1 123  I 229 
Consumption  I  143  1602  1420  1 785  I  146  1607  1424  1 790 
Surplus  - 273  - 375  - 259  -515  - 304  -420  - 301  - 561 
Sweet potato 
Production  2  161  2091  2013  2  159  2  150  2080  2002  2  148 
Consumption  2  161  2091  2013  2  159  2  150  2080  2002  2148 
Surplus  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Wheat 
Consumption  I 317  1610  1 688  I 588  I 318  I 611  1690  I 590 
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Figure 7.1.  The Indonesian rice  market in  1988. 
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Figure 7.2.  Comparison between the ~lCtual situation in the rice market 
in  1988 and a no-policy situation. 
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Figure 7.3.  Parametaisation of the tCrtiliser  price  to tind the optimal 
level offcrtiliser subsidy (1988), 
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8.1  Summary 
The  anah'sis  of Chapters  1  and  2  showed that the  generally  prudent 
macroeconomic management of the 1970s resulted in  steady and sub-
stantial growth in the Indonesian economy,  The l;o\,ertlment's response 
to the problems of  the oil re\,enue downturn of  the 1980s \\'as decisi\'e in 
terms of tax,  trade, financial  and  im'estment reform, and reduction in 
domestic subsidies.  This response seemed to maint,lin economic stabilit\' 
and alter  the pace and direction of growth.  The longer term will  be 
rllrthcr influenced  by  the acknowledgment in  Repclita  V  of the  larger 
role no\\' accorded to the pri\'ate sector. 
Policies directed to the agricultural sector during the 1980s t()lIowed 
the  same  broad  lines  as  those  of the  pre\'ious  decade.  There  was  a 
growing appreciation of  the need to balance rice against secondary crops 
and initiati\'es in  other sub-sectors, cn:dit policy was  restructured, and 
input polic\' partially n:.lppraised.  vVhile  most aspects of  macroeconomic 
policy during the 1980s h.1\·e been basically sound, there has been some 
inconsistency between sectOl" al  and macroeconomic policy.  roodgrains 
and cash crops (smallholder and estate) suffered discrimination and/or 
benefited ti-om  a varying mix of export taxes, exchange rate protection, 
subsidised inputs, credit and infi-astructural support.  However, continu-
ing pressure for economy-wide reform is evident, including advocacy ofa 
shift to market-oriented agriculture, and this may ultimately provide for a 
more coordinated policy approach in the 1990s. 
Despite  the  problems associated  with  rice  in  1986 and  1987, this 
industry improved its  performance in  1988 and  1989, yielding a  3.5% 
annual  growth  rate  tor  Repelita  rv.  This  in  turn  contributed  to  an 
annual growth rate of 3.3% tor the agricultural sector as a whole tor the 
plan period, a more than adequate result given the circumstances. Within 
an economy-wide growth target of 5% per annum, Repelita V projects a 
3.6% per annum growth rate for the agricultural sector, with cash crops, 
livestock  and  fisheries  expected  to  reach  between  5.5  and  6.7%  per 
annum, while foodcrops are expected to contribute a more modest 2.8% 
per annum (rice alone 2.9%). 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that each cash crop faces particular restrain-
ing factors on either production, export or both.  Although there is some 
use of  high-yielding stock and increased awareness offertiliser (mainly by 
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estates),  there  is  nowhere  near  the  emphasis  on, and  usage  of,  new 
technology that is  now common in  rice cultivation. 
The livestock sector is  unlikely to make significant progress until the 
forage  situation is  investigated and  improved.  Programs of upgrading 
for both beef  and dairy cattle are underway and advice is being sought on 
all aspects of  cattle, sheep, goats and poultry (including overseas advice). 
However, real progress may await further intensified programs which co-
ordinate all  the aspects of livestock  management (e.g. breeding stock, 
forage, disease control and marketing). 
Timber products have been a large export earner over the years and, 
although the plywood and veneer industry have just managed to replace 
the  lost  revenue  from  log  exports,  debate  remains  about  the  policy 
methods chosen  to promote the development of the timber industry. 
Exploitation  and  appropriate reaHorestation  policies  will  be  needed  if 
this sector is  to continue its contribution well into the future. 
Fisheries are providing a small, but growing, contribution to dietary 
protein and, in addition, one part of the industry (prawns) is  contribut-
ing strongly to agricultural exports.  Provision for future exploitation of 
this resource, together with appropriate conservation, should ensure that 
this  sector continues to provide for  both domestic and export needs. 
Careful  policy  coordination  will  need  to  be  devised  to overcome the 
problems of potential conflict between traditional and modern fishing 
methods. 
Chapter 4  considered  at  length  the  relative  positions  of rice  and 
secondary food crops.  The attainment of  rice self-sufficiency has brought 
some appreciation of the need to consider a more diversitled food base. 
The palawiJa crops have been comparatively neglected.  Yields are low by 
neighbouring  country  standards,  and  a  large  number of farmers  are 
reliant solely upon palawija for income.  Given that the income elasticity 
of  demand for rice in  Indonesia has declined and is expected to continue 
to do so,  per capita  rice  consumption will  peak  and  then  decline  as 
consumption diversifies  into food  with higher income e1asticities  (e.g. 
poultIY).  These foods,  in  turn, form  part of the derived  demand for 
palawija,  in  addition  to palawij«Js contribution  to  basic  food  needs, 
nutrition  diversity  and  additional  protein.  Even  so,  there  are  quite 
challenging problems to be overcome in  pressing ahead with foodcrop 
diversification,  while  formulating policies which  will  lead  to sustained 
growth in  the rice  sector, albeit at a  lower level  than  in  the previous 
decade, and also working within the confines of a substantially reduced 
budget. 
Indonesia has reached the incongruous position where rice yields are 
among the highest in  Asia  while palawija yields are among the lowest. 
There are  three  major constraints  involving  the  palawija:  (a)  socio-
economic (consumer resistance and rice  preference); (b) infrastructural 
(roads,  shipping,  port  handling,  communications,  markets);  and 
(c)  technical  (seeds,  fertilisers,  cropping  patterns,  extension,  storage, 
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makers wi th the major challenge. 
The review presented in Chapter 5 of  recent agricultural sector model-
ling  work  showed  the  complementary  relationship  between  the  filllr 
models appraised.  While difh:rent in  degree, the general directions of 
policy prescriptions flowing fi'oll1  these models were similar.  However, 
little int()rmation \\'as provided by these previous studies on the relative 
cost of using alternative policies to achie\'e self sufficiency  t~lrgets.  The 
provision of  this type of information became the central objective of the 
ACIAR project.  It was the opinion of  the leaders of  this project that the 
pioneering work in estimating the underlying demand and supply param 
eters had progressed Etr enough, and that a more comprehensive policy 
analysis  was  now more appropriate.  By  integrating the  previous esti-
mates into a consistent policy model that measured the impacts of  policy 
changes on (a) social and gm'Crnment.ll costs :lI1d  benefits and (b) the 
distribution of such  costs  and  benefits, an  attempt could  be  made  to 
obtain a reasonable picture of the trade-oHs invol\'Cd in policy selection. 
In Chapters 6  and 7  the modelling work of the current project was 
described.  The overall objective of  the economic modelling was to assess 
the impacts of  the f()()d  policies that were f()llowed  Lw  Indonesia between 
19X5  and  19XX,  :tnd  to demonstrate  the  benefits  and  costs of some 
alternatives.  first, it \\'as shown that the policies  fi)llowed  produced a 
net wcial  benefit.  This arose  principally because, by using policies to 
encourage domestic output, fewer imports of rice were needed so that 
the international price was  fi)rced  down.  Thus compared \\'i th the no 
policy position, Indonesia benefited from the lower-priced imports. 
Second, it was shown that there arc  a  variet~' of policy combinations 
that would achieve the self-sufficiency objective.  for example, a reduced 
fertiliser subsidy could be replaced by higher output price support.  The 
alternatives  that were  examined  had  virtually  no efkct on  net  social 
benefit.  That is,  there is  a birly flat  net-social-benefit response function 
in  the vicinity of the policies that were actually purslled when the self-
su fticiency constraint is  im posed. 
Third, under an objective of unconstrained maximisation of net social 
benefit, it  is  possible to show both that there is  an optimal level  of the 
fertiliser subsidy policy, and that such a policy may have disadvanuges in 
other dimensions.  In 1988, the optimal policy was to increase the price 
of fertiliser by about 30'X,. 
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  the  outcomes  actu~lll\' 
achieved by Indonesian policy-makers were encouraging.  A balancing of 
the various objectives would seem to imply that a level oh'ice output just 
belo\\' sdf-suHiciency is  appropriate.  Such a level was achieved in  1986, 
1987 and  1988.  In this situation, the foreign  exchange costs  appear 
reasonable, revenues fro\11  import taxes can be raised to finance part of 
the tl:rtiliser subsidy, and the support policies do not ()\'er-encourage rice 
producers at the expense of  secondary fi)()d  crops. 
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8.2  Conclusions 
There arc  two significant conclusions of this study related to economic 
policy in  Indonesia, and two signific,1l1t conclusions n:lated to economic 
modelling. 
With  respect to policy,  it  is  clear that, after a  period of turbulence 
during the 1960s, sustained and consistent macroeconomic policy action 
during  the  Soeharto  period  Ius  resulted  in  economic  stability  with 
growth.  Even in years when there was instability in oil prices, and hence 
export revenue, the policy stance sllccessfully prevented instability from 
adversely aflccting the domestic economy. 
In  general,  similar  comments  can  be  applied  to  scctoral  policy  in 
agriculture.  O\Tr a  period  from  the  late  1970s through  to  1986 the 
single goal of selfsutliciency in  rice was paramount.  Rice price support 
and  krtiliser  subsidy  policies  were  applied  consistently  and  self-
sufticiencv  was  achieved  in  1985.  This  was  a  particularly  impressive 
achievement  given  that  Indonesia  had  been  the  world's  largest  net 
importer only five  ,"cars earlier. 
This leads  to the second significant conclusion  related to economic 
policy, namely the difficulty oftine-tuning policy.  Since the achievement 
of rice  selfsufticiency  at  least  two  other  policy  considerations  have 
appclred.  t:irst,  there  h~lS  been  some  concern  expressed  abou  t  the 
government cost of achieving rice  sclf-sufliciency.  Second, it has  been 
observed that the secondary f()()d  crops have been disadvantaged by  the 
policv support given to rice.  Together these concerns led to an attempt 
to fine-tllne the price policy combination during 1986 and  1987.  The 
fertiliser price increased with a reduction in the subsidy afforded it.  The 
problem was that rice output responded more dramatically than expected 
(perhaps as  a result of exogenous effects like  pests and the weather in 
addition to the policy change).  As a result, the notion of  fine-tuning the 
policy instruments was called into question.  It appears that rice farmers 
are significantly influenced by price policy, possibly highly responsive to 
fertiliser prices directly, or to the rice/fertiliser price ratio.  Thus, phasing 
out of  subsidies as a first step towards greater economic efficiency in  the 
agricultural sector may need to be more gradual than initially hoped. 
Turning to economic modelling issues, two significant conclusions are 
also observed.  First, the situation has been reached where a critical mass 
of agricultural sector economic modelling has been performed through 
this project and the others discussed in  Chapter 5, so that the basis for 
sound, pragmatic  policy advice  based  on such  models now exists.  It 
would seem  reasonable  for the  Indonesian  Ministry of Agriculture  to 
maintain a policy analysis capability based on such models. 
The second economic modelling conclusion  is  an  extension of the 
first.  It is that the agricultural sector modelling that has been performed 
can  be  usefully  augmented  both  to  capture  the  general  equilibrium 
effects of  agricultural policy changes through multisectoral models, and 
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---------to show in  a more detailed partial equilibrium manner the impacts of 
policy changes on particular food commodities.  Again researchers in the 
Ministry of Agriculture are well placed to perform such work, given the 
level of training and experience that many have achieved and given the 
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170 1.  Introduction 
The policy analysis  outlined in  the body of the report is  based on an 
explicit model of supply and demand for a  group of Indonesian food 
commodities.  The  model  was  explicit  in  the  sense  that  a  particular 
functional form was chosen for the supply and demand functions, values 
for own- and cross-price elasticities were assumed and then parameters of 
the supply and demand functions were derived utilising base-period price 
and quantity data.  Simulations using the explicit system of  equations so 
derived were then undertaken to explore various policy scenarios. 
This approach avoided the need for econometric estimation. Of  course, 
the crucial steps in  the approach were assuming that a particular func-
tional  form  was  appropriate  and assuming  particular elasticity  values, 
although  both assumptions were made partly on the basis of previous 
econometric work. The authors believe that this approach might be used 
more often in commodity-market analysis in  developing countries where 
the  data  needed  for  econometric  estimation  may  be  unavailable  or, 
perhaps,  highly suspect.  In  general,  the  time  and  resources  spent  in 
collecting data and  fIne-tuning econometric estimates can  be a  heavy 
drain on scarce research resources. 
A  somewhat  more  general  approach  to  policy  evaluation  in  the 
absence of a  structural  econometric  model  entails  making  first-order 
approximations  to  the  quantitative  effects  of changes  in  exogenous 
variables using 'equilibrium displacement modelling'. With this approach, 
which is essentially comparative static analysis (see, for example, Chiang 
1984)  one  can  usually  make  useful  qualitative  statements  about  the 
dTects  of policy  initiati\'Cs  and,  provided  onc  is  content  to  confine 
analyses to small (sav,  10% or less) clunges ahout an initial equilihrium 
and provided one is  prepared to assume elasticity \',llues, one can make 
reasonably  ,lccurate  quantitative  estimates of responses  to changes  in 
exogenous variables. It differs from the approach adopted in  this study in 
that no assumptions have to be made about ti.lIlctional forms. Rather, the 
procedure  provides  a  tlrs\order approximation  to  quantitative dtccts 
irrespective of the underlving functional forms, 
The procedure is  outlined in  the next section and a simple numerieal 
example is  provided,  In the subsequent section the procedure is <lpplied 
to the Indonesian food-crop model.  Some strengths and \\'c.lknesscs of 
the procedure are outlined in  the tlnal section. 
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2.  The Procedure 
Consider the following market model for two commodities, 1 and 2: 
D1  =  D1  (PI' P 2' W) ...... (demand for commodity 1) 
SI  =  SI (P 1, P 2:  X) ....... (supply of commodity 1) 
D2  =  D2  (PI' P 2' Y) ....... (demand for commodity 2) 
(1) 
S2  =  S 2(P  1>  P 2 Z) ........ (supply of commodity 2) 
Dl  = SI =  0 1  ........... (commodity 1 market clearance) 
D2  =  S2 =  02  ........... (commodity 2 market clearance) 
where: 
D  =  quantity demanded; 
S  =  quantity supplied; 
P  =  pnce; 
Q  =  equilibrium quantity; and 
W, X, Y,  Z  =  exogenous influences on supply and demand. 
The model defined by equations (1) is  a 'general function' model in 
that no explicit  functional  forms  have  been assumed.  Too, although 
there is  a unique exogenous variable in each equation, this is  merely for 
convenience and there could in  fact  be  several  exogenous variables  in 
each  equation, with  particular exogenous variables entering into more 
than one equation. 
In equilibrium: 
QJ  DJ (PI' P2, W) 
(2) 
QJ  SJ (PI' P2, X) 
Q2  D2 (PI' P2, Y) 
Q2  S2 (PI' P2, Z). 
172 The system of  equations (2) contains four equations and four endog-
enous variables (Qp Q2' PI  and P2)· 
Equilibrium  displacement  modelling  allows  one  to  examine  how 
changes in exogenous variables affect each endogenous variable after the 
system has fully adjusted to the changes.  In other words, the interest is in 
general  equilibrium  impacts.  A  convenient way  of measuring  these 
impacts  when  only  a  single  exogenous  variable  changes  is  through 
general equilibrium elasticities.  These elasticities show the percentage 
change in  an  endogenous variable  associated with  a  1%  change  in  an 
exogenous variable after full  adjustment has  occurred.  They are  to be 
distinguished  from  Marshallian  e1asticities  which  show the  percentage 
change in  an  endogenous variable  associated  with  a  1  % change in  an 
exogenous variable assuming the values of other endogenous variables 
do not change. 
After total differentiation of (2) the following system is obtained: 
(3) 
dQ,  =  (ClD,/ClP,) dP,  +  (aDJaPJ dP2 +  (oDJaW) dW 
dQ, =  (asJaPI )  dP,  +  (asl/apJ dP]  +  (asJaX) dX 
•  dQ2  =  (aD2/ap,) dP,  +  (aD2/aPJ dP2  +  (aD/ay) dY 
dQ2  =  (as/a1\) dl\  +  (as/apJ dP2  +  (as/az) dZ. 
Using the relationship that dQi  =  Qi din Q"  ete.  (i.e.  the 'ordinary' 
differential  of a  variable  equals  the value  of the variable  times  its  log 
differential), the system can be rewritten as: 
{ 
Q,d In Q, ~ (ilO,lilp,) p,d In PI + (ilO,lilPJ  p,d In 1', + (ilD,IilW) W dIn W 
(4)  Q,d  In Q, ~ (ilS,IilP,)  P,d  In 1', + (ilS,Iilp,) p,d  In 1\ + (ilS,IilX) X d  In X 
Q,d  In Q,  ~ (ilO,lap,) I\d In PI + (aD/ ill',) I',d  In 1', + (aD/ ay) Y dIn Y 
Q,d  In Q,  ~ (iJS,Iill',)  I' ld  In PI + (as,Ial')  I \ d  In 1 \  + (as,IilZ) Z dIn Z. 
Dividing each equation by the Qi appearing on the LHS and bearing 
in  mind  that (aD/ap) (P/Q) and  (as/ap,) (P/Q)  are  Marshallian 
demand and supply elasticities, respectively, the system becomes: 
din Q I =  1111 d In  PI  +  1111 din 1\  +  111IVd  In  W 
dlnQI=  Ell dlnP1  +  EI2 dlnP2  +  ElxdlnX 
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where: 
1']  (E .)  =  price elasticity of demand (supply)  for  commodity i with 
I,  I) 
respect to commodity j (i, j  =  1, 2); 
1']ik(E ik )  =  elasticity of demand (supply) for commodity i with respect 
to exogenous variable k (i  =  1,2; k  =  W, X, Y,  Z). 
In matrix form, the system is: 
Upon post-multiplying both sides of matrix equation (6) by the vector 
[lid In W  ljd In X  lid In Y  lid In  Z] 
and setting the ratios of  log differentials of  any two difterent exogenous 
variables to zero (e.g. d In W/d In  X =  0), one obtains' 
(7)  E G  =  D 
where: 
E= 
d Ln P/d  Ln W  d In P/d In X din P/d Ln Y d In P/d  Ln  Z  ] 
din P2/d Ln W  d Ln P/d In  X din P/d In Y d In P2/d In Z 
d Ln Q/d  Ln W d Ln Q/d In X din Q/d In Yd  In Q/d In Z 
din Q2/d In W din Q2/d In X d In Q/d In Yd  In Q/d  Ln  Z 
I  This step is undertaken as an alternative to repeated solution of (6) where each solution 
is for a change in a single exogenous variable. The general equilibrium elasticities we are 
seeking show the change in an endogenous variable resulting from a change in a single 
exogenous variable. 
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for example, that dIn P/d In  W  =  (dP/PJ/(dW  jW)).  The first now 
contains the general equilibrium elasticities of  PI with respect to each of 
the exogenous variables, where only one exogenous variable changes at a 
time.  Similar interpretations are placed  on  the elements of the other 
rows.  These general equilibrium elasticities are obtained as: 
(S)  G  =  E-IO 
where E-I is  the inverse of E. 
As  an example, suppose the explicit form of the model with equilib-
rium (market clearing) conditions imposed is: 
(9)  { 
01. =  -0.8 P1.  +  OA P2  +  lAW 
01. =  0.5  P1.  0.2 P2  + 0.7X 
02 =  0.3 P1.  0.7 P2  +  lAY 
Q2 =  -OA P1.  +  0.8 P2  + 0.6Z 
If  the initial values ofW, X, Y and Z are each 1.0, then in the solution 
each endogenous variable has a value of 1.0.  The Marshallian elasticities 
computed at the equilibrium values of  the endogenous variables and the 
base values of  the exogenous variables are: 
'11 11  -O.S,  1112  0.4,  11 1",  1.4; 
£  11  0.5,  £12  -0.2,  £ I x  0.7; 
1121  0.3,  1122  - 0.7, 
112"  1.4; and 
£ 21  -0.4,  £ 22  0.8,  £ 22  0.6. 
One could now assume a change in the value of  one of  the exogenous 
variables, compute new equilibrium values for the endogenous variables 
and then compute the general equilibrium elasticity of  each endogenous 
variable  with  respect to the exogenous variable  whose value ehanged. 
For example, ifW changes from 1.0 to 1.01 (i.e. by 1%) the new solution 
IS: 
QI  =  1.0056,  Q2  =  0.9996; and 
PI  =  1.0137,  1 \  =  1.0064. 
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The general equilibrium e1asticities are therefore: 
This exercise could be repeated tor changes in  X, Y and Z to build up 
a complete set of  general equilibrium e1asticities. 
An alternative is to use the comparative static methods outlined in the 
previous section.  By direct substitution of  the initial Marshallian e1asticities 
into matrices E and 0: 
E~ [ 
- 0.8  0.4  - 1  0 ] 
0.5  - 0.2  - 1  0 
0.3  - 0.7  o - I 
- 0.4  0.8  o - I 
and 
D~  [ 
- 1.4  0  0  0 ] 
o - 0.7  0  0 
0  0 - 1.4  0 
0  0  0 - 0.6 
Therdore: 
[  13725 
- 0.6863  0.5490  0.2353 ] 
0.6405  - 0.3203  I.I 995  - 0.5098 
G =  0.5582  0.4209  0.0366  -0.0157 
0.0366  0.0183  0.7320  0.2863 
In  practice  one  may  need  to  estimate  the  change  in  endogenous 
variables  when  several  exogenous variables  change simultaneously, al-
lowing for general equilibrium effects to occur.  For example, how does 
PI  change when both 'vV and Y change?  In this case it is inappropriate to 
measure the change in PI as an elasticity because more than one exogenous 
176 variable  is  changing.  The alternative  is  to measure the proportionate 
change  in  PI  (i.e.  d  In  PI  or dP/PI)  associated  with  simultaneous 
proportionate changes in Wand Y.  This can be approximated as: 
Returning to the numerical example, suppose the proportionate change 
in W is .01 and the proportionate change in Y is .03. 5etting the values of 
W  at 1.01 and the value of Y at 1.03 in  equations (9) and solving the 
system simultaneously yields a solution set QI =  1.0067; Q2 =  1.0216; 
PI  =  1.0302; and  P2 =  1.0421.  Hence, the proportionate change  in 
PI  =  0.0302. 
It can easily  be  verified  that the proportionate changes in  the other 
endogenous variables can  be  obtained as  the sum of products of total 
elasticities with proportionate changes (i.e.  an equation corresponding 
to (10) above). 
3.  The Indonesian Foodcrop Model 
The food crop model that has been used for policy analysis in this study 
consists of  eight demand functions and seven supply functions as follows: 
0 1  =  0 1 (PlC'  Pz' ... , Pg,  Y) 
51  =  51  (Pip' Pz' ... ,1\, P9 ) 
O2  =  O2 (PlC ' P2, ... , Ps' Y) 
52  =  S2  (Pip' P2, . .. , P7,  P9 ) 
0 3  =  0 3  (Plc' P2, ... , Ps' Y) 
53  =  53  (PiP' P2, ... , P7,  P9 ) 
(11)  0 4  =  0 4 (PlC'  P2, ... , Ps' Y) 
54  =  54  (PIP' P2, ... , P7,  P9 ) 
0 5  =  0 5  (PlC ' P2, ... , Ps' Y) 
5, =  5, (PI' P2, ... , P7,  P9 ) 
::'I  ;)  P 
0 6 =  0 6 (PlC'  P2, ... , Pg, Y) 
56  =  56  (PIP'  P2, .. . , P7,  P9 ) 
0 7 =  0 7 (Plc'  P2, ... , Ps' Y) 
57 =  57  (Pip' P2,  •. .  ,  P7, P9 ) 
Os =  Os (Plc' P2, .. . , Pg, Y) 
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where: 
°  =  quantity demanded; S  =  quantity supplied; Y  =  income, 
P  price; and subscripts 1 to 9 denote commodities (1  =  rice; 
2  corn; 3  =  cassava; 4  =  sugar; 5  =  groundnut; 6  =  soybean; 
7  sweet potato; 8  =  wheat; and 9  =  fertiliser). 
There are two rice prices:  the consumer price (PIJ and the producer 
price  (PIP)'  Quantities  demanded  and  supplied  are  determined 
endogenously, as  are the prices of sugar, groundnut and sweet potato. 
All  other variables are treated as  being determined exogenously. 
The model is closed with the following identities: 
The aim is to generate a set of  general equilibrium elasticities showing 
how each endogenous variable responds to a 1  %  change in each exogenous 
variable, allowing for general equilibrium effects to occur.  The endog-
enous variables are 01' SI' 02' S2'  03' S3' Q., Q5' 0 6' S6' Q7'  Qs' 1\, Ps' 
and P7 (15 in  total) and the  exogenous variables are Plc'  PIp' P2, P3,  P6, 
Ps'  P9  and Y (8  in  total).  Having obtained these general equilibrium 
elasticities, it is  a simple matter to derive general equilibrium elasticities 
for other variables of  interest, such as imports and revenues, by appropri-
ate differentiation of identities. 
After imposing the equilibrium conditions (12) on (11 ), total differ-
entiation  and  conversion  to  log  differentials  as  in  Section  2,  the 
Indonesian foodcrop model can be expressed as  : 
(13)  RS  =  TU 
where  R  (15x15), S  (15xl), T  (l5x8) and  U  (8xl) are  shown  in 
Figures  1 to 4, repectively.  Now post-multiply both sides of (13) by 
V (lx8), where V is as shown in  Figure 5, to obtain: 
(14)  R(SV) = T(UV). 
After setting the ratio oflog differentials of  any two difTerent exogenous 
variables  equal  to  zero,  the  matrix  UV  becomes  the  (8x8)  identity 
matrix.  Relative  to equation  (7), matrix  R  corresponds  to matrix  E, 
matrix SV (15x8) corresponds to matrix G and matrix T corresponds to 
matrix D.  In other words, equation (14) is of the form of equation (7) 
where E is of dimension (15x15), G is of dimension (15x8) and 0  is of 
dimension (15x8). 
178 Values  of the  Marshallian  e1asticities  needed  for  equation  (14) are 
obtained  from  Tables  7.5  and  7.6  in  the  body of the  report.  The 
numerical  forms  of matrix  E  (=R),  E-', 0  (= T) and  G  (=SV)  for  the 
Indonesian food crop model are shown in Figures 6 to 9, respectively. 
Suppose one wanted  to determine the proportionate change in  the 
producer price of rice  that would be necessary following some propor-
tionate change in  the price of fertiliser assuming the government wished 
to maintain  the same level  of rice  self-sufficiency, defined  as  the ratio 
S/D, (i.e. the ratio of  rice supply to rice demand). 
For the self·sufficiency  ratio  to  remain  constant, the proportionate 
changes in rice supply and demand, following changes in producer prices 
for rice and fertiliser, would need to be equal.  That is: 
where: 
and 
After substituting (16) and (17) into (15) and a little  manipulation 
one obtains: 
Equation ( 18) gives the proportionate change in the producer price of 
rice  that  is  necessary  for  any  proportionate  change  in  the  price  of 
tCrtiliser.  from hgure 9: 
l;(\,I\.l  0.29930 
C(\,1\)  0.1 S489 
C( D"  1\,)  0.00 I 06 
(;(1\,I\J  (U)0747. 
Suhstituting into ( 18): 
(19 )  dP  /P 
II'  Ip 
=  (l.S4439 (dP.,II\). 
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For cx~lmpk, if the goyerI1l11ent  increa~ed the price of fertiliser by S'){., 
it  would  haye  to  increase  the  prod ucn  price  of rice  by  2.72  % 
(= 0.S4439 x O.S  x 100) in order to maintain the cxi~til1g ~elfsufficiency 
ratio. Ckarh', many other policy cxperiments could be conducted using 
the gennal equilibrium clasticities provided in  hgure 9. 
4.  Strengths and Weaknesses 
Equilibrium displacement modelling is clearly a useful analytical tool that 
allows  the  analyst  to  cxplore  the  impacts  of changes  in  cxogenous 
variables.  At times the analyst might only be  concerned with  making 
qU~llitati\'e statements about impacts, such as  the direction of change in 
endogenous \·ariables.  Somcrimes this \\'ill be possible just with the usual 
assumptions ahout the signs of  Marshallian own  -and cross-price elasticities 
and  the  assumption  that  Marshallian  own-price  elasticities  cxceed  (i n 
absolute \'alue) Marshallian cross-price elasticities.  Sometimes it will  be 
necessary to make assumptions ahout the relati\'e sizes of  dcm~lnd and 
supplyelasticities. 
To demonstrate, consider applying Cramcr's rule to matrix equation 
(6)  assuming W  increases  (d  In  VV  is  positi\'e)  while  other cxogenous 
\'ariables remain constant (d In  X, d In Y and d In  Z  = 0).  It can be easily 
\'erified  th~lt the solution to d  In  PI  is  unambiguously positi\'e assuming 
11 1"  is  positi\'e, but the sign of din Q 1 will be amhiguous unless assump-
tions are made ~lbout the relative sizes of  demand and supply elasticities. 
Equilihrium displacement modelling can also be used to make quanti-
tativc  predictions  about  the  impacts  of finite  changes  in  exogenous 
variables in  the manner demonstrated in  this appendix.  Because it is  a 
procedure based on differential calculus, the degree of accuracy of the 
predictions  is  inversely  related  to the  size  of the  exogenous  changes 
being considered.  Research by Alston and Wohlgenant (1990) suggests 
that  the  predictions  will  be  quite  accurate  for  changes  in  exogenous 
variables of 10% or less.  If the underlying functional forms are indeed 
linear then the procedure is  exact provided percentage changes in any 
exogenous variable x are measured as  (XI - xo)/xo where the subscripts 0 
and 1 indicate initial and new values, respectively.  If  percentage changes 
are measured as d In x (= In  XI  - In xo) then the procedure will be exact for 
functional forms that are linear in logs (B. Hurd, pers. comm., 1992). 
The  authors  believe  that,  given  the  severity of problems  normally 
encountered in estimating structural econometric models in developing 
countries,  equilibrium  displacement  modelling  provides  a  convenient 
alternative which is  economical (relative to econometric modelling) in 
terms of  research resources.  While it provides only approximations, the 
same is  true for econometric modelling.  For example, one never knows 
'true' functional  forms to use in an econometric model, although one 
can choose those which appear most appropriate based on any a priori 
information available  and statistical  tests.  The procedures outlined in 
180 this  ~lppcndix  pro\'idc  tirst order  approximations  till"  an\'  undcrl\'ing 
functional ti)rm. 
Becausc elJuilihrium displacement modelling is  a fimn of  comparati\·e 
statics, it un be criticiscd on the grounds that adjustment paths ti"om one 
eLJuilibrium to  ~\11othLT arc ignored.  Ofcoursc st,nic economctric models 
also suffer this criticism.  Thc criticism could be m·ercome to somc extent 
lw  repeated  ~lpplications of cLJuilibrium  displaccmcnt modelling  uSll1g 
Marshallian ebsticities corresponding to ditklTI1t lengths of run. 
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o  000 0  0  000 0  0  0  ~ ~ 0 
o  0  0  0  COO  0  0  0  0  ~ COO 
o  000 000 0  C  0  ~ 000 0 
o  0  0  0  coo C  ~ ~ 0  0  0  0  0 
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0000""0000000000 
o  0  0  ......  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  000 0 
00 ......  000000000000 
0  ......  0000000000000 
......  00000000000000 
182 cl  In DI  'Ylll  0  1112  111,  11 Ir,  III x  11"  0 
cl  In SI  0  Ell  E'2  El,  Elh  0  0  f  1'1 
cl  In D2  1121  0  'Yl22  lh;  112 (,  lh,  lh  0 
cl  In S2  0  E21  E  22  E  23  E  26  0  0  f ]l) 
cl  In D3  'Yl31  0  11,'2  lh;  11",  11,x  lh  0 
cl  In S3  0  E31  E  ,2  E"  E,(,  0  0  f.N 
cl  In ~  'Yl41  0  11,)2  1143  11,)6  114x  l1.h  0 
cl  In Q5  0  E41  E  .)2  En  f.)(,  0  0  t-ll) 
cl  In D6  'Yl SI  0  1102  11-, 
:"1:'1  110"  11"  11"  0 
cl  In S6  0  ESI  E ;;2  E;;:\  £;;6  ()  0  E  :;(,j 
cl  In Q7  'Yl61  0  1162  11",  11""  11",  11,,,  0 
cl  In Ds  0  E61  Ell]  E  fl~  £66  0  0  C(}l) 
cl  In P4  'Yl71  0  11-2  11-,  1l,6  11"  11 7,  0 
cl  In p_  O  E71  E  -2  E  _.,  E  7()  0  0  E"'l)  , 
cl  In P7  'YlSI  0  l1x2  11"  11",  11~x  lh,·  0 
Figure 2.  Figure 3. Matrix T(l5 x 8) of  equation (13). 
Matrix S(I5 x 1) 
co  of  equation (13).  w ~ 
co  .,. 
cl  In PI < 
cl  In PIp 
cl  In P2 
cl  In P3 
cl  In P6 
cl  In Ps 
cl  In Y 
cl  In P9 
Figure 4. 
Matrix U(8 x 1) 




[I/(d In P,)  l/(d In P,,)  I/(d In P,)  I/(d In P,) l/(d In P,)  I/(d In P,)  I/(d In Y) l/(d In P j 
Figure 5.  Matrix V( 1 x 8). 
\' N  ~ M  N  ~ N  NOM  0  N  0  ~ ~ ~ 
000 0  ~ 0  0  000 0  0  N  N  0 
000000000000000 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
M  ~ N  N  ~ 0  N  000 N  N  N  0  ~ 
000000000  ~ ~ 0  0  0  0 
9 0 9 0 9 0 9  0  ~ 9  9 0 9  0  9 
N  N  N  N  N  0  0  0  NOM  0  ~ 0  N  o  0  0  0  0  0  ~ MOO  0  0  0  0  0 
000000000000000 












o  0  0  0  0  0  0  000 ~ 0  0  0  0 
000000000000000 
000000000000000 
o  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  ~  ~ 0  0  0  0  0 
000000000000000 
000000000000000 















6  ~ 0  6  6  6  6  6  666 0  0  6  6 
000000000000000 
000000000000000 













1.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.02087 
)< 
-0.02087 
0.00000  1.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  -0.02037  0.02037 
0.00000  0.00000  1.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.02093  -0.02093 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  1.00000  0.00000  0.00000  -0.02072  0.02072 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  1.00000  0.00000  0.02364  -0.02364 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  1.00000  -0.00041  0.00041 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.30021  0.69979 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00589  -0.0589 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.03220  -0.0322 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  -0.00029  0.00029 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00515  -0.00515 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.02037  - 0.02037 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  1.00071  -1.00071 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.01474  -0.01474 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.02060  - 0.02060 
(cols 9- 15 next table) 
Figure 7(a).  Columns 1- 8 of Matrix E-! (15 xIS). 0.02233  -0.02233  0.00000  0.00000  0.04217  -0.04217  0.00000 
-0.00774  0.00774  0.00000  0.00000  -0.02128  0.02128  0.00000 
0.01547  - 0.01547  0.00000  0.00000  0.06177  -0.06177  0.00000 
-0.01518  0.01518  0.00000  0.00000  - 0.04174  0.04174  0.00000 
0.04010  -0.04010  0.00000  0.00000  0.28335  -0.28335  0.00000 
-0.00058  0.00058  0.00000  0.00000  -0.04005  0.04005  0.00000 
0.00446  -0.00446  0.00000  0.00000  0.01228  -0.01228  0.00000 
0.28605  0.71395  0.00000  0.00000  0.01740  -0.01740  0.00000 
0.08684  -0.08684  1.00000  0.00000  0.04650  -0.04650  0.00000 
- 0.01430  0.01430  0.00000  1.00000  -0.00087  0.00087  0.00000 
0.00723  -0.00723  0.00000  0.00000  0.50064  0.49936  0.00000 
0.00774  -0.00774  0.00000  0.00000  0.02128  -0.02128  1.00000 
0.01488  -0.01488  0.00000  0.00000  0.04092  -0.04092  0.00000 
0.71512  -0.71512  0.00000  0.00000  0.04350  -0.04350  0.00000 
0.02890  -0.02890  O.OOO()()  ().OO()()O  2.00256  -2.00256  0.00000 
Figure 7(b).  Columns 9-15 of  J\1J.trix  E l (15  x 15). 
CD 






-0.60  0.00  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.36  0.00 
0.00  0.30  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.15 
0.34  0.00  -0.80  0.28  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.00 
0.00  -0.12  0.50  - 0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.20 
0.10  0.00  0.15  - 0.55  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.00 
0.00  -0.08  -0.01  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.05 
0.04  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.50  0.00 
0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.15 
0.05  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.02  0.65  0.00 
0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.10 
0.08  0.00  0.04  0.04  -0.90  0.03  0.50  0.00 
0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.00  -0.15 
0.01  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.05 
0.12  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.02  -0.80  0.55  0.00 
Figure 8. Numerical form of matrix D( 15 x 8). ~ 
OJ 
<.0 
Endogenous  Exogenous 
variable  variable 
PlC  P  P2  p,  P6  P  Y  ] P  ,  8 
D]  -0.59763  0.00106  0.04535  0.03659  0.03394  0.04129  0.38537 
5]  -0.00141  0.29930  - 0.05285  - 0.01335  - 0.02196  -0.00077  -0.01543 
D2  0.34223  0.00119  -0.79376  0.28860  0.03331  0.04135  0.03113 
52  -0.00201  -0.12098  0.49519  -0.02618  - 0.02307  - 0.00114  -0.02064 
D3  0.10578  0.00371  0.17359  - 0.51352  0.04859  0.02411  0.05072 
53  -0.00045  -0.08041  -0.01286  0.19516  - 0.00049  - 0.00042  - 0.00098 
Q4  0.01235  - 0.01383  -0.00682  0.00770  0.01267  0.00622  0.15313 
Qs  0.01471  - 0.00685  0.00148  0.01651  0.01474  0.00601  0.18905 
D6  0.08609  0.00198  0.05062  0.05057  -0.88783  0.03285  0.57301 
56  - 0.00074  - 0.02016  - 0.02107  -0:00083  0.39826  -0.00030  -0.00945 
Q7  0.00557  -0.00482  0.01576  0.04054  0.00608  0.00525  0.01288 
Ds  0.12141  0.00070  0.04285  0.0]335  0.02196  -0.79923  0.56543 
P4  0.04118  0.02057  0.04393  0.02567  0.04222  0.02072  0.51043 
p- 0.03678  0.00788  0.05369  0.04127  0.08684  0.01503  0.47263  , 
p 
7  0.02229  0.02073  0.14303  0.24216  0.02432  0.02102  0.04911 
Figure 9. General equilibrium e1asticities of Matrix G (15  x 8) for the Indonesian Food Model. 
P  9 
0.00747 
-0.15489 
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0.01584 
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